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Abstract  
 
 
This thesis is an inquiry into the challenges to the role of civic organisations in political 
reform during and after political transitions. The major question this research addresses is: How 
do institutions and institutional dynamics constrain political reform during a transition? The thesis 
examines how demands for reform by non-governmental organisations in Lebanon and Libya were 
not translated into concrete political decisions taken by regimes during a transition period. The 
thesis suggests that the combination of weak states and power-sharing agreements marginalizes 
civic organisations, and poses institutional constraints on the likelihood of reform.  
 
The thesis is based on contemporary research on events and reform trajectories in Lebanon 
and Libya, with a focus on the demands and strategies employed by activists during periods of 
transition. Lebanon between 2005 and 2010 and Libya between 2011 and 2013 underwent critical 
political events but subsequently did not adopt political reforms despite demands by civic 
organisations in two main areas: the electoral system in Lebanon and the constitutional process in 
Libya. A study of these two reform campaigns reveals deeply entrenched historical patterns and 
elements of continuity that led to path dependent outcomes during transition. By utilising theory 
and concepts from the perspective of historical institutionalism, the thesis identifies the factors 
behind path dependent outcomes in Lebanon and Libya. 
 
I argue that the transitions in Lebanon and Libya were a result of only ‘partially’ critical 
junctures. The thesis builds on the approach of path dependence by offering insights as to how 
historically inherited institutional dynamics from the previous regime can cause junctures to be 
only ‘partially’ critical for the broader political order. The main source of data comes from 
participant observations, interviews and focus groups with two organisations that tried to advance 
electoral reform and constitutional development.  
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Chapter One - Introduction and Key Questions 
 
“The complete realist, unconditionally accepting the causal sequence of events, deprives himself of the 
possibility of changing reality. The complete utopian, by rejecting the causal sequence, deprives himself 
of the possibility of understanding either the reality which he is seeking to change or the process by which 
it can be changed. The characteristic vice of the utopian is naivety; of the realist, sterility.” 
E. H. Carr 
 
1.1 Research Question and Purpose 
Lebanon between 2005 and 2010 and Libya between 2011 and 2013 underwent critical 
political events but subsequently did not undergo political reform in two key areas: electoral 
system and constitutional order. Instead, similar features of a centralised state system, sectarian or 
tribal forces, and weak responsiveness to civil society on the part of the state prevailed, indeed 
continued from the time before each of these critical events. The events described here as mass 
uprisings did contribute to an opening up of the public sphere and an increase in public 
participation, but not to reforms that could affect the broader political order.  
This thesis is about political reform in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The 
major question it addresses is: How do institutions and institutional dynamics constrain political 
reform during a transition? The question was inspired from the disappointments I felt as an activist 
in Lebanon for many years which later resounded with Libyan activists I met during Libya’s 
transition. I examine transition as an event accompanied by changes in the regime, such as mass 
citizen mobilisation, and social upheaval. Transition here is seen as a temporal incident used to 
distinguish a historically significant moment that marked a break in past practices; transition is not 
used as a normative prediction of change in a predetermined direction.1 In studying the constraints 
on political reform in the MENA region two key questions arise: What institutional characteristics 
make political reform challenging in Lebanon and Libya? Why are the demands of civil society 
actors unable to influence political reform in both countries? In addressing these questions, I will 
explore those elements of continuity that create path dependence and pose a constraint on the 
reform process (and outcomes) in the areas of elections and constitutional development. 
                                                          
1 I am not referring to teleological descriptions of the school of transitology as advanced by Philippe 
Schmitter and Javier Santiso, “Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy,” 
International Journal of Political Science Review 19, no. 1 (1998): 69-92 or in Larry Diamond, “Thinking 
about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 21-35. 
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The objective of this first chapter is to explain the main questions surrounding this research. 
It is comprised of four parts. Initially the chapter will present the context that the questions are 
based in. Next, the chapter introduces the two countries to be studied, highlighting some 
distinctions and similarities that will be explored. The third section presents key concepts that 
make up the theoretical framework. I will then present the hypothesis and conclude this chapter 
with an overview of the methodology and conceptual approaches. The main purpose of this thesis 
is to answer the above questions by proposing a framework for studying the challenges hindering 
reform during political transitions in the MENA region. This framework is on the literature on 
historical institutionalism and path dependence in comparative politics. The framework explicates 
the limitations on reform and shows how events that might have been ‘critical junctures’2 in the 
political order failed to result in critical change because of particular institutional constraints. This 
framework brings together two streams of related but distinct explanations of transition that are 
salient in political studies concerning the MENA region. The first involves the question of 
interpreting transition in the region and the second addresses the question of the direction of this 
transition.  
I posit that my framework of political reform can broaden this debate by showing the ways 
in which history matters and what path dependent explanations we can attribute to the challenges 
of reform during transition. In this way, we can explain how transition results only in partial 
changes to the political order due to constraints on the reform process. By utilising qualitative 
research and content analysis pertaining to two case studies this thesis is theory-generating. Case 
studies are a valuable tool for generating theory in comparative politics as they allow for analysis 
of macro-political phenomena.3 Case studies also help us to move away from generalising 
paradigms and explanations regarding the MENA region and bring out the intricacies and unique 
elements of each of the countries within the region. Here, I build on the existing interpretations 
and models of the path dependence model4 to explain the shortcomings of the reform process in 
                                                          
2 Critical junctures are described by Giovanni Cappochia and Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical 
Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, no. 3, 
(2007): 341-369 as “relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened 
probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest.”  
3 Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Case Study Method. Roger Gomm et al. 
eds, (California: SAGE Publications, 2000). 
4 James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society 29, no. 4 (2000): 507-
548. 
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both Lebanon and Libya and to further the debate by adding new elements to the typology of path 
dependent explanations. I selected cases from which particular elements of continuity (from a pre 
and post juncture) emerge as constraints emanating from the role of institutions and the actors 
concerned with political reform. Although there is a selection bias, as both countries exhibit 
challenges to reform, the added value of this work is in deepening our understanding of these 
challenges, understanding that could be applied to the study of other countries.  
The elements of continuity in my study constitute the independent variables and reform is 
the dependent variable. Elements of continuity create a condition under which institutional 
mechanisms make political reform very difficult. A study of the institutional characteristics and 
mechanisms reveals how and why political leaders did not adopt political reform during transition. 
Reform is therefore more likely when there are less elements of continuity, and vice versa, the 
presence of elements of continuity tends to limit reform. Fewer elements of continuity would 
therefore, in theory, indicate a higher probability of a fully critical, as opposed to only a partially 
critical, juncture. This work’s innovative contribution to knowledge is three-fold: Firstly, the 
illustration of path dependence in the MENA region and the advancement of explanations of path 
dependence. Secondly, I will show empirical evidence of the ineffectiveness of civil society 
organisations in political reform during transition. The third contribution is the conceptualising of 
political reform by examining the relations between institutions and civil society actors. The 
central argument around partially critical junctures is explored by assessing the ways in which 
civil society activism changed, but remained ineffective, in influencing political reform.  
This area of research remains under-studied and under-theorised in the MENA region and 
overshadowed by normative accounts of transition and democratisation particularly after the 
uprisings dubbed as the ‘Arab Spring.’5 There is little known about how institutions reinforce path 
dependence in the way state institutions address demands for reform. My model depicts constraints 
stemming from the historical features of state institutions that do not encourage political leaders 
to adopt reform during transition. In the specific cases presented, the political leadership does not 
appear to have an interest in, or capacity to, carry out the proposed reforms of civil society actors. 
There are few, if any, studies that provide a theoretical framework for political reform in the 
                                                          
5 See for instance Olivier Roy, “The Transformation of the Arab World,” Journal of Democracy 23, no. 3 
(2012): 5-18.  
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MENA region backed up by contemporary empirical evidence. At the time of writing there is also 
no account comparing Lebanon and Libya in a way that furthers understanding of the constraints 
during a transition. By studying the challenges to these reform processes we are better able to 
answer why political transition may not bring about political change. We are then also able to 
understand this as a specific form of path dependence, explained in terms of identifiable elements 
of continuity that the cases of Lebanon and Libya exhibit. These elements are referred to later as 
the intricacies of Lebanon’s power-sharing sectarian system and of Libya’s stateless society.  
I argue that the reasons that political transition and mass uprisings in Lebanon and Libya 
were not accompanied by a change in the political order are found in the institutional make-up of 
these polities. Political order here is defined as the overall system governing citizen-state relations, 
political representation and political processes. The persistence of a specific form of political order, 
I will show, is due to both countries exhibiting path dependent outcomes that constrain political 
reform and limit the potential for change. In both countries, political institutions could not 
overcome historical traditions of a generally weak state system, which limited the agency 
preferences of the political actors who rose to power during transition and in turn marginalised the 
role for civil society to play. As the cases will show, political actors preferred to avoid institutional 
and political reform in order to bring back historical features that prevailed before the critical 
juncture. For Lebanon, this is evident in the tradition of sectarian power-sharing that constrains 
the potential for electoral reform; a tradition that sectarian leaders reinforced after the critical 
juncture. In Libya, this is found in the legacy of statelessness that Gadhafi left behind which 
constrains the process of the development of a new constitution, a legacy that the transitional 
period reinforced at the expense of political reform. I trace the institutional developments that took 
place after the colonial periods of both countries (1940s for Lebanon and 1950s for Libya) and 
focus more specifically on the dynamics after Lebanon’s partially critical juncture of 2005 and 
Libya’s partially critically juncture of 2011.  
The paradigm of path dependency can be used to reveal underlying endogenous political 
dynamics in the fields of comparative politics and international relations. While not dismissive of 
exogenous factors and varying regional and international forces in both cases studies, the thrust of 
this thesis lies in delineating internal constraints on reform. The endogenous approach is preferred 
for the MENA region both because of its novelty and its potential use as a tool in theory and 
practice. In other words, the approach gives scholars something new to consider that is country-
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specific and it gives development practitioners something new to focus on. The endogenous factors 
here are explained both in terms of path dependent mechanisms and path dependent outcomes that 
persisted after a specific critical juncture. This is why I refer to these instances of mass uprisings 
as having been only ‘partially’ critical. Path dependence then is a factor of endogenous dynamics, 
mechanisms and practices that appear to be halting political reform in both Lebanon and Libya.  
The framework of political reform in this thesis theorizes the ways in which historical 
institutional arrangements reinforce political choices that maintain elements of continuity from 
pre-transition and post-transition. Political reform is described in this thesis as any attempt aimed 
at enhancing the effectiveness and the functionality of political institutions viewed from a 
structuralist perspective.6 I show how new options for reform are settled using old methods of 
decision-making. In the long-run, such methods create perpetual cycles of corruption, violence and 
oppression that are familiar to both Lebanon and Libya.  
Both countries are examples of weak states7 with a history of varying levels of 
authoritarianism, centralisation of power, and marginalisation of civil society. The selection of 
these two cases is meant to encourage future research on cases and countries that exhibit similar 
characteristics; such research can feed into explaining why mass uprisings do not lead into 
meaningful political change. For the purpose of this thesis, the comparison is geared towards 
generating a theory of political reform that explores the dynamics and influence of path 
dependence on political order in the MENA region. The use of path dependent arguments and 
historical analysis is not entirely new to the region. In Lebanon, path dependence was proposed by 
Kingston as a driver behind the reproduction of sectarianism and the cause of various constrains 
placed upon the advocacy efforts of civil society.8 In Syria, Hinnebusch brings back the discussion 
of historical features and path dependency in his analysis of the uprising.9 Allen examines the 
                                                          
6 The structualist explanations of reform are probabilistic and not deterministic, leaving room for agency 
and contingency while attributing outcomes of reform to more structural political and institutional 
constraints.  
7 According to Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States; State-society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), weak states are those that 
result from the fragmentation of social control and the heterogeneity of rule-making in society. They are 
essentially states overridden by strong but fragmented social non-state institutions.  
8 Paul Kingston, Reproducing Sectarianism: Advocacy Networks and the Politics of Civil Society in Post-
War Lebanon, (New York, Albany: SUNY Press 2013).  
9 Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “Documenting the Roots and Dynamics of the Syrian Uprising,” The Middle 
East Journal 67, no. 3 (2013): 467-474.  
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hypothesis that due to path dependence externally imposed state-building fails or succeeds due to 
institutional factors, “the recognition of institution-related variables enabled through the path 
dependence lens can increase the extent to which nation-building success can be predicted under 
these circumstances…”10 Throughout this thesis, path dependence is the approach used to explain 
persistent institutional characteristics that continued after an important historical moment was 
captured in a mass uprising. This approach will explain how intricacies in the states of Lebanon 
and Libya challenged the possibility of political reform during transition.  
The main argument I make is that challenges to reform are a symptom of three major 
elements of continuity in Lebanon and Libya, which are: weak states, power-sharing agreements, 
and an ineffective civil society.11 This thesis does not argue for direct causality, nor do I contend 
that historical events necessarily dictate a particular outcome. Instead, my main contention is that 
we must deconstruct the ways that political reform is perceived by searching for the institutional 
elements and dynamics that constrain such reform. When these constraining elements have their 
roots in history and in institutions they can be seen as path dependent outcomes. Reform is defined 
as any political, policy or procedural change aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the political 
order. It is not based on the uni-linear assumptions of modernisation or development but merely 
intended to identify an effort undertaken by political actors to change the political order wholly or 
partially. For instance, demands for proportional representation are an attempt at reforming the 
electoral system. And similarly demands for citizen participation are attempts are reforming the 
constitutional process.  
My perspective is in line with Pierson’s assertion that path dependency arguments can 
“provide an important caution against a too easy conclusion of the inevitability, “naturalness”, or 
functionality of observed outcomes.”12 The approach helps scholars to avoid looking at political 
outcomes in Lebanon and Libya as ‘naturally’ non-democratic or providing explanations of how 
conflict is inevitable in these societies. Instead, my concern is with understanding why political 
institutions are unable to engage citizens in the constitutional process in Libya and why political 
                                                          
10 Daniel Allen, “New Directions in the Study of Nation-Building: Views through the Lens of Path 
Dependence,” International Studies Review 12, no. 3 (2010): 414. 
11 I explain the elements of continuity in terms of the level of openness to adopting and implementing 
reform, depicted in terms of the degree to which power is centralised, power-sharing is communal, and civil 
society is marginalised. These three factors are explained further in Chapter Two. 
12 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics,” The American Political 
Science Review 94, no. 2 (2002): 251-267, at p. 252. 
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leaders are unwilling to reform the electoral system in Lebanon. This makes theories about political 
change or reform become deeply rooted in the local context and local actors concerned with this 
reform, rather than situating political change in an external set of expectations or predictions about 
the future. In understanding the obstacles to reform, the thesis fills a gap in the literature around 
weak states, power-sharing and civil society in the Arab world by providing analysis around 
political elements that contribute to a deadlock in the reform process during transition.  
Political reform is embedded in a set of institutions and actors that presumably have a role 
in promoting and executing this reform. Such reform is therefore susceptible to the degree of 
institutional readiness and to agency preferences that can support or constrain it. In this sense, 
reform can be viewed as a decision-making process taking place both within and among 
institutions. Agency preferences can bring about the political will and political support for reform, 
while institutions signify the capacity to implement a reform. Institutions, formal and informal, 
create the framework, norms and standards of behaviour that allow for or that limit change. In this 
thesis the decision-making regarding reform is largely perceived through Simon’s ‘Bounded 
Rationality’ explanation which posits that human beings have limited information, limited capacity 
to process information, and tend to satisfy rather than to maximise.13 Within this viewpoint 
political reform tends not to be drastic but incremental as Lindblom would call it, a process of 
‘muddling through.’14 The constraints on the decision making process further indicate that 
junctures, under the conditions present in Lebanon and Libya, have only been partially critical.   
For the two case studies in this research even the possibility of incremental change is 
questionable because there are patterns reproducing the institutions that strongly constrain even 
incremental change. This thesis will review these patterns or reproduction by identifying the ways 
in which civil society and regime preferences diverge on issues of reform during transition. In both 
country junctures, civil society’s preferences were in favour of reforms but the political and 
institutional response to their demands limited civil society’s influence within the process. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the relevant institutions are state and political institutions and the relevant 
actors are political decision-makers and civil society activists. The main assertion in this analysis 
is that the options available to decision-makers about reform remain highly path dependent in the 
                                                          
13 Herbert Alexander Simon, Reason in Human Affairs (California: Stanford University Press, 1983), 3-35. 
14 Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through,” Public Administration Review 19, no. 2 
(1959): 79-88.  
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cases of Lebanon and Libya and as such limit the potential for critical moments to be turned into 
effective critical junctures. This means that any reform that favours a new type of representation 
or relations between citizen and state has dismal chances of success because institutions have 
deeply rooted practices that have become difficult, if not impossible, to change. 
The findings from my two case studies would also be of interest to scholars in the fields of 
democratisation and political transitions. While this thesis is not concerned directly with 
categorising a reform as democratic or non-democratic, its underlying premises can be used to 
describe why Lebanon and Libya exhibit more undemocratic than democratic features. I mean here 
by democratic features those that Schmitter and Karl defined as procedures of free and fair 
representation, open participation of citizens, and accountability in the public realm.15 But the 
prediction of tendencies for democratic or non-democratic features is beyond the scope of this 
work. I am more interested in showing the limitations of two key reforms that were constrained in 
the cases of Lebanon and Libya and proposing that the reasons for this evasion are found in 
elements of continuity in the institutions concerned with the reform process. More specifically, I 
employ the functionalist approach16 to arrive at an explanation of how political institutions are not 
serving political reform but hindering transition towards a more effective political order in 
Lebanon and Libya. The perspective of functionalism answers the questions of how institutions 
emerge and why they are sustained in terms of the functions they perform.17 For Lebanon and 
Libya, the functionalist approach helps in clarifying the specific effect of the absence of crucial 
political reform in both countries. It helps answer the main questions in this thesis, about how and 
why civil society has been ineffective in light of how institutions continued to function after a 
critical juncture, providing evidence of the only partial criticality of that juncture.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Phillipe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is…And Is Not.” Journal of Democracy 2, 
no. 3 (1991): 114-120.  
16 See for instance, John Harsanyi, “Rational-choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and 
Conformist Theories,” World Politics 21, (1969): 513-538.  
17 See for instance John Zysman, How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1994), 244. 
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1.2 Why Lebanon and Libya? 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the reasons for, and theorize about the failure 
of, reform and the challenges it faces. The approach of path dependence coalesces well with the 
case studies of Lebanon and Libya, which both exhibit weak state institutions in the face of strong 
non-state actors which dominate the reform process. The case studies will be able to advance a 
broader understanding of the MENA region that has strategic importance for academics and 
practitioners in the fields of politics and international relations. Lebanon and Libya can be treated 
as examples of a more general pattern in the region, where instability, facets of authoritarianism, 
and social fragmentation continue to be persistent. They are also cases exhibiting partial signs of 
political change that can deeply further our understanding of tensions between tribal or sectarian 
forces and the processes of state building. Research of the Lebanon case preceded research into 
the Libyan case. From the Lebanon case, the variables of weak state, power-sharing and ineffective 
civil society emerged which later resonated with the case of Libya after the fall of Gadhafi’s 
regime.  
The countries are distinct yet comparable. Both countries share in common the presence of 
minority groups with sub-national identities that make up Lebanon and Libya’s demographics. 
Sect in Lebanon constitutes the major religious group that requires representation in the political 
order. Lebanon has not undergone a census since the 1930s but estimates of sectarian communities 
point to the presence of: Muslims who are divided between Sunnis and Shiites. Sunnis make up 
the largest religious group, accounting for 27% of the Lebanese populous.18 Shias also make up 
27% of the population, which makes the Muslim population greater than 50%, without considering 
the Druze population.19 The Druze account for 5.6%20 of the citizens of Lebanon, making them a 
sizable minority.  Christians, the other half of the sectarian community in Lebanon, consist of 
various denominations with different political affiliations. Maronites, the largest of the Christian 
communities, encompass 21% of the Lebanese population.21  Greek Orthodox make up the next 
largest number of Christians in the Lebanese population, with current estimates putting them as 
                                                          
18 United States of America Department of State, “Report on International Religious Freedom: Lebanon,” 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2012/nea/208400.htm (accessed 10 October 2014).  
19 “Report on International Religious Freedom: Lebanon.”  
20 CIA World Facebook. “The World Factbook: Lebanon,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/le.html (accessed 5 October 2014). 
21 “The World Factbook: Lebanon.”  
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9%22 of the Lebanese public.23 The remaining population consists of various Christian groups, 
including a significant Armenian population.  
The Libyan demographics show sizable minority groups that comprise of tribes and ethnic 
minorities. Libya has a diverse population of Arab and Berbers (or Amazigh) which encompass 
97% of the total population. It is estimated that the Amazigh constitute 236,000 to 590,000 people 
in Libya (4-10% of the overall population. Libya’s society is also highly tribal. Libya contains 
over 100 tribes, with 30 powerful and substantial ones.  The Gadhafa tribe (Gaddafi’s tribe) is 
small and not as significant as other major tribes in the state. Libya’s largest tribe is the Warfalla, 
(population of nearly 1,000,000) who have historically disapproved of Gaddafi’s regime.24 The 
Magarha are the second largest tribe in Libya, followed by the Zuwayyah tribe is mostly rural and 
controls great swaths of oil-rich land.25 Other significant tribes from the east include the Misrata, 
who are considered the largest tribe in east Libya. In both Lebanon and Libya, minorities or sects, 
tribes and ethnic groups have provided the mechanisms for political participation and provided 
political leadership that was important in the historical junctures of state formation, revolution and 
political development. 
The cases of Lebanon and Libya are significant geographically; one is in the Middle East 
(Lebanon) and the other in North Africa (Libya). The cases are also significant theoretically as 
Libya was historically authoritarian or autocratic and Lebanon is considered more of a 
consociational parliamentary democracy. The differences in these types of political systems make 
the comparison all the more insightful to students and researchers with an interest in the MENA 
region. The differences also further the application and expansion of path dependency to two 
comparable but distinct contexts. For instance, the type of communal power-sharing order in 
Lebanon is based on sectarian representation and has been solidified for more than five decades. 
Whereas in Libya, at the time of writing a new power-sharing agreement is still emerging and is 
comprised of tribal and military representatives who have chosen to isolate former pro-Gadhafi 
                                                          
22 “Report on International Religious Freedom: Lebanon.”  
23 Ibid.  
24 Apps, Peter. “Factbox: Libya’s tribal, cultural divisions.” Reuters, August 25, 2011 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/25/us-libya-tribes-idUSTRE77O43R20110825 (accessed 3 
October 2014). 
25 Ibid.  
 20 
 
supporters and is still less solid as that of Lebanon. Civil society organisations are ineffective in 
both contexts however as will be assessed in the case studies in Chapters Four and Six.  
The study of Libya examines the process of constitutional development between 2011 and 
2013 by assessing the experience of the Forum for Democratic Libya (FDL) in leading 
constitutional dialogues across the country (2011 – 2013). FDL was established in 2011 by Libyan 
activists, intellectuals and members of the diaspora. It was funded privately by its founding 
members at first and then obtained funding from the United Nations Development Program to 
continue its activities across Libya. FDL’s main focus in those two years was on constitutional 
dialogue and citizen participation in that process. The constitutional development case study is 
relevant to this thesis because constitutions are a key part of the legal framework in organising the 
relations between citizens and state, representing citizens, and appeasing political tensions. 
Constitutional development also requires dialogue and consensus, which are both key variables 
inhibiting the process in Libya thus far.  
The study of Lebanon examines electoral reform efforts between 2006 and 2010 by 
assessing the experience of the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) and the 
Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform (2005 – 2009), two key civil society organisations. LADE 
was established in 1996 in Lebanon but was only overtly operational after 2005. It was also 
privately funded at its start and then received funding from United Nations agencies, European 
Union and American donors to expand its activities that focused on electoral reform across 
Lebanon. The failure of reforming the electoral system is relevant to this thesis because elections 
are a key framework in organising relations between citizens and state, representing citizens, and 
appeasing political tensions. Also, both cases exhibit high levels of activism by civil society, and 
non-governmental organisations more specifically, that had an articulated set of demands from 
both the electoral and constitutional processes that were not adopted by political institutions.  
The selected civil society organisations are important for my research questions in three 
ways. Both these organisations emerged after a critical juncture. They benefited from a window of 
opportunity created during the uprisings in Lebanon in 2005 and in Libya in 2011 and where able 
to mobilize citizens and articulate demands for political reforms. Both organisations successfully 
engaged thousands of people in their lobbying activities, demanding reform from politicians. Both 
of them were partially successful in pushing for political institutions to formally recognise and 
address their demands. But the organisations also fell short of generating sufficient pressure for 
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reform to be adopted. Both FDL and LADE sought to create platforms that were cross-sectarian, 
cross-regional and cross-ethnic. The organisations’ activities are also examples of political action 
that was non-partisan and show how movements or organisations that are not part of historically 
powerful institutions are less effective during political transitions.  
The Libyan case is a quandary for the path dependence approach. It remains to be seen 
whether Libya will develop a new and more open path for its new constitutional process or whether 
it will revert back to a more centralised and less inclusive process similar to the one it had in the 
past. Lebanon having held frequent elections since 1943 is also a quandary for the path dependence 
approach and for a theory of failed political reform. Both the cases of the Lebanese elections and 
the Libyan constitution should be given close examination for their ramifications for path 
dependence and reform failure, especially as the two issues are still relevant to the future political 
orders of these countries at the time of writing.  
 
1.3 Definitions and Key Concepts  
This section defines five key concepts that are relevant to the proposed framework on 
political reform. These concepts are historical institutionalism, path dependence, critical junctures, 
agency, and political transition. The concepts are particularly significant to this research as they 
create the building blocks for the next section presenting the framework for political reform in the 
cases of Lebanon and Libya.  
 
Historical Institutionalism  
Historical Institutionalism is a paradigm for studying political evolution that focuses on the 
institutions that produce and reproduce certain decisions, norms, and political outcomes. The 
paradigm is based on the assumption that institutions carry significant historical features that 
articulate the interests and values of certain groups. Historical Institutionalism is an addition to the 
literature on ‘new institutionalism’ and historical sociology which emerged in the 1990s and was 
created by scholars who tried to interpret the role and impact of institutions on change and human 
behaviour.26 The paradigm of “historical institutionalism” does not describe a single theory or 
                                                          
26 The “new institutionalism” framework was restated in 1990 and with the principal claim that once formal 
and informal arrangements were institutionalised in a modern polity, they assumed became difficult to alter. 
See for instance John G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in 
Political Life,” The American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984): 734-749.  
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body of literature, as Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol explain.27 Instead, it encompasses a school 
of thought captured by a wide range of authors who believe that “history matters” and who attempt 
to show how it relates to specific situations and events. Some of the commonalities among these 
authors is that they study how institutions evolve and analyse the combined effects of institutions 
and the processes that led to their evolution.28 In historical institutionalism, the concepts of “self-
reinforcing mechanisms” and “high switching costs” have been used to better understand the 
persistence and resilience of certain institutional and political arrangements. In this sense, path 
dependence in the political sciences is similar to the concept of increasing returns in economics, 
as favoured by Arthur.29 One of the core claims of historical institutionalism is that institutions do 
more than channel policy and structure political conflict; the definition of interests and objectives 
is created in institutional contexts and is not separable from them.30 
Within comparative politics, this approach has been labelled as ‘new institutionalism’ and 
is associated with comparative political economists such as Katheleen Anne Thelen, Frank 
Longstreth, Sven Steinmo, Peter Hall, Rosemary Taylor and Theda Skopcol. According to Thelen, 
Longstreth and Steinmo, historical institutionalism is an attempt to illuminate how political 
struggles are mediated by the institutional setting in which they take place.31 Institutions, according 
to Hall’s widely cited definition, include formal rules, compliance procedures and standard 
operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals and various units of the 
polity and economy.32 Any political process or arrangement therefore can fall into the category of 
institutions whether it is formally state-controlled and structured or whether it is loosely structured 
non-state organised. 
Historical institutionalism also focuses on the relational nature of institutions and how they 
interact with each other. As Immergut asserts, more important than the formal characteristics of 
                                                          
27 Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,” 
in Political science: The state of the discipline. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds., Political Science: 
the state of the discipline (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 693.  
28 Pierson and Skocpol, “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,” 695.  
29 W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1994). 
 30 Zysman, How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth, 244. 
31 Thelen, Kathleen Anne, Frank Longstreth and Sven Steinmo, Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (London: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
32 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political 
Studies 44, no. 5 (1996): 935-957. 
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either state or social institutions per se is how a given institutional configuration shapes political 
interactions.33 It is therefore useful to apply this in the analysis of relations between civil society 
and the state or between citizens and a political process such as elections. The historical 
institutionalism perspective also helps reveal how institutions responded to demands for reform by 
activists during the transitions in Lebanon and Libya. Because of its emphasis on institutions as a 
constraint on political decision making, the historical institutionalist approach will be useful in 
explaining why reform did not take place after an uprising.  
The historical institutionalists’ point of departure is to look at institutions and study how 
they are affecting political behaviour and political outcomes. The context of decision-making for 
the historical institutionalists is another key dimension used to explain political outcomes using 
this model. According to Steinmo and Thelen, historical institutionalism understands politics as a 
result of a matrix of institutions “in which individuals manoeuvre, they are motivated by a complex 
mix of sometimes conflicting preferences.” 34 This will be made evident in the cases of electoral 
reform and constitutional development, where political actors faced conflicting demands, the 
choices often being between changing, or maintaining a status quo (reform and old systems). In 
particular during political transitions in both Lebanon and Libya, political actors were faced by 
demands for greater inclusion for example, but at the same time can be confined to an institutional 
set up that cannot accommodate inclusion. Here the attempts for political reform will oscillate 
between demands for citizen representation on the one hand, and the stability of the regime on the 
other hand, which causes the reform process to be limited at best. Thus, while rational choice 
institutionalism suggests that preferences are based in pure rational choice (to maximize self-
interest), historical institutionalism claims that preference is based on weighing end-results while 
being constrained by the institutional set-up.  
 
Path Dependency  
Path dependence is a central concept in the recent theoretical investigation of historical 
institutionalism. The literature on path dependence reflects developments in the traditions of 
economics, sociology and, more recently, political science. The concept of path dependence 
                                                          
33 Ellen M. Immergut, “The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism,” Politics and Society 26, no. 5 
(1998): 5-34.  
34 Thelen, Longstreth, and Steinmo, Structuring Politics, 5. 
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emerged from economic literature in the 1980s and was then applied to the study of politics from 
the 1990s onwards. Conceptually, path dependence results from a state of historical 
institutionalism that is affected by mechanisms that produce and reproduce increasing returns. The 
concept of increasing returns means that once a decision is made it leads to long-term effects that 
reinforce the impact and implications of that decision. Theoretically this means that there is an 
institutionally constraining historical factor (or factors) that limit action or decision-making, 
forcing them into path dependent outcomes. Path dependency posits that political decisions 
accumulate over time, gain institutional shape (be it formal or informal), and restrict options for 
future policy-makers.35 In a way, path dependency can be used to anticipate changes in political 
decisions in the future by studying institutional variables and historical features in the present. To 
say that an outcome is path dependent signifies that a political result or decision is highly affected 
by a path that was adopted before the decision had to be made. Path dependency also means that 
decision-makers have less power to make new decisions in circumstances that are highly affected 
by their choices and structures that were in place prior to their making the decision. 
Scholars using path dependence are keen to distinguish their paradigm from causal 
explanations like those used in historical determinism. Path dependence is concerned with the 
dynamism of cause and effect where institutions and political actors are moving in a series of 
influences brought about by crucial decisions and institutional arrangements from the past. 
According to March and Olsen, political outcomes are a function of three primary factors: the 
distribution of preferences (interests) among political actors, the distribution of resources (powers), 
and the constraints imposed by the rules of the game (constitutions). Path dependence treats these 
as endogenous factors limited by the very institution that determines what is possible.36 Pierson 
proposed one of the most cited explanations of path dependence in the study of politics where he 
posited that path dependence is a social process grounded in a dynamic of increasing returns.37 
Path dependence is therefore active in the social milieu of agents (actors) and it is heavily 
influenced by past decisions that are influencing a situation at present (increasing returns of 
choices in strategic moments in time). Of great importance to my argument that critical junctures 
                                                          
35 Adrian Kay, “A Critique of the Use of Path Dependency in Policy Studies,” Public Administration 83, 
no. 3 (2010): 553-571. 
36 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” 
The American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (1984): 734-749.  
37 Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics.”  
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in Lebanon and Libya did not lead to significant political reform is Pierson’s challenge to the 
traditional conceptualisation that large causes necessarily lead to large outcomes, while small 
causes necessarily lead to small shifts in outcome. In doing so, Pierson encouraged the application 
of path dependence to political science when it was previously confined largely to economics. 
Douglas explains that an institutional structure inherited from the past is impervious to change if 
the proposed alteration (or reform) threatens its leaders.38  
But it was James Mahoney who provides a rigorous and empirical application of path 
dependence in political science by studying the processes of political and institutional development 
in Central America.39 Mahoney asserts that path dependence is a lens through which observers can 
understand why the cost of change can be very high. Path dependence explains why the probability 
for change can be very low in a specific institutional context. In this view, a great deal of 
importance is given to certain decisions regarding politics and institutions because the potential 
for reversal is very low after a path is selected. For Mahoney, choices lead to self-perpetuating 
institutions in the same manner that economic costs reinforce certain technologies in the 
marketplace. Path dependence is very useful when studying why elements of continuity persist in 
the MENA region despite regime change and how certain political processes – like power-sharing 
– become very difficult to reverse once institutionalised because the ‘cost’ of change is very high. 
The case studies selected for this thesis will contribute to this debate by providing explanations 
about how decisions made in the past and practices put in place at a certain time have contributed 
to the failure of reform in Lebanon and Libya. In doing so, I do not dismiss the causal explanation 
altogether, but rather use the case studies inductively to point out the type of causal explanations 
that can help advance our understanding of why these regimes have resisted political reforms. As 
North describes, path dependence theory is not about inevitability where the past almost predicts 
the future.40 Path dependence as an approach shows how and which choices that provide 
alternatives and possibilities for change. Path dependence is only a way to conceptually narrow 
                                                          
38 Douglas North, “The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development,” in The New 
Institutional Economics and Third World Development. John Harris, Janet Hunter and Colin Lewis, eds., 
(New York: Routledge, 1995): 98-99. 
39 James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society 29, no. 4 (2000): 507-
548.  
40 North, “The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development,” 98-99.  
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the possibilities and choices available to decision makers and to link decision-making through 
time.  
 
Critical Junctures 
Scholars of comparative politics have long been interested in critical moments and in the 
causes and implications of critical change. Critical moments are unforeseen events that destabilise 
an existing social and/or political order. In Libya, a recent critical moment was the ousting of 
Colonel Muammar Gadhafi who had exercised total control for 42 years.  In Lebanon, it was the 
withdrawal of the Syrian regime after 30 years of political control during which time the state was 
under massive pressure from internal and external sources. Both these moments were then 
accompanied by a series of events in the political sphere that marked change from past practices 
and policies. Critical junctures are expected to create deep and lasting change in the political order. 
The notion of critical junctures or ‘conjunctures’ is defined by Pierson and Skopcol as the effects 
of interaction between distinct causal sequences that become joined at particular points in time.41  
Junctures are critical because they place historically long standing institutional arrangements on 
new paths or trajectories, which become very difficult to alter.42 Critical junctures destabilise a 
temporal and institutional equilibrium, in other words they create a ‘jolt’ in a system or a process 
that becomes difficult to reverse or to influence.43 In the language of historical institutionalism, 
this deep change leads to new “mechanisms of reproduction,” which carry and often amplify the 
effects of a critical juncture through time.44 In other words, a change that leads to an institutional 
and political domino effect is considered as influenced by, or signifying a critical juncture. 
Scholars of historical institutionalism consider critical junctures to be new choices with lasting 
impact because they “close off alternative options and lead to the establishment of institutions that 
generate (new) self-reinforcing path dependent processes.”45  
The most prominent definition of critical junctures was suggested by Capoccia and 
Kelemen: “In the context of the study of path dependent phenomena, we define critical junctures 
                                                          
41 Pierson and Skocpol, “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,” 693-695.  
42 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 133-167.  
43 See Kathleen Anne Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 369-404. 
44 Ibid, 369-404.  
45 Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures.”  
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as relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that 
agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest. By relatively short periods of time, we mean 
that the duration of the juncture must be brief relative to the duration of the path dependent process 
it instigates (which leads eventually to the outcome of interest). By “substantially heightened 
probability,” we mean that the probability that agents' choices will affect the out-come of interest 
must be high relative to that probability before and after the juncture.”46 Similarly, I will be 
suggesting that the probability of reform is affected by the probability that agents’ choices will 
change after a critical juncture, in the case studies agents’ choices remained unchanged causing 
the institutions to evade reform. A critical juncture therefore would enable political actors to make 
critical changes in their past policies or stances on a certain reform issue.  
Theorists have recently interpreted the Arab uprisings as leading to a series of political, 
cultural and social changes.47 Revolutions, regime change, leadership change, cultural 
transformation, and reform are examples critical junctures that can disrupt certain political 
preferences and promote others. Critical junctures are therefore a moment of strategic selection 
that creates systemic and lasting change. But while the literature defines the concept well, it does 
not explain why change can be limited despite a seemingly critical juncture According to Pierson 
“arguments about path dependence explain why particular historical junctures have lasting 
consequences.”48 But this begs the question in the cases of Lebanon and Libya, why did these 
critical junctures not create “increasing returns” in the form of political reforms. In particular, the 
reforms of the electoral process in Lebanon and the constitutional process in Libya remained 
largely limited. These two case studies will advance the understanding of critical junctures and 
contribute to the literature providing empirical insights from both countries. In later sections the 
inductive method will help identify some evidence of these as having been only “partially” critical 
junctures for the institutions of both countries.  
 
The Question of Agency  
Historical institutionalism should not be mislabelled as a deterministic approach. Rather 
the study of institutions allows us to examine the relationship between political actors as objects 
                                                          
46 Ibid, 348. 
47 For an ‘optimistic’ account of the Arab Spring see for instance Francesco Cavatorta, “Arab Spring: The 
Awakening of Civil Society: A General Overview,” IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook, Med. (2012): 75-81.  
48 Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics.” 
 28 
 
and as agents of history; it is interpretive. Thelen posits that the study of critical junctures views 
agency as part of the patterns of interaction between political processes and the effect of those 
interactions on institutional outcomes.49 Steinmo and Thelen also state that “the institutions that 
are at the centre of historical institutional analyses – from party systems to the structure of 
economic interests such as business associations – can shape and constrain political strategies in 
important ways, but they are themselves also the outcome (conscious or unintended) of deliberate 
political strategies, of political conflict, and of choice.”50 Therefore the concept and potential of 
agency is given important consideration in the study of the path dependency approach. It is 
people/agents who will finally sit and decide upon a course of action from a set of alternatives and 
reform options. This is why the case studies in this research focus on what course agents in civil 
society and in government chose during a critical juncture. Agents have the ability to encourage 
and make use of a critical juncture, especially in periods of transition and uncertainty, when they 
make choices that would otherwise have not been foreseeable. In this thesis those agents are the 
public administrators, the civil society actors, and the political actors whose efforts may or may 
not have pushed forward a certain reform. Conceptually, if agents did not, or could not, adopt a 
reform they in fact reinforced a path dependent outcome and led to the juncture being only partially 
critical during the period of study. 
My case studies will illustrate the validity of the theory of path dependence by showcasing 
how critical junctures in Lebanon and Libya did not create enough incentive for agents to adopt 
reforms. Instead, agents were more likely to revert to old ways of doing things whenever there 
were strong path dependent outcomes. Here agency falls into the traps of routine, using historically 
designed institutions and mechanisms to deal with political life. My research will therefore explain 
how path dependency in both countries limited agency preferences and constrained the probability 
of change during transition. These mechanisms of reinforcement are explained as elements of 
continuity that shaped the preferences of agents who are concerned with political reform.51  
                                                          
49 Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” 388. 
50 Thelen, Longstreth, and Steinmo, Structuring Politics, 7. 
51 Chapters Three and Five explain these mechanisms further. In particular for Lebanon, the elements of 
continuity are described as the sectarian political leadership (zu’ama), the power-sharing system embodied 
in the concept of co-existence (aish mushtarak), and the sectarian system (nizam ta’ifi). For Libya, the 
reinforcement mechanisms are explained as regionalism (jehawiya), role of Islam in shaping identity and 
mobilisation patterns, and the notion of revolutionary politics (thawra). 
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This thesis considers that agency can be a source of critical change but was not in the cases 
of Lebanon and Libya. Agency can instigate mass mobilisation, alternative leadership, and a new 
political culture, individual actions can contribute to heightening the impact of a critical juncture 
by advancing political reforms. Agents can diffuse new ideas and enable new actors, but in my 
two subsequent cases structural and institutional constraints limit the potential of revolutionary 
agency.52 Without including the concept and dynamism of agency, change cannot be adequately 
explained.53 According to Goldstone (1998): “The study of revolution, although certainly the study 
of a path dependent process, does utilize invariant laws, as well as allowing for the contingent role 
of key but undetermined events.”54 My framework will theorize about the ways in which agents 
failed to choose political reform as a symptom of path dependence.  
While the question of agency is not unique to this research, my contribution is two-fold. 
The case studies first reveal that civil society organisations in Lebanon and Libya were not change 
agents in the processes of political reforms. These actors were ineffective from the time before and 
after the critical juncture, hence contributing to the juncture only being partially critical. The 
junctures in this study did open up new platforms and possibilities for civil society organisations 
but not enough to enable them to influence the reform process. Secondly, the case studies will 
show how political leaders were not critical change agents in political reform. Political leadership 
brought back notions and practices that reinforced path dependence and evaded the reforms under 
consideration. This empirical evidence furthers our understanding of how institutional 
arrangements practically hamper the opportunity for reform during transition by constraining 
agency preferences. As a result, I posit that where we can identify elements of continuity, agency 
preferences tend to be in favour of maintaining the status quo or in support of historical 
mechanisms rather than novelty. This proposition then calls for a reconsideration of our present 
understanding of revolution, transition, civil society and democratisation in Lebanon and Libya 
and countries of the MENA region more broadly.  
 
                                                          
52 See for instance George Lawson, “After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in the Middle East? The Arab 
uprisings: revolution or protests?” LSE IDEAS, (London: London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 2012). 
53 Peters B. Guy, Jon Pierre and Desmond King, “The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in 
Historical Institutionalism,” The Journal of Politics 67, no. 4 (2005): 1275-1300.  
54 Jack A. Goldstone, “Initial Conditions, General Laws, Path Dependence and Explanation in Historical 
Sociology,” Journal of Sociology 104, no. 3 (1998): 829-845. 
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Political Transition 
As is often the case in the study of politics, political events cause a reappraisal of dominant 
paradigms, theories and methods. Throughout the MENA region, mass uprisings reinvigorated the 
debate on regime change, civil society, and transition after years of being dominated by unchanged 
assumptions about politics in the region. Before the uprisings, and throughout the first decade of 
the 2000s, much of the research on civil society and political change in the region concluded that 
the Arab World was exceptionally resistant to democracy and civil society in the liberal tradition.55 
By looking at Arab League member states, for example, before 2011, it was clear that none of the 
regimes were electorally competitive and as such were dismissed as shades of different 
authoritarian or autocratic systems.56 Because of authoritarian upgrading, Hinnebusch among other 
leading scholars on the region, contended that the regimes were resilient and were adapting to the 
political context of the 21st Century without necessarily moving towards another form of 
democratic governance.57 Countries in the MENA region, while being very different, have been 
hypothesised historically as non-democratic with the exception of some scholarship by Volpi, 
Anderson, and others that perceive them as semi or pseudo-democratic.58  
Following the uprisings in 2010 and 20111, the use of inductive method to generalize 
theories about regime change became more useful as a country-by-country approach to understand 
the dynamics of revolution and of political change.59 Broadly, transition is employed in politics as 
a movement away from a certain path towards a new path. It is used to describe movement away 
from or in the direction of a) a type of regime (authoritarian, democratic or other), b) a type of 
political culture (civic, tribal, sectarian or other), and a type of outcome (stability, inclusion, 
violence or other). The transition paradigm is salient in studies of the Arab world and MENA 
                                                          
55 See for instance Standford A. Lakoff, “The Reality of Muslim Exceptionalism,” Journal of Democracy 
15, no. 4 (2004): 133-139. 
56 See Alfred Stepan and Graeme Robertson, “Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism,” Journal of Democracy 
15, no.4 (2004): 140-146.  
57 Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “Authoritarian Persistence, Democratisation Theory and the Middle East: An 
Overview and Critique,” Democratization 13, no. 3 (2006): 373–395.  
58 See Frederic Volpi, “Pseudo-Democracy in the Muslim World,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 6 (2004): 
1061-1078, and Lisa Anderson, “Arab Democracy: Dismal Prospects,” World Policy Journal 18, no. 3 
(2001: 53-60.   
59 See for instance Lisa Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring: Praising the Differences between 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 3 (2011): 2-7.  
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region particularly because it provides a useful framework to categorize regimes and compare 
political outcomes.  
According to Schlumberger however, relying on a single use of the transition paradigm 
will not help determine the direction of transition and the potential for political change in the Arab 
World.60 Despite similar historical features in culture, economy and society, the particularities of 
each of the political systems in these countries merits a careful analysis that would lead scholars 
to varying conclusions about the nature of political dynamics at present and the prospects of future 
change.61 Transitology in comparative politics applies a set of assumptions, concepts and 
hypotheses that can explain and predict the path from autocracy or authoritarianism to 
democracy.62 But this approach falls short of explaining what makes it possible for these regimes 
to undergo any form of transition.63 
The shortcoming of the transition paradigm lies in its use of a linear approach that does not 
sufficiently explain the dynamics during and after a critical juncture. For while it is not possible to 
claim that transition is not taking place in the region; it is also not plausible to state that a full 
transition has occurred and in a clearly defined direction. This is why I use the term “reform” to 
refer to specific directions and characteristics of the type of transition that took place after critical 
junctures in Lebanon and Libya. I distinguish between transition, as an overall process of change 
comprised of several changes in a unified direction, and reform, as a specific change in one aspect 
of the political order. The underlying assumption is that junctures accompanied by reforms that 
lead to more competitive electoral processes and more inclusive constitutional processes signify a 
transition into a new form of governance. But if reforms are only partial, it is not possible to 
conclude that a major transition in one direction has taken place. This thesis then employs 
transition as a temporal and political construct. The case studies will show how electoral processes 
                                                          
60 Olivier Schlumberger, Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Non-democratic 
Regimes (California: Stanford University Press 2007).  
61 See for instance the study of varying attitudes towards change and democracy in Amaney Jamal and Mark 
Tessler, “The Democracy Barometers: Attitudes in the Arab World,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 1 
(2008): 97-110.  
62 Schmitter and Santiso, “Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy,” 69-92.  
63 The transition paradigm gave way to consolidology approaches which allowed scholars to conceptualize 
the various forms of changes in the political system, often described as movements towards or further away 
from some form of democracy. See Paul Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “The Conceptual Travels of 
Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?” Slavic Review 53, 
no. 1 (1994):173-185. 
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were not critically reformed (weak evidence of transition) in Lebanon (between 2005 and 2010) 
and how constitutional development mechanisms were not critically reformed (weak evidence of 
transition) in Libya (between 2011 and 2013). 
Another shortcoming of the transition paradigm is in the transmission of normative 
concepts, like civil society, as vehicles of a transition. For example the role of civil society is 
debated as a driver of democratic transition and a prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy. 
The proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as institutions of a broader civil 
society, is described as inherently a force for change.64 In another viewpoint civil society as a set 
of actors has been associated with the resilience of autocratic regimes that are able to co-opt, 
control and even use civil society to promote regime’s interest.65 In both accounts the transition is 
perceived as linear and purposeful, while in the new institutionalism approach it is perceived as 
constrained and more fluid. I employ the term “civil society” not to suggest a specific value or pre-
supposed role in politics, but as it is being used and promulgated by the actors themselves to refer 
to a particular type of social actors. I will then study this activism as illustrative of path dependent 
institutional features.66 The case studies explore why civil society actors were unable to contribute 
to reforms and how their demands went unmet. The case studies in Chapters Four and Six therefore 
problematize the transition and join other studies that highlight this same conundrum about civil 
society’s role. 
For the purpose of this thesis, transition, after a critical juncture, is described as a time-
bound event or set of events that created some form of change in the way that political order 
conducts itself, whether it is through a change in political leadership, constitutional arrangement, 
representation and/or relations between citizens and the state. Transition is used instrumentally to 
indicate a break in a pattern or a change in an institution that had similar features for a long time. 
I am interested in explaining why political reforms did not occur during two transition periods that 
followed each of the critical junctures in Lebanon and Libya. The timing of the selected reforms 
                                                          
64 See for instance Amyn Sajoo, Civil Society in the Muslim World: Contemporary Perspectives (London: 
IB Tauris, 2002) or Francesco Cavatorta and Paul Aarts eds., Civil Society in Syria and Iran: Activism in 
Authoritarian Contexts (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013). 
65 For example Norton acknowledges that civil society puts Arab regimes under pressure from citizens but 
explains that these regimes are strong enough to co-opt demands and not undertake change in the direction 
of liberalisation or democratisation. See Augustus Richard Norton, “The Future of Civil Society in the 
Middle East,” Middle East Journal 47, no. 2 (1993): 205-216.  
66 Chapter Two defines civil society and proposes a typology from which I identify the actors selected for 
each of the case studies 
 33 
 
in my case studies is the months and early years following a mass uprising or a change in the 
regime. 
 
1.4 Explaining Challenges to Reform: Hypothesis and Main Arguments  
The main hypothesis in this research is that critical moments in Lebanon and Libya did not 
lead to political reform due to mechanisms that kept in place elements of continuity from before 
the uprisings (described as critical junctures). The study of interactions between political 
institutions and civil society associations can go a long way in furthering our understanding of the 
political contexts of the MENA region and the motivations of the actors involved in the reform 
process, which have thus far halted reform in Lebanon and Libya. Assessing the role that civil 
society organisations were able to play during transition will advance our understanding of the 
type of juncture that took place in both countries. This approach will also widen the scope of the 
path dependency approach. North contends that “we are just beginning the serious task of 
exploring the implications of path dependence.”67 Assessing how path dependence diminishes 
from the role of civil society activists during transition highlights new implications within this 
approach and opens the door for future research and a widening of the applicability of the approach 
to the MENA region.  
My framework is inspired from two seminal works in the study of path dependence and 
comparative politics. The first is by Mahoney who offers four explanations in a typology of path 
dependence and identified the mechanism of reproduction, potential characteristics of institution, 
and the mechanism of change for each explanation of path dependence.68 Mahoney’s four 
explanations for why path dependence outweighs the potential for alteration in a system are: 
utilitarian, functional, power and legitimation. I apply the explanations mainly of power and of 
functionality to the cases of Lebanon and Libya. The power explanation posits that “an institution 
can persist even when most individuals or groups prefer to change it, provided that an elite that 
benefits from the existing arrangement has sufficient strength to promote its reproduction.”69 
While the functional explanation says that once events lead to the selection of a particular 
institution, the functionalist logic can predict self-reinforcing processes.70 The case studies of 
                                                          
67 North, “The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development,” 100.  
68 Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology.”  
69 Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” 518. 
70 Ibid, 507-548, 
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Lebanon and Libya will both show how the elements of continuity led to the persistence of weak 
states, power-sharing agreements, and ineffective civil society organisations while promoting 
institutions that reinforced and reproduced these elements of continuity.  
The second work I build on is by March and Olsen, who claimed that political outcomes 
are a function of three primary factors: the distribution of preferences (interests) among political 
actors, the distribution of resources (powers), and the constraints imposed by the ‘rules of the 
game’ (constitutions).71 To date, the theoretical approach of path dependence has not been utilised 
in the cases of Lebanon and Libya and can prove illuminating when the question of why political 
reform continues to be constrained in both countries is considered. It also helps reveal which 
institutional constraints are causing institutions to reinforce elements of continuity and limit the 
potential of change that would typically be brought about by a critical juncture. 
I make three central arguments in this thesis. The first is that agency preferences made at a 
certain point during a transition reinforce path dependent outcomes that become locked in the 
system, making it challenging to reform. My second argument is that elements of continuity 
constrain political reform when states are weak, when power-sharing is adopted, and when civil 
society organisations are ineffective. The third argument is that political reform is highly unlikely 
under these conditions, which cause junctures to be only partially critical. 
The framework I use presents three constraints on political reform that comprise the 
characteristics of path dependence in Lebanon and Libya. These constraints are the mechanisms 
that limit and reinforce similar agency preferences during a transition, causing institutions to be 
rigid. Limiting agency preferences on reform issues makes junctures in Lebanon and Libya only 
partially critical. It follows that reform (as the dependent variable) is unlikely when institutions 
display these three constraints (which comprise the independent variable labelled as elements of 
continuity). The elements that persist after regime change mean that there is no trigger for reform 
from the agents and no openness to reform from institutions. The elements create a deadlock 
whereby the reform process ends up trapped in mechanisms that reproduce old practices and 
similar political outcomes. 
                                                          
71 March and Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” 734-749.  
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In Chapter Two I analyse the literature streams concerned with my three levels of analysis: 
weak states, (communal) power-sharing, and ineffective civil society actors. The framework will 
be used to explain why political reform remains constrained in Lebanon and Libya. It also presents 
evidence that addresses the other two sub-questions in this thesis: What institutional characteristics 
reproduce these elements of continuity and make political reform difficult in Lebanon and Libya? 
And, why are the demands for political reform by some civil society actors still unmet in both 
countries?  
I posit that political reform is unlikely when state institutions are weak, representation and 
power-sharing is undertaken through tribal or sectarian representation, and when civil society 
actors are organisationally and politically ineffective in the reform process. Under communal 
power-sharing systems, civil society actors are rendered ineffective as power and decision-making 
is in the hands of leaders whose choices on reform issues are shaped by path dependent institutions. 
Without altering these constraints, agents’ choices and actions will remain constrained. Whenever 
these mechanisms of reproduction are strong, political reform is highly unlikely. Focusing on 
critical junctures helps us revisit transitions as moments embedded with crucial decisions about 
reform and path dependence reminds us that reformers are not writing on a tabula rasa but are 
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constrained by institutional structures and processes.72 This thesis will explore these constraints 
and contribute to the literature by widening the scope and applicability of historical institutionalism 
to the MENA region.  
 
1.5 Research Design and Methodology 
This thesis uses an inductive approach that derives empirical evidence from two case 
studies in Lebanon and Libya. The findings will widen the scope of both the theory of critical 
junctures and the approach of path dependence by highlighting key implications of the partial 
reforms that took place in both countries. In light of the theoretical framework proposed here the 
methodology of this thesis is consistent with the approach of new institutionalism and comparative 
politics.73 The thesis is utilising the Comparative Historical approach to arrive at explanations that 
are relevant to contemporary trends.74 This method helps further our understanding of reform 
options and institutional intricacies in Lebanon and Libya by linking reform outcomes to elements 
of path dependence. Comparative studies delineate institutional variables and configurations that 
help in explaining specific outcomes theorised here to be path dependent outcomes.75 The use of 
country-comparisons can fall into the trap of becoming theory-confirming studies and might be 
used to focus on a single cases without looking at how the comparison might apply to other cases.76 
But for the purpose of this study, the country-comparisons are well suited to answer the research 
questions as well as to test insights from one case (Lebanon) that took place before the other 
(Libya). In this way, the study is comparing two different times and places that exhibit similar 
constraints on political reform. 
The dependent variable in this thesis is political reform, which is affected by institutional 
factors that constrain the possibilities of reform during transition. The independent variable is 
explained in terms of elements of continuity maintained by three mechanisms of reproduction 
(weak state, communal power-sharing, ineffective civil society actors). The research flows in three 
                                                          
72 Mariana Prado and Michael Trebilcock, “Path Dependence, Development and the Dynamics of 
Institutional Reform,” University of Toronto Law Journal 59, no. 3 (2009): 341-380. 
73 Kathleen Anne Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, 
the United States, and Japan (London: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
74 See for instance James Mahoney, “Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics,” Comparative 
Political Studies 40, no. 2 (2007): 122-144.  
75 Mahoney, “Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics.”  
76 See Lijphart, Arend. "Comparative politics and the Comparative Method." The American Political 
Science Review (1971): 682-693. 
 37 
 
phases. First, I present a generic framework that aims at theoretically tackling the questions posed 
in this research. The framework offers two levels of analysis: firstly, the processes of political 
reform is studied by assessing the engagement of civil society, and secondly, the constraints on 
political reform in both Lebanon and Libya. Second, I use the case study method to provide 
empirical evidence founded in historical arguments as to why the political bodies in Lebanon and 
Libya have not undergone political reform in recent years despite experiencing a critical juncture. 
I use two cases of partial reform in each of the countries to test and apply the theoretical framework. 
Thirdly, I conclude with my contribution to knowledge and scholarship about civil society and 
path dependence in the region.  
The contribution of my research is three-fold. First in relation to methods and paradigms, 
I advance the use of the inductive method in understanding the intricacies of countries in the 
MENA region. I also contribute to ‘neutralising’ the concepts of civil society, and political order 
and ridding them of some of their earlier normative assumptions. Second, I provide empirical 
evidence explaining why civil society organisations were ineffective during the transitional periods 
of both countries. This claim regarding the role of civil society has its supporters and its opponents 
from among scholars in the region, but so far little evidence has been put forward to support either 
viewpoint. Lastly, my contribution to the study of critical junctures and path dependence takes 
place through analysis of failed or partial reforms. 
 
Research Methods 
This research is mainly qualitatively orientated but has also used quantitative data. I use 
therefore mixed methods within the inductive method to develop my hypothesis based on empirical 
data from each of the case studies. I will answer my research questions using two specific cases 
and then derive theoretical conclusions from those findings. Although historical institutionalists 
differ regarding in their focus, they do share a common theoretical objective, which is to relate 
institutional variables to a historical context.  Thelen, Longstreth and Steinmo explain that, “rather 
than deducing hypothesis on the basis of global assumptions and prior to the analysis, historical 
institutionalists generally develop their hypothesis more inductively, in the course of interpreting 
the empirical material itself.”77 Historical institutionalism in particular is a largely inductive 
endeavour and also coalesces well with the case study method used in my research. 
                                                          
77 Thelen, Longstreth, and Steinmo, Structuring Politics, 7. 
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 For each of the case studies, and in addition to the academic literature, three main research 
tools are used in this study to complement existing literature. The first tool is participant 
observation from 2005 to 2010 in Lebanon and from 2012 to 2013 in Libya.78 In the Lebanon case 
study, I was a volunteer activist observing the 2005 elections and a founding member of the 
campaign for electoral reform that is assessed in chapter four. During the 2009 elections, I spent 
four months co-leading the election monitoring operation and developing data collection and 
reporting systems for 3,000 Election Day observers. The case study of Lebanon therefore 
historically preceded the case of Libya. It was from this case that I was able to identify the three 
main elements of continuity in research. Visiting Libya after meeting with the founders of the 
Forum for Democratic Libya following the 2011 uprising I noticed two patterns that I had 
identified in Lebanon. First, there was a general enthusiasm and belief in the role of civil society 
and in the potential of reform which lasted for about a year. But by 2012, Libyan activists were 
becoming more disappointed and Libya was exhibiting similar political signs of weak state 
institutions and power-sharing that were hindering the reform process. It was in early 2012, that I 
decided to add Libya as a comparative case to this research and to use it for testing the insights 
gained from the Lebanon case. In Libya, I attended and helped organise multiple workshops, 
events, seminars and protests by civil society, women’s groups and political organisations between 
2012 and 2013, specifically on the issues on the constitutional process. I worked closely with the 
Forum for Democratic Libya in my capacity as a consultant since the group’s inception at the start 
of the uprisings in March and April of 2011. 
The second research tool is empirical data extracted from a survey, semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups with key informants involved in the reform process. The third is 
content analysis based on official and unofficial reports and news sources. The objective is to 
triangulate the results and validate theoretical propositions with empirical input, especially since 
the cases under consideration are relatively new and take place in a dynamically changing political 
environment. As such, the analysis of the case studies in based primarily on first hand observation 
and participation, validated with the data from surveys, interviews or focus group respondents, and 
then supported with the relevant literature. This is how the three constraints in the framework came 
about. The key concepts and assumptions are taken from the actors that are promulgating them 
                                                          
78 See the use of this method in Bruce Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon Publishers, 2011), 163-169.  
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(for instance, “failure to influence reform” is a phrase repeated by most activists interviewed in 
this thesis). 
 
Libya Research Methods 
The novelty of the Libyan case and the fact that little had been done to identify and 
understand the role of civil society during transition required multiple trips and a large sample of 
respondents in order to answer the questions in this thesis. The sample size of participants in focus 
groups for Libya therefore is 900, out of which 600 filled out an additional survey on their 
perspectives about civil society and constitutional development.79 FDL invited participants to take 
part in the focus groups and assisted in building rapport.80  FDL used focus group outcomes for 
their own advocacy campaign and allowed me to document the results for the purpose of my thesis. 
The focus groups were structured in a way that brought 10-12 participants with a trained moderator 
that facilitated a semi-structured discussion on their priorities and understanding of the 
constitutional process. All opinions were welcomed and documented in an inclusive manner, even 
those opinions that were contested were listed to allow results to identify ‘most cited’ responses 
and to identify additional responses.81  The survey was advertised during the workshops that FDL 
organised on constitutional dialogue. Participants filled the survey prior to the commencement of 
the focus groups and there was not a single case of refusal to fill the survey. 
The 30 interviewees in the case of Libya (who were all interviewed in Tripoli, Misurata 
and Benghazi between 2012 and 2013, with some exceptions that took place by telephone) were 
decision-makers, government officials, elected members of General National Congress, political 
party representatives, and civil society activists that my contacts through FDL helped me secure.82 
My timeline for the Libya research was as following:  
Dates Method 
July 2011 – February 2012 Design of Active Citizenship workshops 
Review of secondary data from workshops 
                                                          
79 Survey results are in Chapter Six. Respondents were 74.5% male and 25.5% female, 27.7% were from 
the South, 31.3% from the west, and 41% from the eastern region.  
80 Focus group methodology inspired from David L. Morgan, “Focus Groups,” Annual Review of Sociology 
22(1996): 129-152. 
81 Based on Jenny Kitzinger, “The methodology of Focus Groups: the importance of interaction between 
research and participants,” Sociology of Health and Illness 16(1994): 102-121. 
82 For each country, I annex a list of profiles of the interviewees with their names, where appropriate, as 
well as the questions used in the semi-structured interviews.  
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February 2012: first field visit  Pilot survey on concept and role of civil society and 
constitutional priorities (sample n=85)  
June 2012: second field visit Interviews and meetings with civil society 
representatives 
January 2013: third field visit  Interviews and participant observation of launch of 
constitutional dialogue project 
February – May 2013: fourth field 
visit  
15 constitutional dialogues conducted as focus groups 
(n=900) 
Survey distributed (n=600) 
July 2013: fifth field visit Interviews with activists and Members of General 
National Congress  
August – September 2013: sixth 
field visit  
Interviews with representatives of international donors 
and political parties 
 
Lebanon Research Methods 
The methods applied in Lebanon were different and relied mainly on content analysis of 
violations to the 2005 and 2009 elections. The patterns identified in the violations and the 
shortcoming of reforming the electoral law inspired questions for the interviews and focus groups 
in Lebanon. The sample size of participants in interviews and focus groups from Lebanon is 40 
respondents who were directly involved in electoral reform between 2005 and 2010. I approached 
respondents over the phone as the vast majority of them knew me informally from my experience 
in the 200 elections. The interviews were conducted between 2012 and 2014 and were perceived 
by respondents as an opportunity to have an honest discussion about why electoral reform had 
failed. Because of my role with LADE in 2005 and 2009, access to quantitative data pertaining to 
electoral violations was made available after taking permission of LADE’s Executive Director to 
study the 2005 and 2009 reports. Having co-led the 2009 monitoring operation I analysed the 
results of hundreds of violations in the pre-electoral phase and 1,011 critical violations on Election 
Day in June of 2009.83 The subsequent 40 interviewees in Lebanon (all took place in Beirut 
between 2010 and 2013) were with Members of Parliament, leading activists on electoral reform, 
political party representatives, and protestors calling for electoral reform.  
 
Positioning of the Researcher  
                                                          
83 The observation strategy and methodology are in an annex. 
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Although in both cases, participant observation provided me the main source of data and 
access, my position vis-à-vis the research respondents was different. In Lebanon, gaining access 
for interview and focus groups was quite straightforward. Most participants in the study knew me 
or had worked with me personally. They viewed me as an insider with whom they were 
comfortable discussing ‘what went wrong’ in the campaign and attempts for reform. These 
interviews were essential in arriving at conclusions such as why advocacy failed after the 2005 
juncture. Being familiar with the people and the political context in Lebanon made it easy to 
schedule and administer interviews. At the same time, I had to ensure respondents that my own 
assumptions regarding the role of LADE would not influence the way I relayed their responses. I 
constructed the questions in a neutral manner and asked them to repeat facts and events that they 
knew I was familiar with. I succeeding to appear knowledgeable about electoral reform but without 
appearing as influencing their answers.  
Conducting field research in Libya was not as straight forward. To gain access to a 
representative sample, contacts from FDL were crucial. During the research design phase, I helped 
FDL staff develop a sheet of targeted respondents in every region. This ensured that the sample of 
participants in the focus groups were representative of the main regions, tribes, ethnicities, as well 
as the political, militant, and civic groups that were active in the region. The main method of 
recruiting participants was through word of mouth. FDL had respected contacts in each of the 
dialogue locations who made calls and visits to win the trust of influential local leaders, who then 
proceeded to issue invitations in writing to each participants. Traveling with Libyan activists also 
from FDL helped put respondents to my survey at ease, many of whom when they knew the 
meetings were for PhD research were very eager to speak up and to answer interview questions. 
There was an extra level of effort required from me in the Libya case in order to prove that I was 
knowledgeable of the context, an effort that was not needed from me in Lebanon as I am perceived 
more of an insider. This is why my pilot survey in Misurata in February 2012 was needed and I 
used that experience to reformulate some questions and review some concepts.  
The main limitations of my research were similar in both Lebanon and Libya. In both cases 
limited sources of governmental information exist on the two case studies, although there are more 
documents in the case of Lebanon. This is due both to the fact that the government institutions of 
both countries do not have an Access to Information law and as such are not bound to document 
and publish any data. In neither country, for instance, is there any official and accessible registry 
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of civil society organisations nor are voting records of legislators made public. It was therefore 
necessary to identify ‘reliable’ individuals who could offer information on facts, figures and 
events. Another key challenge was the timeframe allocated. The case studies are both very 
contemporary and while they help theorize certain patterns, they both took place in recent years. 
There is very little historical analysis about elections in Lebanon and even less on the constitutional 
order in Libya. Where available and relevant, this research is widely cited in my thesis. Lastly, the 
bias in both cases can be felt in the type of answers respondents gave. Respondents displayed the 
need to be ‘optimistic’ in their accounts and would tend not to be able to accurately explain the 
challenges and expectations for reform.  
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Chapter Two - Explaining ‘Partially’ Critical Junctures 
 
“The path dependent strategy is premised on the assumption that “history binds”  
– events at a given point in time limit future outcomes –  
and that consequently regime change cannot be explained  
without attention to long-term effects of past events.” 
James Mahoney and Richard Snyder 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Critical junctures that could produce lasting political change have not been accompanied 
by political reform in Lebanon and Libya. Reforms that would enable the state to sustain lasting 
changes and promote participation in the political process are still very weak in both countries. For 
reasons that will be discussed in the case studies, both countries show signs of reverting to past 
practices instead of adopting reforms that could increase the criticality of Lebanon’s juncture in 
2005 and Libya’s juncture in 2011. This chapter has two main objectives. First, it will examine the 
key concepts that constitute the elements of continuity in this study, which are weak states, civil 
society, power-sharing and political reform. Second, it contextualizes these elements of continuity 
in the cases of Lebanon and Libya. The chapter concludes by explaining the constraints on reform 
and paves the way for presenting each of the country case studies.  
As the main aim of this thesis is to explain the constraints on political reform during 
transition, reform as a concept will also need to be clarified. My framework focuses on the 
mechanisms that result in path dependent outcomes so I start by reviewing each element of 
continuity and how it influences the reform process. The analysis presented later in the case studies 
pertains to continuity and change within the context of transition in Lebanon and Libya. 
Understanding political reform is not without its bias and the definition can be grounded in 
theoretical assumptions about governance and about the direction of political change. As such 
there may be a normative bias attributing specific norms to the reform process. For this research, 
I adopted a functionalist perspective on reform that views it as a process that changes the way the 
state deals with citizens and with political competition, emphasising the types of decisions taken 
during transition which have a long-term effect in reproducing path dependent outcomes. Political 
reform here refers to changes in policy, law or practice that influence the political order in the 
direction of greater representation and more open participation. The objective of political reform 
this thesis does ascribe normative values as the research carries an underlying assumption that 
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more representation and participation would be desirable in the cases of Lebanon and Libya. The 
investigation of the question of political reform however is functionalist rather than normative. In 
other words, political reform is examined to reveal the extent to which a particular juncture helped 
the political order shift away from past practices and therefore was capable of leading to a moment 
of strategic selection, even if only partially. The normativity of greater representation in the case 
of Lebanon and greater participation in the case of Libya is only regarded as evidence that path 
dependence limited the potential of the political order to shift from an uncompetitive process in 
Lebanon and non-participatory governance in Libya. The normativity is used for illustration of the 
constraints on political reform. 
The concept of political reform will be used as one indicator of juncture in a certain political 
order. According to Bratton and Van de Walle, “a wide variety of government actions can plausibly 
be labelled political reforms, from adjustments in party and administrative regulations to the 
introduction of a new national constitution.” 1 The broader concept in this study adopts reform as 
any measure taken by a ruling elite to improve the effectiveness of the political system and increase 
political competition.2 This claim is normative, in the sense that it attributes a particular value to 
the reform process and the reform result, but it is also functionalist because it stresses political 
competition as the main function for reform. In turn political competition can be a main vehicle 
for political or regime change which in itself is an indicator that a critical reform has taken place. 
From the functionalist perspective, reform is a purposeful political strategy that can make state 
institutions more effective and make the political process more representative.  
The research in this thesis pertaining to constitutional development and to elections is 
mainly focused on identifying political change and determining elements of continuity, of which 
competition and public participation are key factors. Therefore, the function of reform, as depicted 
here, is to enable a more competitive electoral process in Lebanon and a more participatory 
constitutional process in Libya. This is where the role of the civil society organisations is 
particularly revealing of specific patterns that remained dominant before and after the critical 
junctures in both countries. In Lebanon and Libya’s case studies the identified constraints stifled 
political competition and public participation, a result that was reinforced by the ineffectiveness 
                                                          
1 Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van De Walle, “Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa,” 
Comparative Politics 24, no. 4 (1992): 419-442. 
2 Ibid.  
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of civil society actors that led to a juncture that was only ‘partially’ critical. The chapter further 
explicates these constraints before moving on to the case studies that present the background and 
implications of these constraints on the reform process in Chapters Three to Six. We begin by 
clarifying the meaning of partially critical junctures, then move on to the literature streams relevant 
to the three elements of continuity.  
 
2.2 Uprisings, Reform and Critical Junctures  
This section ties together the issues of reform and revolution in order to argue that similar 
institutions and political patterns prevailed prior to and after the junctures of 2005 in Lebanon and 
2011 in Libya. These elements of continuity are evident in the inability of state institutions to 
execute reforms, the inability of civil society to participate in the process of reform, and the effect 
of power-sharing on the possibility of reform. This in turn has discouraged political competition 
in Lebanon and constrained it to sectarian leaders, it has also marginalised the role of citizens in 
the constitutional process of Libya so far. In doing so, this section paves the way for explicating 
the constraints on reform as they will be used in each of my case studies. It also explains how the 
concepts of sectarianism, power-sharing and political reform will be used in this thesis.  
The starting point for this thesis is the period leading up to the mass uprisings that swept 
Lebanon and Libya in 2005 and 2011 respectively. Each of these moments is seen as a juncture 
that was accompanied by broader changes in society and politics, but not in the nature of political 
competition and political participation. Political competition here is defined as the forms in which 
individuals and groups portray public interest and work towards accessing public office. These 
forms can be electoral or non-electoral, but in both cases tell us a great deal about the way in which 
political leadership manages resources and relates to citizenry. In Lebanon, hundreds of thousands 
of citizens came together to call for the ousting of the Syrian-backed regime, demanding 
sovereignty and freedom. The years between 2005 and 2010 witnessed a rise in a number of civil 
and political freedoms, namely those of associations and media. But this uprising did not trigger 
political reform, particularly in the electoral system, and so electoral competition remained within 
the confines of sectarian groups which was similar to the pre-2005 dynamics.3 In Libya, the 2011 
revolution ousted Gadhafi who had governed for more than 42 years, but the newly found freedoms 
                                                          
3 Melani Cammett M. and Sukriti Issar, “Bricks and Mortal Clientelism: Sectarianism and the Logics of 
Welfare Association in Lebanon,” World Politics 62, no. 3 (2010): 381-421. 
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were not accompanied by reforms in the constitutional order in the three years that followed (2011 
– 2013), which I cover in my study. In fact, my research on constitutional dialogues will reveal 
deeply entrenched tensions and weaknesses in state institutions, which are similar to pre-2011 
dynamics and dates back even to Libya under the colonial order. In Libya, newcomers to the 
political scene after 2011 reverted to old mechanisms to mitigate tensions and to manage the 
transition. In Lebanon, political leaders reconfigured their relations using old formulas after the 
Syrian withdrawal and kept state institutions weak at the expense of a sectarian power-sharing 
agreement. A study of the Lebanese uprising shows that politicians who were Ministers and 
statesmen under the Syrian tutelage won the subsequent elections again after Syria’s withdrawal 
from Lebanon.4 
The approach of path dependence provides a useful interpretation of the way in which 
political leaders in Lebanon and political newcomers in Libya during the transition reinforced 
similar institutional mechanisms to those pre-uprising. Here I build on the work of historical 
institutionalists, who see political actors as rationally-bound satisficers.5 In political science, this 
is echoed by Magnusson and Offosson, whose work is useful in addressing issues of political 
change through the lens of the bounded rationality of decision-makers.6 I therefore argue that 
political actors who were anti-Syrian in Lebanon and anti-Gadhafi in Libya did not act in a way to 
maximize national interest, but were constrained by the institutions and institutional dynamics 
which ensured a return to past practices rather than the adoption of new reformed practices. The 
weakness of the reform process was therefore an enabler and a reinforcer of path dependence. We 
will see this more clearly in the way that the Lebanese Parliament addressed electoral reform and 
the way that Libya’s General National Congress evaded attempts in creating a participatory process 
of constitutional development.  
Historical institutionalism, according to Thelen, Longstreth and Steinmo, views politics as 
a result of a matrix of institutions “in which individuals manoeuvre, they are motivated by a 
                                                          
4 Of the many such examples I recall here Walid Jumblat the Druze leader who had been in power for the 
three decades during Syria’s patronage, Botrous Harb the Maronite outspoken Syrian critic who was 
Minister several times under Syria’s patronage, and the Sunni Future Movement led by late Rafik Hariri 
who was Prime Minister twice under the Syrians and whose son Saad ran for the 2005 elections after Syria 
withdrew.  
5 Simon, Reason in Human Affairs. 
6 Lars Magnusson and Jan Offosson, eds., Evolutionary Economics and Path Dependence (Vermont: 
Edward Elger, 1997). 
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complex mix of sometimes conflicting preferences.” 7 In many ways, the uprisings in Lebanon and 
Libya carried conflicting preferences. The movements and protestors involved called for similar 
overarching demands of freedom and participation that were never translated into political reforms. 
Instead, in the post-uprising phase when civil society associations demanded reform, they were 
marginalised from the process. The result were choices by political leadership in favour of limiting 
reforms and making these junctures only somewhat significant for the broader political order. That 
is not to say that change did not occur in both countries. Indeed it is possible to argue that Libya’s 
constitutional declaration in August 2011, despite challenges to the process, is in itself a major 
reform after 42 years of being governed by Gadhafi’s Green Book. In Lebanon, a partial reform of 
the electoral process did take place in 2005 and can also be considered a major change following 
30 years of Syrian patronage over the electoral process. At the same time, an exploration of these 
processes and results expose serious elements of continuity that merit closer analysis. Without 
understanding these features and the history behind them, it is not possible to understand the 
political dynamics at present. For each of the cases, path dependent outcomes indicate that there 
were institutionally constraining historical factors that limited action and decision-making. In other 
words, political leaders could only do so much during the transition. Path dependency posits that 
political decisions accumulate over time, gain institutional shape (be it formal or informal), and 
restrict options for future policy-makers.8 This process of instilling ‘‘self-reinforcing 
mechanisms’’ or historical ‘‘lock-ins’’ made the uprisings unsuccessful in triggering political 
reform.9  
I portray the Arab uprisings in this study using Capoccia and Kelemen’s definition of 
juncture: “In the context of the study of path dependent phenomena, critical junctures are relatively 
short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents' 
choices will affect the outcome of interest. By relatively short periods of time, “we mean that the 
duration of the juncture must be brief relative to the duration of the path dependent process it 
instigates” (which leads eventually to the outcome of interest). By “substantially heightened 
probability,” we mean that the probability that agents' choices will affect the out-come of interest 
must be high relative to that probability before and after the juncture.”10 In a way the uprisings 
                                                          
7 Thelen, Longstreth, and Steinmo, Structuring Politics, 7. 
8 Kay, “Critique of the Use of Path Dependency in Policy Studies.” 558. 
9 Arthur, Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. 
10 Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures,” 348. 
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created a period where there were heightened possibilities for change due to changes in the regime. 
While the uprising in Libya led to changes that were somehow more significant, in Lebanon they 
were a mere embellishment of an existing sectarian power structure. In both cases a deeper 
exploration, such as the one found in my case studies, is needed to explicate continuity. The 
uprisings created the opportunity for a strategic selection moment in Lebanon and Libya that was 
constrained by the preference of political agents to resort to old mechanisms of political order. The 
potential for expanding this strategic selection moment was limited by a sectarian political order 
and a power-sharing system in Lebanon. Sectarianism, or sectarian political order means a system 
of government that uses sect as the primary unit of representation and participation in the political 
system. In Libya the strategic selection moment was limited by weak state structures and the 
emergence of power-sharing agreements that placed sub-national communities, like sects in the 
Lebanon case, at the heart of representation and participation in the new political order. Both these 
arguments are expanded in the subsequent sections.  
To conclude this section, it is important to bear in mind that scholars are tracing 
opportunities for regime change to an array of factors including internal and external. Political 
reform processes in Lebanon and Libya proved to be slow and challenging and merit a closer look 
at the history and institutions of both countries. Citizens in both Lebanon and Libya have harboured 
dissatisfaction with the patronage of Syria and the regime of Gadhafi, yet their political leaders 
have retained a capacity to discourage political participation and competition. We need to 
understand what explains the decisions to not undertake reform after the uprisings. The case studies 
will later show that political leaders during the transition were motivated primarily by the desire 
to maintain institutions that enabled them to share power.11 In the cases of elections and 
constitutional order, the leaders assessed options and engineered a process that would lead to their 
wielding power instead of leveraging a competitive participatory process for elections and a 
participatory constitutional process, thereby aborting the possibility of a complete critical juncture. 
I move now to depicting the three elements of continuity: weak states, communal power-sharing, 
and ineffective civil society actors, all of which are evident in the case studies that will follow.  
 
                                                          
11 This is in line with one of Mahoney’s power explanation of path dependence where he claims that 
institutions are reproduced because it is supported by an elite political group and that the mechanism of 
change would be to weaken elites and strengthen subordinate groups.  
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2.3 Implications of a Weak State  
The presence of a weak state means that political leaders make decisions outside of state 
institutions, that citizens receive goods and benefits from outside the state, and that political order 
depends on mechanisms stronger than those found in state institutions. For the purpose of 
understanding reform processes, I posit that a weak state means that public institutions are limited 
in their ability to push forward reform options and to advocate for, or to implement, reform. Weak 
state institutions are limited from a resource and political leverage perspective. In the cases of 
Lebanon and Libya, the state is not the guarantor of citizenship for instance. Citizenship as a status 
is obtained through loyalty to a particular community (ideological, tribal or sectarian). To deem a 
state as weak is to say that there are other political actors that are (too) strong in relation to the 
state, the former are able to grant citizenship rights as a status, for example, and to undertake 
reform. In other words, the state has not permeated all of the political, social and geographical 
boundaries within its borders. This section presents the rationale for identifying weak states as a 
constraint on political reform.  
Both Lebanon and Libya as former colonial states bear what Ibrahim refers to as 
“deformities, ranging from artificialities of their borders to the internal weakness of their 
institutions.”12 During the first decades of their independence both Lebanon and Libya faced the 
challenges that Harik depicted as an embattlement on both internal and external fronts.13 In both 
countries, non-state actors and organisations survived from the colonial period and remained 
powerful players in the political order, including a combination of tribal, religious, military and 
sectarian actors. In both cases, colonial rulers redirected resources and authority in a way that 
deeply affected the response of indigenous forces to the reconstituting of political power, resulting 
in a fragmentation of social control and the heterogeneity of rule-making within these polities.14 
While state-formation as a process in Europe for instance took centuries, the post-colonial periods 
in Lebanon and Libya mistakenly depicted the formal declaration of independence as the rise of a 
capable central government and a state that could govern effectively. In both countries, 
destabilising regional forces played a role in either undermining or directly competing with 
                                                          
12 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “The Troubled Triangle: Populism, Islam and Civil Society in the Arab World.” 
International Political Science Review 19, no. 4 (1988): 373-385. 
13 Iliya Harik, “The Origins of the Arab System,” in The Arab State. Edited by Giacomo Luciani, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990), 1-28.  
14 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, 140. 
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national authorities. The rise of Nasserism in Egypt for example, was for both Lebanon and Libya, 
though for different reasons, a factor in fragmenting as well as polarising the social and political 
orders at both local and national levels.15 
But the effects of colonialism alone are not sufficient to explain the current states of 
Lebanon and Libya as weak. There are also solid endogenous forces that led to these states having 
weak capabilities in the face of political competition, conflict or political demands from their 
citizens. Although there is much scholarly debate about the terminology of weak or fragile states, 
the commonality in such literature is the state institutions’ lack of willingness or capacity to 
perform core state functions mainly in the fields of security, representation and welfare.16 Core 
state functions are widely recognised as: security and use of power to preserve sovereignty over a 
territory, provision of basic services such as education and health to citizens, and fostering 
legitimacy through the rule of law and protection of the right to participate in the political 
process.17 
There is also a broad agreement that states can be viewed across a continuum of weaknesses 
identified in the decline of state performance, from weak states to fully ‘collapsed’ states.18 Indeed 
this continuum is used in much of the development literature to indicate areas where state capacity 
building is needed, and to distinguish from capacity building to the initial stages of state building, 
where state institutions are deemed to be dysfunctional.19 The functionalist approach to identifying 
state weaknesses is useful in the cases of Lebanon and Libya. Here I borrow from Ghani et al the 
proposed features of statehood that are: (1) a legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, (2) 
                                                          
15 For Gadhafi, Abdel Nasser as an icon and Arab nationalism provided the young Colonel the momentum 
he needed to skew public opinion in favour of a socialist-style popular rule as opposed to the Monarchy. It 
enabled him to promote himself as an alternative to the King and the carrier of Arab nationalism which 
accounts for much of his later stances on tribes, Berbers and other ethnic minorities. In Lebanon, Abdel 
Nasser was a factor in polarising political factions against sectarian lines with the Christians mainly led by 
then President Camille Chamoun opposing the ideologies and policies propagated by Arab nationalists, and 
the Sunni Muslims aligning themselves with Arab Nationalism culminating in the 1969 Cairo agreement 
that openly allowed armed Palestinian factions to join a conflict with Israel from Lebanese soil, which 
proved then to spark the civil war in 1975. 
16 Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin P. Clements, and Anna Nolan. “On hybrid political orders and 
emerging states: What is failing–states in the global South or research and politics in the West?” Berghof 
Handbook for Conflict Transformation Dialogue Series 8 (2009): 15-35. 
17 Stuart E. Eizenstat, John Edward Porter and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Rebuilding Weak States,” Foreign 
Policy 84, no. 1 (2005): 134-146. 
18 Boege et al., “On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States,” 3.  
19 See for instance Edwin Brett, “State failure and success in Zimbabwe and Uganda: The logic of political 
decay and reconstruction in Africa,” Journal of Development Studies 44, no. 3 (2008): 339-367. 
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administrative control, (3) sound management of public finances, (4) investment in human capital, 
(5) the creation of citizenship rights and duties, (6) provision of infrastructure, (7) market 
formation, (8) management of the assets of the state, (9) effective public borrowing, (10) 
maintenance of rule of law. Of the ten features, there are three conditions that are most relevant to 
my case studies which are 1) monopoly over the means of violence, 2) creation of citizenship rights 
and duties, and 3) maintenance of rule of law.20 These three pre-conditions are in line with the 
functionalist perspective on the role of the state, which was weakened during transition in both 
countries. The three conditions I selected are also in line with literature on state failure and state 
success that looks at state performance primarily in the delivery of public and political goods.21 
Political goods are the rights and expectations of citizens that the state manages and delivers 
through interaction with citizens. The weaker the state is when it comes to controlling violence, 
nurturing citizenship rights, and maintaining the rule of law, the less it is able to provide these 
goods and thus citizens have a reason to seek them from other actors. This perspective on the 
weakness of the state will be applied in the two subsequent case studies in this thesis.    
Legitimacy of state institutions is another factor of statehood advanced by Weber, who 
explains that in traditional communities, people are tied into informal networks of mutual 
obligations which are perceived as more powerful than their obligations as citizens to the state.22 
Legitimacy of rule is a crucial consideration for Lebanon and Libya particularly because it takes a 
strong political connotation in the reform process.23 According to Weber, the state is comprised of 
“compulsory political organisations” whose “administrative staff successfully upholds the claim 
to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical forces in the enforcement of its order…within a 
given territory.”24 In the absence of a monopoly over force, people respond to and obey rules of 
                                                          
20 Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnahan, Closing the Sovereignty Gap: How to Turn Failed 
States into Capable Ones (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2005). 
21 See Ronald Pennock, “Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods,” World Politics, 
18, no. 3 (1966): 415-434.  
22 Max Webber, Politics as a Vocation, from Max Webber: “Essays in Sociology,” edited by Heins Heinrich 
Gerth and Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 54. 
23 Legitimacy (pronounced: shareiya) In the case of electoral reform in Lebanon in 2006-2008, legitimacy 
was contested by the Cabinet as a factor of the extent to which sectarian groups can be represented in power 
after Shi’a Ministers practiced their veto power and withdrew from the executive. In Libya, the question of 
legitimacy over rule and the constitutional process was portrayed by the General National Congress (GNC) 
as a factor of the extent to which pro-Gadhafi forces can be isolated and excluded from power. Legitimacy 
in both countries is highly related to the issue of religious belonging and ethnic or tribal identities.  
24 Webber, Politics as a Vocation, from Max Webber: “Essays in Sociology,” 54. 
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their community (be it ethnic, religious or cultural) as opposed to the rules of the state. Legitimacy 
in weak states therefore is in the hands of the groups in power rather than in the hands of 
institutionalised civil servants.  
This crisis of legitimate rule is symptomatic of the inability of the state to spread and 
maintain the rule of law across a particular nation or geography. Legitimacy, and therefore the 
ability to govern, rests in the hands of the leaders of communities and not in the hands of the state 
and its institutions. Chapters three and five will address the sources and examples of communal 
leadership in Lebanon and Libya. For example in Lebanon, strategic political issues are settled in 
a “national dialogue table” often bringing in factions that are not formally within the state to broker 
a deal on a state issue.25 Likewise in Libya, loosely organised military factions that fought on the 
side of the revolutionaries during the 2011 uprising have pushed forward their desire to isolate 
pro-Gadhafi forces, not as part of the state, but as community leaders. In both cases these actors 
derive their strength from their traditional communal leadership of tribes or sects, which forms the 
same basis for political party formation and access to public office. 
Viewing the state from a functionalist perspective again, Migdal’s work is illuminating.26 
He posits that the state’s ability to survive rests on the organisational capabilities of its leaders, 
population size, potential material and the available human resources as well as the international 
configurations at the time.27 Here government’s ability to influence political processes depends on 
its capacity to mobilize human and material resources for state action.28 This begs the question, 
when human, military and material resources are not at the disposal of the state, what does this 
imply for the ability of the state to maintain its rule? In Libya for instance, oil and natural resource 
management is at the mercy of military factions, and financial resources in Lebanon are highly 
dependent on consensus between sectarian leaders outside of state institutions. With regards to 
reform during transition, Migdal claims that during crisis institutions weaken as their rules become 
irrelevant to matters at hand. As a result, institutional change is seen as discontinuous and sporadic, 
occurring only in rare, sudden moments (critical junctures). In crisis or transition therefore, any 
                                                          
25 For instance, the national dialogue before Lebanon’s 2006 conflict with Israel brought together state and 
non-state sectarian leaders to agree on strategic security issues including for example the status of 
Palestinians in Lebanon. See Paul Salem, “The Future of Lebanon,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 6 (2006): 13-
22.  
26 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, 21. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, 22. 
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attempt to increase state capability will necessarily undermine the prerogatives and bases of social 
control enjoyed of non-state strongmen. Chapters three and five will show how the transition in 
Lebanon and Libya gave leeway to traditional leaders emerging from sects or tribes who had an 
advantage over other potential newcomers.  
Within the functionalist perspective on reform state institutions set the ‘rules of the game 
of a society,’ as reforms formally devise and structure political interaction.29 To conclude, what is 
most relevant to my case studies is that weak state institutions lack the political support to advance 
a reform process especially during transition. These institutions have weak formal rules (laws, 
regulations, procedure) and weak informal constraints (norms, culture, attitudes) when it comes to 
being able to advocate for, and execute a reform.30 Weak states incentivize alternative sources of 
rule-making which are very often non-state actors. At present, armed groups in Libya that fought 
Gadhafi’s forces are yet to disarm and continue to weaken the state’s monopoly over the use of 
force. Lebanon continues to be torn between warring factions and armed groups, with Hezbollah 
and its resistance to Israel representing the foremost armed force. In particular, reforms that can 
alter the relations between citizens and state in the direction of rule of law are especially unlikely 
when citizens tend to obey the rules of non-state organisations (military or other) as opposed to 
public institutions. Weak states are also unlikely to be able to advance citizenship rights and to 
promote public participation in political processes. It is important to note the distinction between 
weak states and failed states, in which warring factions contest power are maintained by purposeful 
strategies of political agents.  
Within the approach of path dependence, weak states that persist from pre and post uprising 
are one element of continuity that leads to the constraining political reforms. They indicate a lack 
of willingness for, and interest in, political reform that could strengthen state institutions in either 
country. I move now to the second element of continuity that hinders political reform.  
 
2.4 “Communal” Power-sharing Systems 
Power-sharing as a form of governance is not necessarily a pejorative term in comparative 
political studies. Scholars and practitioners arguing in favour of this form of governance consider 
                                                          
29 See Prado and Trebilcock, “Path Dependence, Development and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform,” 
349.  
30 Ibid.  
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that the sharing of power and decision-making is indeed a good thing for any state. But the sharing 
or dividing of sources of power for political gain should not be mistaken as the inclusion of various 
political factions. In the cases of Lebanon and Libya, power-sharing has gone beyond its traditional 
intention, to ensure representation of the various factions, to instead subjugate the state and keep 
state institutions at the mercy of various factions. Power-sharing has also confined political 
participation to religion, region or tribe. In the case of the Lebanese electoral system, citizens 
cannot participate except on the basis of sectarian belonging and ancestral origin, which limits 
loyalty to the nation as a whole and limits the role of parliamentarians to pleasing only members 
of their sectarian group. Sectarianism therefore in Lebanon is the political order in which the sect 
is the main unit for representation and participation in the political system. It indicates that 
citizenship as a status and as a set of benefits necessarily is part of sectarian not national identity. 
Membership to a specific segment of society is referred to as a ‘community’ in this research and 
therefore communal power-sharing is an agreement of predefined communities coming together 
to form a legislature and an executive branch. Power-sharing, which is often incorporated within 
the larger field of consociationalism, is the practice of sharing and dividing power among sizable 
and pre-determined groups.31 
Regarding Libya, Chapter Six shows how demands for participation in the constitutional 
process are based on regional and tribal identities, as will be revealed in the study of the 
constitutional dialogues, this makes national priorities difficult to agree on. In this section, I make 
my argument as to why this particular form of power-sharing; that is primarily about ‘communal’ 
representation (regional, sectarian, or tribal), has proven to be a constraint on political reform 
during transition and has contributed to higher path dependence in the cases of Lebanon and Libya. 
In this thesis, power-sharing refers to a set of political and public institutions that formally 
distribute the rights of representation and decision-making to a predetermined (communal) group 
of people. For Libya, power-sharing refers to how sizable groups accommodated each other’s 
political demands at the expense of an open and inclusive constitutional process. In particular 
between 2012 and 2013, the Libyan political order becomes more based on dividing power among 
certain groups which themselves contribute to path dependence after the uprising.  
                                                          
31 See Arend Lijphart, “Definitions, Evidence, and Policy: A Response to Matthijs Bogaards’ Critique,” 
Journal of Theoretical Politics 12, no. 4 (2000): 425-431.  
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Ever since Arend Lijphart coined the term in the late 1960s, power-sharing has been put 
forward as a model of maintaining democracy in a divided society.32 Lijphart’s work demonstrated 
that power-sharing in divided or conflict-ridden societies provided an incentive for elites to 
cooperate.33 Rather than the Westminster style of majoritarian democracy, power-sharing, which 
enables a consociational or consensus-based democracy, was seen as a breakthrough in 
comparative political studies, providing a mechanism for the leaders of divided social groups to 
be proportionally represented in government. According to Lijphart democracy is only possible in 
divided societies when power is shared rather than monopolised and concentrated in the hands of 
the majority, particularly if the minority consists of a group that is ethnically or culturally 
homogenous.34 Inter-communal violence, civil wars, and political disintegration are some of the 
reasons cited that encourage a power-sharing agreement among political or ethnic groups.35  
The case of Lebanon, dating back to 1861, was widely cited as an example of power-
sharing which could secure an end to violence and stability in the political order.36 Other more 
recent examples have included South Africa after Apartheid37 as well as Iraq after 2005.38 The 
primary assumptions being that power-sharing offers the opportunity to resolve crises by 
guaranteeing warring factions the opportunity to be part of government. Akin to power-sharing, 
consociational democracy is seen as one form of government that responds to a particular political 
culture and social structure - one that is fragmented. Lijphart (1969) argues that consociational 
democracy enables leaders of rival groups to channel their competitive behaviour into a shared 
executive and a shared parliament where they can be proportionally represented.39 For Lebanon, 
                                                          
32 Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One 
Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).  
33 See for instance Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1977). 
34 Arend Lijphart, “Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Theories,” 
The Journal of Federalism 15, no. (1985): 3-10. 
35 Brenda Seaver, “The Regional Sources of Power-sharing Failure: The Case of Lebanon,” Political 
Science Quarterly 115, no. 2 (2000): 247-271. 
36 The history and implications of this form of political system is presented in the following chapter 
discussing Lebanon’s case in more detail.  
37 See for instance Arend Lijphart, “South African Democracy: Majoritarian or Consociational?” 
Democratization 5, no. 4 (2007): 144-150.  
38 See John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, “Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation as Political 
Prescription,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 5, no. 4 (2007): 670-698, or Stefan Wolff, 
“Conflict Resolution between Power-Sharing and Power Dividing, or Beyond?” Political Studies Review, 
5, no. (2007): 377-393.  
39 Arend Lijphard, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, no. 2 (1969): 207-225.  
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power-sharing enables rival groups to ‘agree to disagree’, but all work within weak state 
institutions that allow opposing groups to maintain power and representation. One main pillar of 
consociationalism is the commitment of elites to maintaining power-sharing as a means to 
overcome fragmentation and mutual tensions. Lijphart advances this work to include an electoral 
system that offers Proportional Representation (PR) as opposed to a majoritarian system, which 
he claims might aggravate tensions and provide fewer incentives for cooperation.40 Proportional 
representation should go beyond the electoral process as well, to include proportional appointment 
of civil servants and proportional allocation of public funds.41 
The two primary attributes of consociational democracy, according to Lijphart, are: grand 
coalition and segmental autonomy—and its two secondary characteristics are —proportionality 
and minority veto: “Grand coalition, also called power-sharing, means that the political leaders of 
all of the significant segments of a plural (deeply divided) society govern the country jointly. 
Segmental autonomy means that decision-making is delegated to the separate segments as much 
as possible. This in turn supports fragmentation in identity and in citizenship whereby political 
participation is contingent about the willingness of separate segments to engage their communities. 
There is no overarching institution (state) that protects the right to participate and to be represented. 
Proportionality is the basic consociational standard of political representation, civil service 
appointments, and the allocation of public funds. The veto is a guarantee for minorities that they 
will not be outvoted by a majority when their vital interests are at stake.”42 
The initial enthusiasm for consociationalism and power-sharing was however dampened 
down over the years. Whilst veto power that secures the representation of minorities encourages 
representation for pluralistic societies, when majority and minority define themselves as ethnic or 
religious groups, veto power paralyses the ability of public institutions to oversee the political 
process and manage public resources. The threat of withdrawal, or lack of confidence, becomes a 
factor determining how much of a say communities (predetermined groups) have in the political 
outcome. When such tensions are not handled in government, the result is civil violence and 
political deadlock.  
                                                          
40 This assertion was echoed for decades later, see for instance Benjamin Reilly, ‘‘Electoral Systems for 
Divided Societies,’’ Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 156–170. 
41 Lijphart, “Non-Majoritarian Democracy,” 10.  
42 Ibid, 3.  
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Notwithstanding the case of Lebanon in, which power-sharing could not deliver its promise 
of limiting violence and managing crises, a growing body of literature provided the theoretical 
foundations for refuting a specific form of power-sharing, that in which representation is pre-
determined. The sceptics (O’leary and McGarry 2006, Van Schendelen 1984, and Roeder and 
Rothchild 2005) used three main grounds for their counter-arguments to Lijphart.43 First, power-
sharing and consociationalism, which presumes consensus-based agreements as the foundation of 
stable political, order make citizens completely differential and allows for secrecy in decision-
making which in turn can fuel discontent from both masses and minorities. Secondly, they refuted 
it as a model of democracy because political participation is threatening to power agreements by 
elites; such political competition is almost absent from the power-sharing agreement and therefore 
contradicts the premise of a democracy. The third argument is that power-sharing, in ethnically 
plural societies, mandates the guaranteed representation of groups that are confined and 
predetermined, as opposed to self-determined groups.44 
This third argument is useful for advancing the assertion that the choice of power-sharing 
in Lebanon and Libya provides no incentive for the political leadership to reform the system. 
Rather it means that identification, loyalty and legitimacy remain a factor of the group or the 
segment that is represented and does not allow for social, political or cultural mobility. In other 
words, being born into a particular group, a citizen is guaranteed that their group is represented 
indefinitely in political processes and political institutions. This confinement can end up 
harbouring dissent, dissatisfaction and radicalism, as opposed to the inclusion and stability that 
consociationalism promises.45 According to Cammett and Malesky, recent research proves that 
power-sharing can exacerbate conflict, especially in the absence of proportional elections that 
would otherwise encourage intra-communal collaboration.46 Moreover there is little literature on 
                                                          
43 See Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild, Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars 
(Ithaca Cornell University Press), and John McGarry and Brendan O’leiry, “Consociational Theory, 
Northern Ireland’s Conflict and its Agreement. Part 1: What Consociationalists Can Learn from North 
Ireland,” Government and Opposition 41, no. 1 (2006): 43-63, and M. P. Van Schendelen, “The Views of 
Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticisms,” Acta Politica 19, no. 1 (1984): 19-49.  
44 Consociationalism is a form of power-sharing and is used interchangeably to indicate a similar 
arrangement that confines and guarantees representation and veto powers to predetermined groups that are 
politically, ethnically or religiously homogeneous.  
45 Arend Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy: Power-Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice 
(New York: Routledge. 2008). 
46 Melani Cammett and Edmund Malesky, “Power-sharing in Post-conflict Societies: Implications for Peace 
and Governance,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 6 (2012): 981-1016. 
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what can consolidate power-sharing systems and what factors are important to the long-term 
survival of the state and the political system.47 
The two country cases in my thesis both exhibit important elements that would position 
them as suitable for a power-sharing agreement. They are both post-conflict societies, ethnically 
diverse, and politically divided. In particular, the social and political cleavages that emerged 
following Syrian involvement in Lebanon (2005) and post-Ghadhafi in Libya (2011) could well 
encourage political actors to prescribe power-sharing agreements as the only way to end a conflict. 
Viewed in comparison with either war or authoritarianism, consociationalism is appealing to 
political leaders in both countries. But this thesis is not about resolving conflict nor promoting a 
stable form of democracy; my question is about the challenges to political reform where power-
sharing has proven a major obstacle. While having an ensured stake in government might be an 
incentive to end a conflict, my main assertion is that it is not an incentive to reform the political 
process or political competition. This century old system in Lebanon is quite different from Libya’s 
recent moves toward a sharing of power. But in both cases, settling political decision through 
power-sharing has brought back elements of continuity from the past. Any attempt to enhance 
political participation (constitutional in the case of Libya) or political representation (elections in 
Lebanon) would threaten the fragile ‘deal’ brokered by communal group leaders whose power is 
based on either religion, region or tribe. The system becomes deadlocked in two ways: 
representation and participation are pre-determined (confining) and reform becomes destabilising 
(no longer self-serving to the groups in power).  
Power-sharing therefore carries within it the seeds that impede political reform. In 
particular, by granting power-sharing in regard of representation also grants a veto power to the 
community groups that are represented. In theory, power-sharing that allows for self-determination 
could encourage reform and intra-communal collaboration in favour of national interests. But a 
pre-determined representation with veto powers perpetuates cycles where deadlock is likely 
(Lebanon 2005 – 2009, and Libya 2012 – 2013), and most importantly weakens the legitimacy and 
power of the state in relation to the legitimacy and power of divided communal groups. Evidence 
from countries in Africa including Sierra Leone, Angola, and Rwanda suggests that power-sharing 
is an unstable form of government that provides only short-term reprieve after conflict but then 
                                                          
47 See for instance Adriano Pappalardo, “The Conditions for Consociational Democracy: A Logical and 
Empirical Critique,” European Journal of Political Research 9, no. 4 (1981): 365-390.   
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becomes an unworkable agreement.48 This is largely because power-sharing is seen as a final state 
of affairs and an agreement to manage potential conflict; it is not regarded as a transformative 
process that offers realistic reform options.49 Based on the premise that power-sharing agreements 
result in a political order that does not encourage political participation outside of predetermined 
confinements, I move to the third element of continuity in my study which is the ineffectiveness 
of civil society actors in both Lebanon and Libya. The communal aspect highlighted here fits into 
the literature on power-sharing, which states that under this type of system, the movement of votes 
among candidates is hindered by heavy social ties, incompatible beliefs, and feelings of hostility 
among the opposing subcultural alignments. This exacerbates tensions and violence among 
communities and limits the ability of individuals to choose for themselves while diminishing the 
role of civic organisations that appeal to the nation as a whole as opposed to communal subcultures. 
 
2.5 Problematizing Civil Society  
 The literature on civil society in the Arab World or the MENA region is vast and presents 
the reader with a variety of contested issues including the conceptualisation of civil society 
organisations, the role of civil society, and the relationship between civil society and regimes that 
are authoritarian or quasi-democratic. In this thesis I use the term civil society to refer broadly to 
the associational (volunteer) sector found in Lebanon and Libya of which non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) are a major segment. Civil society is applied as an illustration that certain 
campaigns for political reform did not succeed to garner sufficient pressure for reform. The thesis 
does not argue that civil society would have brought about democratisation in Lebanon and Libya 
but that its limited role contributed to maintaining path dependent outcomes after each country’s 
juncture. Lebanon has a long history of NGOs and civil society associations whilst in the Libyan 
case these organisations are newcomers to the social and political order. This section highlights 
those aspects in the literature that are relevant to the question of how civil society organisations 
have remained relatively ineffective in the pre and post uprising stage and indicate elements of 
continuity from the past regime. More importantly it relates this ineffectiveness to the challenge 
of political reform in weak states with enduring power-sharing systems. In doing so it is important 
                                                          
48 Ian Spears, “Africa: The Limits of Power-sharing,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 3 (2002): 123-136.  
49 See Tamirace Fakhoury, “Debating Lebanon’s Power-sharing Model: An Opportunity or an Impasse for 
Democratization Studies in the Middle East?” Arab Studies Journal 22, no. 1 (2014): 230-255.  
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to bear in mind that the politically exclusionary nature of the Gadhafi regime (1969 – 2011) is very 
different from Lebanon’s long-standing consociational order (1841 – present). What the two 
countries have in common however, is that during the time period researched for this study, 
representation in the political order was contingent upon belonging to factions that divided power 
and representation in a confining manner, rendering any role for autonomous NGOs as distinct 
from, and ineffective in, the political reform processes. Here I build on the view that institutions 
are determinants of political outcomes and have an effect on the attitudes and the modes of 
participation of citizens.50 It is therefore necessary in evaluating the role of civil society actors to 
have also prepared the ground by understanding how weak states and power-sharing agreements 
relate to the associational sector broadly, and to civil society that seeks to work on political reform 
more specifically. It is also necessary to explain the ineffectiveness of civil society within the 
context of both countries. The category of civil society organisations chosen for this research are 
those that seek to act as a platform outside of the confines of the communities that are represented 
in the power-sharing agreement. For Lebanon and Libya therefore it is groups working on national 
reform issues that mobilise actors from all sects, regions and ethnicities. 
 Of the various categories and types of civil society organisations, my case studies look at 
NGOs that have an organised structure (largely inspired from the Western model) whose presence 
and role is much debated. I look at the segment of these NGOs that dealt with political issues in 
Lebanon between 2005 and 2010 and in Libya between 2011 and 2013. For the purpose of this 
study NGOs are those groups that are able to create platforms for participation in the political 
sphere through direct actions, associations, or through relaying demands of interest to the public 
and in doing so act as a defence against politics and political orders.51 Civil society associations 
can entice mobilisation for a common cause as the case studies will show in Lebanon and Libya.52 
In both countries, these actors proved that they can rally citizens, articulate demands, and ensure 
the participation and support of thousands of citizens in support of a particular reform. Their 
                                                          
50 Miki Caul Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer Leslie, “Engaging Citizens: The Role of Power-sharing 
Institutions,” The Journal of Politics 72, no. 4 (2010): 990-1002.  
51 See for instance Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Boston: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992). 
52 In the survey conducted with Libyan citizens NGOs were most frequently cited as a form of political 
participation, and in interviews with Lebanese activists they are cited as an alternative to mainstream 
political mobilisation which is traditionally through sectarian political parties. 
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function therefore was to advocate for political reform in the direction of greater participation and 
representation in the political system. 
Unlike the normative approach, which sees that civil society is both a factor in enhancing 
democracy and an indication of a quality democracy, my approach sees civil society as an 
indication of weak state structure incapable of structuring the demands of civil society.53 
Normatively, the freedom to form associations that can keep a ‘watchful eye’ on the state is a key 
factor in promoting accountability and responsive governance.54 However, in the Libyan and 
Lebanese context the freedom to form associations is not necessarily linked to their ability to 
pressure state institutions or to influence governance. In the normative stream of literature the 
viability of civil society is dependent on a broader democratic political system that can enhance 
and allow a role for such organisations which is lacking in Lebanon and Libya. By the same token, 
the absence of a dynamic civil society means the political system is not democratic and this angle 
dominated much of the literature on the MENA region prior to the uprisings in 2010 – 2012.55 This 
tension between the role of civil society and the type of governance system has not been concluded 
in both academia and practice. It is not clear whether civil society can indeed bring about normative 
democratic ideals or whether it is that democratic ideals can promote and nurture an active civil 
society. The normative angle espoused by political scholars such as Nawaf Salam, Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim, Augustus Richard Norton, Sheri Berman and Thomas Carothers linked this concept 
strongly to the opportunity of democratising regimes in the MENA region.56 It was thought that 
more presence of civil society actors could force governments to adopt democratic reforms. This 
understanding of the role of civil society actors stems from the assumption that these actors can 
work to promote democracy and that they are found in institutions with democratic ideals. The 
normative claim has dwindled from the academic debate for reasons that civil society actors were 
not proven as capable of promoting democracy. Additionally, it was not necessarily the case that 
these civil society actors were working within democratic structures or democratic ideals that could 
                                                          
53 See for instance Robert Putnam, “Bowling Alone,” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (1995): 65-78. 
54 Larry Diamond and Leonard Morlino, “The Quality of Democracy: An Overview,” Journal of 
Democracy 15, no. 4 (2004): 20-31.  
55 See for instance Sean Yom, “Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World,” Middle East Review 
of International Affairs 9, no. 4 (2005): 14-33.  
56 Nawaf Salam, “Civil Society in the Arab World: The Historical and Political Dimensions,” Harvard 
Islamic Studies Program, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), Sheri Berman, “Islamism, 
Revolution and Civil Society,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 2 (2003): 257-272, Norton, “The Future of 
Civil Society in the Middle East,” Ibrahim, “The Troubled Triangle,” 373-385. 
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expand to reach political leaders.57 For these reasons which make the links between democracy 
and civil society questionable, the normative approach is not the one chosen in this thesis. 
Indeed, the expansion in number and scope of civil society associations and non-
governmental organisations working on issues of governance and political order, particularly in 
the 1990s, was not accompanied by political change in the Arab World and spawned great 
scepticism about the existence of a civil society and the validity of the normative claim that it can 
strengthen or democratize the political sphere. There was also strong scepticism that the NGO 
model supported by foreign donors and policy-makers did not trigger the required political support 
for key reforms that could bring about democratisation in the region.58 This was especially the case 
when foreign allies of the regime were allowed to provide funding and technical assistance in line 
with the state’s political stances.59 Foreign assistance coalesced with the regimes’ strategy to 
position itself as liberal and reformed. This skewed the interests of non-governmental associations 
in favour of maintaining the status quo.60 Across the MENA region regimes allowed for a rise in 
activism and increased the ability of citizens to voice their demands, but that did not change the 
way the state dealt with citizens or the type of political representation.61 The literature review that 
will be presented in Chapters Three and Five shows an increase in the size of the associational 
sector, meaning the number of NGOs. But this new type of political NGOs was not an effective 
mechanism for citizen participation in politics and was not accompanied by political reforms that 
have reshaped the relations between citizens and state.62  
                                                          
57 See for instance the argument that a focus on civil society has been futile in bringing about reform in 
Vickie Langhor, “Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalising Arab Regimes,” 
Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 181-203.  
58 Benoit Challand, Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign Donors and the Power to Promote and Exclude (New 
York, Routledge, 2009). 
59 Yom, “Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World.”  
60 An interview with member of the Civil Campaign on Electoral Reform in Lebanon provides insights as 
to how activists would adapt their priorities and discourse in line with how the governmental commission 
was dealing with reform. 
61 This paved the way for a number of new labels about non-democracies in the MENA region including 
views that these were liberalised autocracies, see Daniel Brumberg, “The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy,” 
Journal of Democracy 13, no. 4 (2002): 56-68 or Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Civil Society as Social Control: 
State Power in Jordan,” Comparative Politics 33, no. 1 (2000): 43-61. 
62 This is one of the major empirical contribution of the thesis. To validate this claim I reviewed databases 
of registered organisations and placed them in a proposed typology then studied NGO role in political 
reform. 
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Another dominant literature stream that can be viewed in a more functionalist light sees 
civil society as a segment of groups or associations that are actively taking part in issues of a public 
nature. Civil society viability in this perspective is based on the ability of the actors and NGOs to 
engage in the political process and contribute to political institutions, processes and participation. 
Under authoritarian regimes therefore, theoretically civil society actors were able to flourish and 
contribute to public affairs without being directly associated with the rise of democracy.63 This is 
because authoritarian regimes would allow a margin of freedom to participate in political affairs 
and to articulate demands without necessarily responding to these demands by opening up 
participation and competition. The functions of these actors is largely dependent on the legal, 
political and social context in the broader system of governance.64 Because of restrictions on 
freedom, funding and activities, the increase in civil society associations in the MENA region was 
not seen as a vehicle for democratisation.65 The mass uprisings that swept the MENA region 
encouraged scholars to rethink the range of relevant social actors by expanding it to include more 
informal social movements that all took part in the mass uprisings, but that were not typically 
considered part of this ‘democratic’ civil society.66 These events contributed to the weakening of 
the myth that NGOs alone can bring about political change and also challenged the notion that 
only a specific type of civil society actor can destabilise long-standing regimes in the MENA 
region. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the NGO’s role in the reform process is included as one 
constraint on political reform represented by the lack of responsiveness of state institutions to the 
demands for political reform promulgated by the NGOs. This research regards civil society as a 
platform capable of mobilising citizens from across different sectarian communities in Lebanon 
and different ethnic and regional backgrounds in Libya. While it remains to be seen whether indeed 
these platforms could being about democratic ideals and democratic reform, the research here will 
                                                          
63 See for instance Vincent Durac, “Entrenching Authoritarianism or Promoting Reform? Civil Society in 
Contemporary Yemen,” in Civil Society Activism under Authoritarian Rule: A Comparative Perspective. 
Edited by Francesco Cavatorta, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 135-155, and Aarts and Cavatorta, Civil 
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65 Holger Albercht and Olivier Schlumberger, “Waiting for Godot: Regime Change without 
Democratisation in the Middle East,” International Political Science Review 25, no. 4 (2004): 371-392.  
66 Cavatorta, “Arab Spring: The Awakening of Civil Society.”   
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show how limitations on such platforms is indicative of strong path dependence which constraints 
the potential for reform. Without reforms that contribute to greater representation and participation 
civil society organisations in both countries were unable to sustain their efforts. In both Lebanon 
and Libya, there are a number of associations that have the expertise, resources and the willingness 
to take part in advancing key political reforms. The case studies will show how these actors were 
disconnected from the centres of decision-making. In both cases discussed in Chapters Four and 
Six, NGOs succeeded in mobilising people, surveying public opinion, and proposing reforms, but 
they fail in being able to contribute to creating the political will necessary for reform, largely 
because the system provides no incentive for decision makers to adopt reform. I therefore 
contribute to the debate about the generic weakness of ‘civil society’ by showing empirically how 
NGOs working on political issues have not been able to trigger political reforms during transition.  
I have selected NGOs working on political reform, specifically demanding political 
representation or participation, as one type of civil society associations that have been highly active 
regarding the issues of elections and constitutional development. These NGOs act as mediators 
between citizens and the state and are illustrative of a particular set of demands that diverged from 
the reform processes in both countries. My selected case studies align with the conclusions of other 
theories, which show how civil society actors and NGOs in particular have been unable to 
contribute to reform during transition. To identify the role of NGOs as constraints on reform, my 
case studies show how the latter’s demands are far from the preferences of political agents during 
transition.  
It is important to position the NGOs selected for my study as part of a broader range of 
actors and associations that we can identify in Lebanon and Libya. The literature around civil 
society typologies is vast and proposes that civil society organisations can be categorised based 
on: scope of work, geographical location, type of membership, nature of activities, and type of 
demands.67 For example, we can distinguish between urban and rural civil society, environmental 
groups and human rights groups, research organisations versus charity organisations, and so on. It 
is also possible to distinguish between formally organised civil society organisations (NGOs) and 
more informal civil society actors (social movements) that are not necessarily registered 
                                                          
67 NTEE classifies nonprofit organisations according to their fields of activity, purposes, governance model, 
religious affiliation, and clientele. Developed by Virginia Hodgkinson and Christopher Toppe in “A New 
Research and Planning Tool for Managers: The national taxonomy of exempt entities,” Non-Profit 
Management and Leadership 1, no. 4 (1991): 403-414.  
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organisations but are groups, networks or movements working for a common cause. Based on a 
review of the databases of most registered organisations in Lebanon and Libya, I propose that there 
are five types of civil society associations that are not necessary mutually exclusive. These are 
presented as different functions that associations can perform:68 
Self-help groups: These are community-based organisations that operate for purposes of 
local social, economic, cultural, political or environmental issues. They bring together local 
stakeholders such as municipal councils, local business and local charities to work on a common 
event or issue (for example, an exhibition of local crafts produced by women or a neighbourhood 
group working to clean the beach).  
Service providers: These are associations that intervene in a particular sector to fill a gap 
in the needs of citizens. Their work typically includes humanitarian relief, food and shelter, 
cleaning, healthcare, schooling, and protection of minority groups among others (for example, 
organisations that set up hospitals where there are none. or provide tents for refugees).  
Public awareness groups: These are organisations conducting research on public policy 
issues that use and diffuse data to raise the awareness of citizens and political leadership regarding 
specific issues. These groups often monitor and report on the performance of public institutions in 
a particular area (for example human rights groups documenting and reporting on violations, or 
groups raising awareness on the abuse of migrant workers). 
Unions: These are professional associations of workers that operate in a particular industry 
or trade in the private or public sectors. They are motivated by the need to maximize the interests 
of their members and comprise a significant arena of activism in both countries (for example a 
union of public school teachers, or of medical doctors).  
Political activism and lobbying groups: These are organisations and actors whose main 
concerns are the political decision-making processes and political competition. They work 
primarily on political reforms and seek to influence a decision by state institutions with regards to 
representation or participation in the political process. They are distinct from political parties as 
                                                          
68 Libyan NGOs database obtained from Centre for Civil Society updated until July 2013 with 
approximately 1,300 registered associations, and Lebanon NGOs database obtained from registry of 
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities cross-checked with online registry of www.daleel-madani.org 
comprised of approximately 1,400 NGOs. By reviewing the scope of work and identifying the sectors where 
NGOs are active in, I inferred the five categories here. 
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they do not seek to access power, but function to promulgate demands and priorities into the 
political process. The two case studies for this research are identified from within this group.  
In each country case study I will provide a broad review of the associational sector before 
concentrating on the experiences of two specific political NGOs. For the purpose of explaining the 
challenges to political reform, I examine the last category of political NGOs because it is most 
relevant to help identify the effects of weak states and power-sharing in both countries. Political 
NGOs chosen for this study were both working on demanding political reforms. Whilst they might 
not be representative of all types of associations, their efforts, which increased after the critical 
juncture, in both countries help uncover the characteristics of path dependence in Lebanon and 
Libya. Studying the demands of these groups and their relationships with political leaders and state 
institutions reveals constraints on the likelihood of political reform. In particular, the way that 
political NGOs remained marginalised from the centre of decision-making and from political 
representation is another element of continuity from pre and post junctures in both countries.69  
Regime reactions to these groups, although they were not as violent as they were pre-
juncture, remained largely dismissive and unresponsive. The two case studies will show how 
NGOs created after critical junctures in these two countries reinforced a similar (negative) 
response to their demands from the new regime as that of the pre-critical juncture regime. NGO-
state relations in my two case studies are illustrative of a constraint on reform and therefore of a 
mechanism of reproduction of path dependent outcomes. For example, in both the cases of the 
Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections and The Forum for Democratic Libya thousands 
of people were involved, a great deal of funding was spent, and in-depth knowledge regarding the 
political issues did not feed into the reform process. Both NGOs also transcended the sectarian, 
ethnic and political divides and brought citizens from different backgrounds to work on a reform 
issue that was later only partially addressed by the political order. The roles therefore of NGOs 
selected in this thesis were to mobilize citizens around a specific political reform, articulate and 
demand political reforms during a transition, and advocate for greater participation in the political 
process.  
In Lebanon, the activism by political groups emerged in the late 1990’s and then more 
openly in the post Syrian era and was concerned with: anticorruption initiatives such as the 
                                                          
69 For Libya see Mabroka Al-Werfalli, Political Alienation in Libya: Assessing Citizens’ Political Attitude 
and Behaviour (London: Ithaca Press, 2011) and for Lebanon see Kingston, Reproducing Sectarianism. 
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Lebanese Transparency Association, citizenship issues such as Nahwa el Muwatiniya, anti-
sectarianism such as SHAML, and electoral reform, led by the Lebanese Association for 
Democratic Elections (LADE).70 In Libya political activism during the Gadhafi era was primarily 
undertaken by diaspora groups and intellectual thought leaders outside of Libya. Political activism 
emerged in Libya with the start of the uprising in 2011 and culminated after the conflict.71 Activists 
established new organisations and groups that became increasingly concerned with youth political 
participation such as H20, transparency and anticorruption such as One-Libya, and constitutional 
dialogue spearheaded by organisations, such as the one selected for this study the Forum for 
Democratic Libya (FDL).  
 
2.6 Conclusion: Elements of Continuity and Path Dependence  
The concepts of weak state, power-sharing and civil society are useful in explaining the 
challenges of political reform for Lebanon and Libya and defined the ways in which each of these 
issues is illustrative of a constraint on political reform. These are persisting elements of continuity 
that resulted in the two countries’ junctures having only been partially critical for the political 
order. These dynamics of transition, reform and post-uprising, focus our attention on reinforcing 
mechanisms that lead to path dependent outcomes. In weak state systems powerful non-state actors 
(military, tribal or ethnic) continue to play a strong role in politics and policy-making, thereby 
rendering state institutions less important to the reform process than outside parties. Likewise, by 
adopting a power-sharing agreement, the political system provides a power of veto to pre-
determined communities (ethnic, regional, religious, etc.), groups that have no interest in 
expanding political representation or participation to members beyond their own group. The more 
functionalist perspective I employ here shows how political institutions are led by largely rational 
actors who simply do not find it in their interest to adopt political reforms that threaten their power 
base and jeopardize representation or participation from outside the pre-determined groups. 
The next chapter familiarizes the reader with the background to the case of Lebanon. In 
particular it emphasizes how the three levels of analysis pertain to Lebanon’s history and political 
institutions. I will begin by a review of the historical features of the Lebanese state and the 
intricacies of the Lebanese case that make political reform especially challenging. The chapter will 
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then conclude with the theoretical implications to the framework presented here before moving to 
the findings from the empirical field study. 
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Chapter Three - Lebanon: Intricacies of a Sectarian Power-Sharing System 
 
 “We believe the reasons behind violence in Lebanon do not lie within  
the previous wars but within the peace settlements that were adopted in Lebanon.” 
Ahmad Beydoun 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The endurance of Lebanon’s consociational democracy and the survival of sectarian 
power-sharing agreements are indicative of a particular form of regime resilience. In terms of path 
dependence, the Lebanese system is an example of how consensus among political elites who have 
an interest in a particular form of government can make reforming state institutions a challenge. 
Most recently, when mass uprisings in the Arab World were accompanied by regime change, many 
hailed the ‘Lebanese model’ as a formula for stability in divided societies, as Lebanon was able to 
maintain its pluralistic character despite deep and longstanding political divisions.1 Lebanon’s 
ability to overcome cycles of conflict was attributed to this power-sharing model which guaranteed 
representation for its main sectarian groups. What tends to be overlooked in the literature is how 
the power of sectarian groups weakened and often paralysed state institutions. Formally the 
Lebanese political system does not require religious representation, but informally the system, and 
all its institutions, is based on the acquiescence of sectarian religious groups.2 
Political decisions require a process of consensus building among sectarian leaders whose 
groups enjoy almost complete autonomy afforded to them by the Ottoman millet system and 
maintained since.3 As early as the mid-nineteenth century, Lebanese sects were recognised as 
autonomous communities and allowed to govern their own personal and religious affairs in 
accordance to religious norms and with input from religious officials.4 Lebanon as a case study 
offers significant insight as to how weak states relate to civic organisations and how power-sharing 
agreements, over time, lead their states to become averse to reforms that would enable political 
                                                          
1 See for instance the Lebanon ‘model’ praised as a potential solution for the conflict in Syria by Stephen 
Rosiny, “Power-Sharing in Syria: Lessons from Lebanon’s Ta’if Experience,” Middle East Policy 20, no. 
3 (2012): 41-55.  
2 See Fakhoury, “Debating Lebanon’s Power-sharing Model,” and Ralph Crow, “Religious Sectarianism in 
the Lebanese Political System,” The Journal of Politics 24, no. 3 (1962): 489-520.  
3 Simon Haddad, “Lebanon: From Consociation to Conciliation,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 15, no. 
3-4 (2009): 411.  
4 Fakhoury, “Debating Lebanon’s Power-sharing Model,” 234. 
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competition and citizen participation outside the confines of ethnicity, religion or geography. 
According to Khalaf, the confessional groups that control a sectarian constituency also undermine 
‘civic consciousness’ and become the very forces that pull society apart and contribute to conflict.5 
Undermining civic consciousness is done through a range of legal and political practices that 
support the sectarian system. The Lebanese political system’s focus on sectarian leadership has 
emphasised a sectarian identity and belonging, which in turn exacerbated social and political 
cleavages among the Lebanese.6 The power-sharing system posits that Lebanon’s consociational 
formula guarantees representation for pre-determined groups split between the main Muslim, 
Christian and Druze factions. Representation is through political parties of a homogenous sectarian 
base, because there is no incentive for intra-communal parties that would represent a national 
constituency.7 
Sectarianism also implies that personal status issues are governed by the religious court 
and confessional authority of each major religious group that is recognised by the state. A total of 
fifteen personal status laws administer the affairs of the eighteen recognised sects.8 The system 
allows for each religious community to have its own court system and all attempts to reform this 
since the 1970s have failed at the state level.9 Article 9 of the Lebanese Constitution underlines 
the state’s respect of all sects and their personal status matters. The Lebanese citizen thus abides 
by his/her sectarian laws and courts “from the cradle to the grave but does not participate in or 
benefit from effective state oversight over religious authorities.”10 Civil marriage is not possible 
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Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000): 27.  
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Theodor Hanf and Nawaf Salam eds., (Berlin: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003).  
7 The sectarian homogeneity of political parties cited historically by scholars was evident again in a research 
I conducted on the 14 political parties currently represented in Lebanon’s parliament. See Carmen Geha, 
“Role of Lebanese Youth in Elections and Political Parties: A Comparative Study,” (Beirut: United Nations 
Development Program, 2013). 
8 For an explanation and implications of this see Lamia Rustom Shehadeh, “The Legal Status of Married 
Women in Lebanon,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 30, no. 4 (1998): 501-519.  
9 The first law proposal on civil status was prepared and advocated for in 1971 by legal experts Abdullah 
Lahoud, Norma Melhem and Joseph Moghaizel but was adopted only by a small party at the time called 
the Democratic Party. In 1998 former Lebanese President Elias Hrawi proposed an optional civil status law 
that was rejected by parliament, and again in 2007 an NGO Nahwa el Muwatiniya in collaboration with the 
Civil Centre for National Initiative launched a campaign to demand removal of reference to sect from civil 
registries that led to the issuance of a decree in 2009 by former Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud declaring 
this right not to refer to sect in the national identity cards as a ‘constitutional right.’ 
10 “Toward a Citizen’s State. Beirut: National Human Development Report,” (Beirut: United Nations 
Development Program, 2009), 70.  
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in Lebanon and all laws pertaining to inheritance, travel and religious freedoms are contingent 
upon their recognition by religious, and not civil, courts. It is only recently that a lawyer, Joseph 
Bechara, has identified a legal loophole and has registered the civil marriage of a few couples 
without having to appeal over decades-old legislation pertaining to sectarian identity that states 
that a person must change their sectarian identity if they wish to marry someone from another 
religion.11  
Election to office takes place through an electoral system where sectarian belonging is the 
basis for candidacy, voting, and representation.12 Sectarianism within institutions requires that 
civil service appointments, and promotions in the public sector, be based on sectarian belonging.13 
Education policies pertaining to what curricula are taught, where schools are built, and who can 
access private education are also tightly linked to sectarian power dynamics.14 Even the 
associational sector is ‘sectarianised’, with the majority of NGOs supported by the state belonging 
to established religious groups, or families of sectarian leaders.15 Sectarian NGOs founded by 
prominent political leaders, especially after the civil war, also are primary providers of up to 60% 
of basic health and education services.16 Even sports, for example, football and basketball clubs, 
is a tool for competition between sects characterised with patron-client relations and financed by 
sectarian elite17. Lastly, although parties do exist, most state representatives do not belong to 
political parties and party competition only takes place between sectarian parties or is aimed at 
                                                          
11 “A Step Close to a Civil Status Law?” Now Media 31 January 2014, 
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/533357-a-step-closer-to-a-civil-status-law, (April 24th 2014). 
12 See Illiya Harik, “Voting Participation and Political Integration in Lebanon 1943 – 1974,” Middle East 
Studies 16, no. 1 (1980): 27-48 and more recently Imad Salamey and Rhys Payne, “Parliamentary 
Consociationalism in Lebanon: Equal Citizenry vs. Quotated Confessionalism,” The Journal of Legislative 
Studies 14, no. 4 (2008): 451-473. 
13 On how this causes rampant corruption see Charles Adwan. “Corruption in Reconstruction: The Cost of 
National Consensus in Post-War Lebanon,” Centre for International Private Enterprise 
http://www.cipe.org/sites/default/files/publication-docs/adwan.pdf (2004), (accessed June 10th 2014).  
14 Charbel Nahas, “Finance and Political Economy of Higher Education in Lebanon,” in Financing Higher 
Education in Arab Countries. Ahmad Galal and Taher Kanaan eds., (Beirut: Economic Research Forum 
Report 2010), 49-86.  
15 Jad Chaaban and Karin Seyfert, “Faith-based NGOs in a Multi-Confessional Society: Evidence from 
Lebanon,” (Beirut: Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 2012), 1-21.  
16 Karim Elbayar, “NGO Laws in Selected Arab States,” International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 7, no. 
4 (2005): 3-27.  
17 See Danyel Reiche, “War minus the Shooting? The Politics of Sports in Lebanon as a Unique Case in 
Comparative Politics,” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2011): 261-277.  
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dividing the votes of sectarian communities18. Party membership is homogeneously sectarian and, 
as such, parties do not support integration but rather the continued fragmentation of identities and 
belonging in the Lebanese polity19.  
With a violent past, unstable future, and perilous regional environment, scholars writing 
on Lebanon continue to interpret events through a narrative of recurrent sectarian strife maintained 
by an ‘imperfect,’ hybrid, or consociational democracy. Inquiries into Lebanon’s political system 
often dismiss its establishment during the Mutasarrifya of Mount Lebanon in the time of the 
Ottoman Empire20 and focus on the emergence of the National Pact that laid the foundation of 
Lebanon’s current state system in 1943.21  Lebanon’s strategic importance within the region has 
also allowed foreign actors to favour power-sharing as a means of sponsoring local groups that 
advance their own interests.22 This creates a situation in which political elites benefit from outside 
support, aiding them in the defeat their opponents and external actors benefit from having 
Lebanese factions advancing their own political agendas.23  
This chapter explains how endogenous and exogenous factors interact and solidify power-
sharing through the guaranteed representation of sectarian groups, thereby entrenching the weak 
state and a civil society that is politically ineffective. I focus particularly on the endogenous forces 
that are inhibiting political reform, particularly those resulting from power-sharing institutions and 
the ineffectiveness of civil society organisations that work on political reform. This chapter has 
three main objectives. First, I present key concepts in the analysis of Lebanon’s political order and 
the relationship between citizens and a sectarian state. In the second section, I examine key 
historical features and events that led up to the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005, the event that 
                                                          
18 See a survey of Lebanese parties in Farid Khazen, “Political Parties in Post-War Lebanon: Parties in 
Search of Partisans,” Middle East Journal 57, no. 4 (2003): 605-624.  
19 See for example Melani Cammett, “Partisan Activism and Access to Welfare in Lebanon,” Studies in 
Comparative International Development 46, no. 1 (2011): 70-97.  
20 See for instance Engin Akarli, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon 1961 – 1920. (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1993).  
21 On the National Pact and its effect on citizen and voter behavior see Harik, “Voting Participation and 
Political Integration in Lebanon.” 
22 See for example some of the earliest accounts of this by Jacob Hurewitz, “Lebanese Democracy in its 
International Setting,” The Middle East Journal 17, no. 5 (1963): 487-506 and more recently in Elizabeth 
Picard, Lebanon - A Shattered Country: Myths and Realities about the Wars in Lebanon (New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 2002). 
23 See for instance Michael Kerr, Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland 
and Lebanon (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2005) and Richard Hrair Dekmejian, “Consociational 
Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon,” Comparative Politics 10, no. 2 (1978): 251-265.  
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comprises the partially critical juncture covered in this thesis. Lastly, I conclude with the political 
implications of these historical experiences before moving on to the case of electoral (non)-reform 
between 2005 and 2010.   
 
3.2 Key ‘Lebanese-centric’ Terms  
This section explains three key concepts that have become part and parcel of the Lebanese 
political lexicon and practice. Politicians use these concepts to promote their decisions and 
convince constituencies that they are upholding the interests of the country. They are therefore 
seen as positive terms when it comes to political decision making and strategic choices about the 
political order. However, by considering their implications, this section highlights their negative 
effect regarding the possibility of political reform. The first notion is co-existence (aish 
moshtarak), a term upheld in Lebanese political discourse as the ultimate aim of the power-sharing 
system. This notion is salient to the political emphasis on ‘co-existence’, which has overshadowed 
much of the politics of, and literature about, Lebanon.24 Co-existence implies that there is 
implicitly a communal tension that must be continuously regulated. The status of a citizen is 
acquired though his/her belonging to a sect and his/her agreement to co-exist with another sect. In 
this context, sects are legally “confessionalizing” the relationship between citizens and the state.25 
National identity is characterised by different identities, so national identity is not unitary but 
occurs through cohabitation and the coexistence of different identities. The system of coexistence 
however fails to provide peace and stability since it exacerbates inequity in citizenship rights and 
empowers sectarian communities to mediate relations between citizens at the expense of the role 
of the state.26 In Lebanon aish moshtarak became the label given by politicians for decisions, 
policies and alliances that they claim are to the advantage of sectarian ties.27 Belonging to a sect 
supersedes belonging to the state and is a prerequisite for political participation. The power-sharing 
system is then portrayed as saving and securing the interests of these sects. But the political 
                                                          
24 See for instance the seminal work by Theodore Hanf, Co-existence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a 
State and Rise of a Nation (London: Centre for Lebanese Studies and IB Tauris, 1994). 
25 “Towards a Citizen’s State,” 23.  
26 Ibid, 24.  
27 For example in 2006 when Right winged party the Free Patriotic Movement led by Michel Aoun signed 
a strategic pact with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Aoun referred to it as an attempt at enshrining co-
existence between Christians and Shia, see more about how this alliance strengthened both power bases of 
Nasrallah and Aoun in Eyal Zisser, “Nasrallah’s Defeat in the 2006 War: Assessing Hezbollah’s Influence,” 
Middle East Quarterly 16, no. 1 (2009). 
 74 
 
institutions resulting from power-sharing have strengthened fragmented identities that feed into 
the promise of co-existence by incurring benefits and representation solely based on sectarian 
belonging.28 At the heart of these institutions is Lebanon’s electoral system, which will be explored 
in Chapter Four.  
Here the second key ‘Lebanese’ term is political patrons (zu’ama; plural for za’im) who 
provide political patronage, protection, and services to citizens.29 The term has its roots in the 
Ottoman Empire where it was used to refer to feudal dignitaries.30 Zu’ama are not religious leaders 
but leaders of sectarian groups supported by religious leadership, such as the Maronite Patriarch 
or the Sunni Mufti. Zu’ama therefore enjoy two bases of support: from religious leaders at the 
national level and from sectarian supporters/constituencies at the national and local level. These 
sectarian bases of power make state institutions the primary loci of contest among sectarian leaders 
who claim that these institutions have a duty to cater for their constituency.31 The zu’ama are self-
proclaimed representatives of the major sectarian groups and have in common the fact that their 
power-base is confessional, they are the merchants and financiers within the Lebanese economy, 
and they have direct official representatives in the legislative and executive branches.32  
There are ‘high level’ sectarian zu’ama who are leaders of major political parties and who 
have representatives in political office. The most prominent are: Hasan Nasrallah who leads the 
largest Shi’a party, Hezbollah, Walid Jumblat who leads the largest Druze party, the Democratic 
Renewal, Saad Hariri who heads the largest Sunni party, Future Movement, and the two heads of 
competing Christian parties, Michelle Aoun of the Free Patriotic Movement, and Samir Geagea of 
the Lebanese Forces. These ‘high level’ zu’ama perform all the functions traditionally ascribed to 
statesmen.33 They have their own foreign ties and external patrons, attend international 
                                                          
28 The assertion is echoed by recent research on the politics of sectarianism by Diane Riskedahl, “The 
Sovereignty of Kin: Political Discourse in Post-Ta’if Lebanon,” Political and Legal Anthropology Review, 
34, no. 2 (2011): 233-250.   
29 See how the term zu’ama is used to explain a sophisticated machinery of how sectarian leaders recruit 
and maintain supporters in Guita Hourani and Eugene Sensenig-Dabbous, “Naturalized Citizens: Political 
Participation, Voting Behavior and Impact on Elections in Lebanon (1996 – 2007),” International 
Migration and Integration 13, (2012): 187-202.  
30 See Are Knudsen, “Acquiescence to Assassinations in Post-War Lebanon?” Mediterranean Politics, 15, 
no. 1 (2010): 1-23.  
31 “Towards a Citizen’s State,” 26.  
32 See Carolyn Gates, The Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of an Open Economy (London: The Centre 
for Lebanese Studies and IB Tauris, 1998), 23-50.  
33 Arda Ekmekji, Confessionalism and Electoral Reform in Lebanon (Washington DC: The Aspen Institute, 
2012).  
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conferences and represent Lebanon, propose and support legislation, as well as sit at the National 
Dialogue table, which is the main platform to resolve political conflict and build consensus.34 For 
example, all civil servants in grades one to three (middle and senior public servants) are appointed 
directly by the Cabinet based on their sectarian affiliation and their receiving a nomination from 
these national zu’ama.35 In addition, there are local-level zu’ama providing services and patronage 
at the local and municipal level. The approximately 940 municipal councils at the local level are 
under-staffed, lack financial resources, and cannot carry out their basic mandates such as the 
cleaning and lighting of streets. These gaps in municipal functions are replaced by local-level 
zu’ama who can cater for the basic health, education and employment needs of citizens in their 
localities. Local zu’ama also organise voting during elections, rally supporters to major protests 
when needed, and distribute benefits and goods via religious or sectarian charity associations.36 
The za’im, most often male, derives his legitimacy from religious figures who endorse him and 
who direct certain policy stances. Political zu’ama and religious leaders therefore collude on key 
reforms. The Maronite Patriarch and Sunni Mufti are therefore key political figures who support 
candidates to parliament, nominate Presidents of the Republic, and can ask their constituency to 
boycott legislative reforms. 
The third term with dual meaning is sectarian system (nizam ta’ifi), referring to the form 
of power-sharing that Lebanon has adopted for over a century. It refers openly to a system that is 
sectarian –seats in Parliament are divided on a sectarian basis and the judiciary and executive are 
appointed to maintain equality among the recognised sectarian groups. Lebanon’s President is 
therefore always a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni, and the House Speaker is Shi’a.37 The 
use of the term nizam, meaning system, is clear about it not being an institution (mo’assasa), but 
a network or a system of sectarian interests in which sectarian leaders perform the main functions.38 
A system, unlike an institution or a state, is not headed by one person and is as such very difficult 
                                                          
34 The ‘National Dialogue Table’ is often called for by presidents to settle issues where sectarian leaders 
are in opposition and which cause institutional deadlocks. See Augustus Richard Norton, “The Role of 
Hezbollah in Lebanese Politics,” The International Spectator 42, no. 4 (2007): 475-491.  
35 “Quality of Public Services,” (Beirut: Beyond Reform & Development, 2012). 
36 Melani and Issar, “Bricks and Mortar Clientelism.” 
37 Lebanon’s Constitution promulgated 23 May 1926 stated representation in parliament but in practice 
these positions became the rule.  
38 Omar Abi Azar, founder of the movement to bring down the sectarian system in 2011 (Iskat Al Nizam Al 
Ta’ifi), interview with author, Beirut, March 2012. 
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to reform or remove altogether.39 Every decision, policy, budget, program or appointment requires 
the approval and buy-in of the major religious sects (the tawa’ef, plural ta’ifa). This illustrates 
Migdal’s assertion that strong social (communal) groups weaken state institutions and make them 
subject to a force that is non-state.40 
The ta’ifi nature of the system strengthens communal identity making the sect a principal 
source of the self and the group, giving rise to multiple spheres that fragment, rather than unite, a 
national public sphere.41 It accentuates religious ties in the political sphere to ensure that religious 
or sectarian identity is a key factor in political behaviour.42 Subsequently, institutions within this 
system are designed to accommodate for fragmented identities that seek protection from sectarian 
zu’ama. The nizam’s main pillars are institutions that are staffed equally among sects and that are 
subservient to the role of sects. Salloukh suggests that it may be more relevant to note that while 
there may be nothing inherently ta’ifi in Lebanon’s political make-up, the ta’ifi system enforces 
and reinforces sectarianism and engineers a particular set of sectarian elite who govern without 
accountability.43 
The nizam tai’ifi therefore has an inherent preference for political actors emanating from 
the high level zu’ama. This is why a look at “the name of presidents, prime ministers, deputies, 
supreme court justices, ministers and most class ‘A’ civil servants would confirm that the same 
family names recur almost uninterruptedly for the last two centuries.”44 These names ascend to 
power from national zu’ama and represent the same large sectarian families who forged power-
sharing agreements at different critical junctures in Lebanon’s history. They are often sons of 
fathers or grandfathers who have been in power for decades and who form elite cartels to 
circumscribe and limit state power.45 Jaafar noted that sectarian consociationalism in the case of 
                                                          
39 This is why founders of the movement to bring down the sectarian system in 2011 say they failed, while 
other Arab countries had one dictator, Lebanon had several dictators maintaining a strong sectarian system 
that cannot be brought down by popular pressure for reform. 
40 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, 21. 
41 Michael Dawahare, Civil Society and Lebanon: Toward a Hermeneutic Theory of the Public Sphere in 
Comparative Studies (Florida: Brown Walker Press 2000).  
42 Fiona McCallum, “The Political Role of the Patriarch in the Contemporary Middle East,” Middle Eastern 
Studies 43, no. 6 (2007): 923-940. 
43 Bassel Salloukh, “The Limits of Electoral Engineering in Divided Societies: Elections in Postwar 
Lebanon,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 39, no. 3 (2006): 635-655.  
44 Hanna Ziadeh, Sectarianism and Inter-communal Nation Building in Lebanon (London: C. Hurst and Co, 
2006): 146.  
45 See for instance Salamey and Payne, “Parliamentary Consociationalism in Lebanon,” and Dekmejian, 
“Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon,” 257.  
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Lebanon has amplified sectarian entities, weakened the state, and multiplied alternative (non-state) 
power centres that heightened the incapacity of political institutions to respond to citizens’ needs.46 
The nizam ta’ifi has made political reform an arduous task and challenged the role of civil society 
in reform since before the civil war until after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005. The nizam ta’ifi 
cannot promote a national form of citizenship and civic participation or enforce the rule of law 
nationally.47 
The three notions explained here embody the features of path dependence in Lebanon. The 
following historical review shows how the role of the zu’ama benefits from this notion of 
coexistence and helps to preserve the sectarian system at various political junctures. These notions 
make the Lebanese state resilient to change, yet weak enough to adopt change that supports 
sectarian power-sharing. The state’s functional weakness allows for social services, freedoms, and 
benefits to be bestowed upon citizens by non-state actors such as charities and political parties led 
and sponsored by its sectarian leaders.48 Sectarian leadership that is para-public (its power stems 
from outside of the state and flows beyond state institutions) remains stronger than the state and 
thrives in the absence of reform on sectarian ties, maintaining hegemony over political life. This 
weakness makes it possible for sectarian leaders to dominate political, economic and social life 
without having any incentive to reform the state and the political processes as will be illustrated in 
Chapter Four. The following section traces the evolution of Lebanon’s power-sharing system over 
five phases. 
 
3.3 Path dependency under the Ottoman Empire and French Colonialism  
The first recorded autonomous political entity, in what later became modern-day Lebanon, 
dates back to 1627 and the establishment of the Mount Lebanon Imarah within the Ottoman 
Empire.49 At the time, feudal ties formed the basis of the social and political order. The Imarah’s 
autonomy was based on subservience to its Ottoman masters; the Emir (prince) was required to 
                                                          
46 Rudy Jaafar, “Democratic System Reform in Lebanon: An Electoral Approach,” in Breaking the Cycle: 
Civil Wars in Lebanon. Edited by Youssef Choeiri, (London: Stacy International, 2007), 285–306. 
47 Of relevance here is the conciliatory form of Lebanese politics placing power in the hands of non-state 
leaders as explained most recently by Simon Haddad, “Lebanon: From Consociationalism to Conciliation,” 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 15, no. 3-4 (2009) 298-416.  
48 See a more detailed documentation of this by Cammett and Issar, “Bricks and Mortar Clientelism.” 
49 Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (London: IB Tauris, 
1993).  
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maintain social order and deliver the required taxes and observe other obligations to the Sultan in 
Constantinople.50 The Sultan partitioned Lebanon into two districts: a northern district under a 
Christian deputy governor and a southern district under a Druze deputy governor. This 
arrangement came to be known as the Double Qaimaqamate. It enabled the officials to claim 
representation of their sectarian communities and, over time, become the powerbrokers for any 
decision-making.51  
From the outset, the power brokers had to deal with the emerging need for coexistence 
among Lebanese communities who suffered inequitable social and economic conditions. Religious 
and confessional tensions first emerged on record in strife led by the peasants of Keserwan, who 
were overburdened by heavy taxes in 1820.52  Maronite peasants rebelled against Druze landlords 
in Mount Lebanon and the conflict resulted in a new power configuration. The lower clergy of the 
Maronite Church, which sided with the peasants, became a challenge to the landowners and an 
immediate patron to political leaders in those areas where tensions arose. The confrontations were 
on the surface motivated by inequity in land and wealth distribution, but they were also 
confessionally motivated by the Church in its attempt to obtain more political power. Beginning 
in 1858, poor Maronites began an uprising against the leadership of the Maronite Church in 
Lebanon who for decades had created a system leading the poor to subservient positions.53 The 
revolt spurred other Lebanese to question the feudal ties they had been placed under by their 
religious leaders. Other Christians and Druze recognised problems within their own communities, 
which were then exploited to further sectarian tensions. This provoked clashes between Christians 
and Druze in Mount Lebanon who portrayed each sect the greater threat.54 By July 1860 the Druze 
were victorious and the death toll on the Christian side stood at eleven thousand.55    
It was against this background of communal violence that the first power-sharing 
arrangement was devised marking the first phase of Lebanon’s political system. The Organic Law 
(Reglement Organique) was announced by the Ottoman Empire, backed by a consortium of 
                                                          
50 Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered.  
51 Seaver, “The Regional Sources of Power-sharing Failure,” 247.  
52 Marie-Joelle Zahar, “Foreign Interventions, Power-sharing and the Dynamics of Conflict and 
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European powers, on 9 June 1861.56 Through a French initiative, an international commission 
representing the five European guarantors of the agreement was established, according to Khalaf 
to, “fix responsibility, determine guilt, estimate indemnity, and suggest reforms for the 
reorganisation of Mount Lebanon.”57 The French saw the Maronite population of as a way to exert 
influence and control over a greater population that had little ties with the West as a whole. In the 
beginning of the French incursion into Mount Lebanon, the government of France supported 
various Maronite clergymen financially and politically in exchange for Maronite leaders 
incorporating various parts of French culture and influence into Mount Lebanon.58  
The Reglement Organique transformed Mount Lebanon into a fully autonomous Ottoman 
province (the Mutasarifiya) with political institutions based on power-sharing among Christian, 
Druze, and Muslims under an Ottoman-European consortium protectorate.59 By 1864, tension 
between the Maronites and the Ottoman governor required substantial modifications to the 
arrangement. Once again, the foreign powers at the time stepped in and helped reform the 
administrative council to consist of four Maronites, three Druze, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek 
Catholic, one Sunni Muslim, and one Shi’a Muslim. This was the first example of proportional 
communal representation in Lebanon and the practice would be repeated in its first constitution 
and forthcoming amendments.60 The 1864 settlement introduced by the Ottomans brought almost 
a half century of communal peace to Mount Lebanon.61  
The “long peace” which reigned in Mount Lebanon during this mutasarrifiyya period made 
possible the establishment of the foundations of the modern state of Lebanon and also enshrined 
sectarian power-sharing as the norm and practice in politics.62 It predicated from the start that 
political competition was contingent upon sectarian-based opponents who needed to secure a deal 
to stabilize their geographical and demographic bases. The agreement also offered formal 
recognition of a ‘millet system’ where ruling sectarian leaders could coalesce with religious 
organisations to manage the social, economic and personal affairs of citizens within their districts.  
                                                          
56 Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon, preface. 
57 Ibid, 6.  
58 Elaine C. Hagopian, “Maronite Hegemony to Maronite Militancy: The Creation and Disintegration of 
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59 William Polk, An Opening of South Lebanon, 1788 – 1840: A Study of the Impact of the West on the 
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60 Ibid. 
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62 Ibid. 
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Upon the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the Supreme Allied Council met in San 
Remo on April 28, 1920, and entrusted France with a mandate over Syria and Lebanon. By the 
spring of 1920 agreement had been reached between Britain and France on how the former Arab 
territories of the defunct Ottoman Empire would be divided between them. On September 1, 1920, 
the French High Commissioner, General Henri Gouraud, proclaimed the creation of Greater 
Lebanon (Dawlat Lobnan Al Kabeer), which would include the territory of Mount Lebanon, the 
metropolitan areas of Beirut, Tripoli, Tyre, and Sidon, the regions of Baalbek and the Bekaa, and 
the districts of Rashayya and Hasbayya.63 From 1920 to 1922, four successive French governors 
administered Lebanon.  
Faced with a growing nationalist movement in Syria, the French found that governing 
Lebanon through alliances with the sectarian elite would challenge a common identity and as such 
would limit the opposition to colonialism.64 A sectarian representation was an expedient solution 
to governing the various communities and so, as Lebanon moved from Ottoman to French rule, 
there was little effort at unification and promotion of citizenship outside the recognised sects. To 
reinforce this, General Gouraud selected a 17-member consultative council, representing the 
different Lebanese confessions, to assist the governors. In March 1922, the French High 
Commissioner sought to establish a more permanent representative body and decreed the creation 
of a Lebanese Representative Council. The Council, inspired by the experience of the 
Mutasarrifiyya, would comprise 30 deputies elected by general (male) suffrage for a period of four 
years. The Council was based on confessional representation in proportion to the size of each 
community as recorded by the census of 1921.65 Based upon a belief that inter-group cooperation 
can be encouraged through sectarian representation, this design reinforced sectarianism and 
increased the power of sectarian leaders, once again perpetuating the ‘millet’ system.66 This was 
one of the earliest examples of how sectarianism became the pretext for extending the rule of 
leaders of the main religious groups and institutionalising their claims to power without facing any 
competition from leaders within their sectarian communities. 
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Studying how Lebanon moved from colonialism to independence is a study of how 
sectarian leaders came together to establish a state that guaranteed their own representation – 
almost indefinitely. Much like the case of Libya, the end of colonialism was a swift change in 
foreign policy prompting independence, and less of a national grassroots movement with common 
demands. The Sunni and Maronite leaders emerged as Lebanon’s founding fathers and forged the 
first modern constitution of Lebanon. A new constitution transformed Greater Lebanon into the 
Republic of Lebanon (Al Jomhourriya Al- Lubaniya) on May 23, 1926 and enshrined confessional 
politics throughout all levels of governance.67 The 1926 Constitution vested legislative powers in 
two houses—a senate (majlis shoyoukh) and a chamber of deputies, or parliament (majlis 
nowwab). Both houses enjoyed widespread powers including the election of the president, voting 
confidence in the government, and approval of an annual budget. The two houses elected the 
president who also enjoyed wide-ranging powers for a three-year term.68  
The first constitution also guaranteed equal representation for sectarian communities in 
public posts.69 This power-sharing agreement increased the influence of a small group of 
prominent Christian families in Beirut and the Mountain, of Shia and Sunni landowning feudal 
families on the peripheries, and of Sunni notables in the coastal towns but it did not profoundly 
change the initial agreement.70 Sectarian representation became the formal means for political 
leadership to extract privileges for themselves, their relatives and their clients rather than to protect 
the interests of their constituencies.71 Like the French in 1920, the new faces of an independent 
Lebanon found the old ‘millet’ system the easy solution and reforming it would have threatened 
their power bases.  
 
3.4 National Pact and Breakdown of the State (1943 – 1975) 
The second phase of the power-sharing agreement is characterised by the beginning of the 
civil war and the inability of the state to withhold this agreement. On the eve of its independence 
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from the French, Lebanon’s political and social class was comprised of sectarian groups and 
ethnicities that came together seeking power, privilege and representation. The National Pact of 
1943 (Al Mithak Al Watany) was brokered by the British to secure the country’s independence 
from France. The sectarian system of representation and access to political office therefore also 
evolved into a pragmatic political strategy.72 The National Pact was an unwritten agreement 
between President Bishara El-Khoury (Maronite) and Prime Minister Riad al-Solh (Sunni). The 
Pact provided a consensual basis for articulating the character of Lebanon’s polity, the distribution 
of power in the country and the shape of its political institutions. The Independence and the 
National Act of 1943 established a unique consociational system, known as “confessionalism” or 
sectarianism (al nizam al ta’ifi), a power-sharing mechanism based on the guaranteed 
representation of major religious communities. The National Pact, having included numerically 
predetermined provisions, would result in future deadlocks that made reform and legislation 
impossible without consensus and without securing the interests of the sectarian elite.73  
The unwritten pact enshrined the principles of (i) segmental proportionality of 
representation in government that is in proportion to the demographic weight of the sectarian 
groups, (ii) segmental autonomy to guarantee the rights of sectarian groups to conduct their own 
religious, educational and cultural affairs.74 Accordingly, the political institutions that emerged 
after 1943 were primarily aimed at preserving Lebanon’s longstanding tradition of securing the 
interests of, and resources for, sectarian elites (zu’ama) who served and maintained the loyalty of 
their constituency. This was seen as the best formula for the ‘coexistence’ of sectarian groups that 
otherwise would detract from an independent Lebanon and threaten its central government.  
The formula exacerbated the patronage system and turned the legislature to “a private club” 
where national leaders promoted their protégés and used intimidation and vote buying to secure 
the election of their lists.75 The National Pact granted the Maronite President extensive executive 
powers and fixed the positions of the House Speaker to a Shi’a and Prime Minister to a Sunni. 
Powerful political leaders representing the religious communities were considered as guarantors 
of the nizam ta’ifi, or the confessional consociational order. The zu’ama aligned themselves with 
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the commercial bourgeoisies’ and worked to ensure a short-lived stability in the realms of politics 
and the economy between 1943 and 1958. According to Najem, “there was some overlap between 
these two groups, but for the most part their respective memberships were distinct. Their co-
operation was based on their common interest in keeping the Lebanese state weak, and in 
maintaining the status quo.”76 But even after independence, the efforts of political leaders were 
geared not towards the creation of a national civic identity, but towards the fragmentation of 
identities in order to maintain sectarian loyalties. In tandem, little effort was made to build capable 
and professional public institutions, but rather efforts were made to keep Ministries and public 
agencies as tools of political leaders among sectarian elites.77  
The rise of Nasser in Egypt and the spread of his pan-Arab ideology in the 1950s deeply 
divided Lebanese confessional politics, contributing to the crisis of 1958 between Maronites and 
Sunnis. Tensions with Egypt grew when pro-Western (Maronite) President Camille Chamoun 
angered local groups by his friendly reaction to the Western powers, primarily Britain and France, 
after their attack on the Suez Canal.78 Confessional groups mobilised, with Western-backed 
Christian groups confronting predominantly Muslim factions supported by the Egyptian-Syrian 
nationalist regimes. This was followed by the US intervening both militarily and politically to 
convince both sides of the conflict to reach a compromise and to elect a new President, general 
Fouad Chehab, who had been commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces since 1945. Despite 
attempts at administrative reforms, most notably those taken during President Fouad Chehab’s 
term in office (1958-64), public administration was ponderous and generally inefficient. Chehab 
came to office after civil strife that had killed 3,000 Lebanese during a standoff between pro-
Western and pro-Egyptian nationalist groups.79  
The tensions were fuelled with the emergence of Palestinian refugees who had set up a 
base in southern Lebanon and began launching guerrilla attacks on Israel.80  Chehab was seen as a 
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‘compromise’ candidate who did not represent either faction.81 He initiated an aggressive policy 
towards the Palestinian camps and limited their armed activities. Chehab’s short time in office did 
show that political will coupled with substantial executive powers can drive institutional reform, 
as he led an effort to establish most of the public agencies still active today including: Civil Service 
Board, Central Bank, the Court of Audits, Water and Electricity Providers, and Central Inspection 
Board.82 
During the 1960s, and more so after the 1967 Arab war with Israel, the internal situation 
in Lebanon was destabilised. The 1967 war resulted in the influx of hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinian refugees, who represented a greater shock than the Lebanese system could peacefully 
accommodate.83 The country became split between two different political factions, one that was 
mainly Muslim and pro-Palestinian, and one that was mainly Christian and anti-Palestinian. At the 
end of Chehab’s term in 1969, uprisings in the Palestinian camps and pressure from Egypt and 
other foreign players ended with the November 1969 Cairo Accords between the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Lebanese state, which authorised Palestinian guerrilla 
activity in Lebanon.84  
The Cairo Agreement fuelled the first phase of the Lebanese Civil War, causing 
polarisation and the armament of militia groups across the country.85 Krayem notes that the 
political system “could not withstand the pressure, and internal compromise became harder to 
achieve.”86 It is generally agreed that 13 April 1975 marks the beginning of the Civil War. 
Irrespective of the particular circumstances that led to this clash, it was already preceded by 
widespread armed conflict between Christian political parties and Palestinian organisations for 
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some years, especially after the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) from 
Jordan in 1970.87 The PLO’s presence in Lebanon was a trigger for the sectarian leaders to divide 
and reposition themselves as either supportive of the armed resistance or fighting against it. The 
PLO was an alibi for the West to arm Christian militia groups and the Arab states to arm Muslim 
groups in preparation for a protracted armed conflict on Lebanese soil.88 
The reasons for the outbreak of the Civil War vary depending on the angle taken. What is 
certain is that the power-sharing agreement could not produce institutions that can mitigate 
conflicts and function in a polarised political climate. Some argue that the war was a class 
struggle.89 At the outbreak of the war, the wealthiest four per cent of the population received 32 
per cent of the total gross national product, and 82 per cent of the population received only 40 per 
cent.90 Others suggest that a major cause of the civil war was increasing calls for the redistribution 
of political power by Muslim groups that perceived themselves as under-represented in the context 
of the National Pact.91 The Shi’a in particular began to lay claim to their share of political power. 
Similarly, according to Johnson, the Sunni zu‘ama were unable to control their own ‘street’, as 
their clients found alternative patrons, including pan-Arab and armed Palestinian groups.92 Other 
scholars argue that the war was primarily caused by the pressures originating from external factors, 
such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which destabilised the country.93 
In this thesis I recognise a combination of these interpretations. Lebanon had significant 
internal challenges, including class struggle and sectarian tensions. These were only heightened 
by the inability of the state to provide security, protection and services without the support of 
sectarian leaders. As soon as sectarian leaders found it opportune to ally themselves with external 
actors to increase their local power bases, they replaced their collusion with confrontation and 
began sponsoring different armed groups. At the same time, Lebanon’s regional environment 
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invited its national leaders to side with, and invite support from, conflicting foreign countries. 
These countries began acting as patrons by providing political and military support to local groups.  
 
3.5 The Civil War (1975 – 1990): ‘Militant’ Sectarianism and Un-sharing of Power  
This third phase of the Lebanese political order shows an ‘un-sharing’ of power and is 
marked by the militarisation of political life. The Lebanese Civil War lasted 16 years, during which 
the magnitude of damage to the country was staggering. About 170,000 perished, twice as many 
have been wounded or disabled, and close to two-thirds of the population experienced some form 
of dislocation from either their homes or communities.94 The war transformed political zu’ama 
into leaders of armed groups and militias, each with their foreign patrons providing weapons and 
financial backing. It also epitomised the weakness of a state that was incapable of brokering a 
political deal, stabilising tensions, or even using its army to end the conflict. 
The initial period of the war, between 1978 and 1982, ended both politically and militarily 
with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6th, 1982. The trigger that expanded the conflict to all 
parts of the country was the PLO’s armed presence, which fuelled polarisation among sectarian 
leaders. The PLO’s presence heightened tensions among confessional groups and gave them 
ideological grounds for their military activity. The right-wing forces led by the predominantly 
Christian Kata'ib (Phalange) Party formed another bloc called the Lebanese Front. The polarisation 
and militarisation signalled a period where the power-sharing agreement had failed to maintain 
stability and caused state institutions to be overridden by non-state armed groups.  
On June 1, 1976, Syrian troops entered Lebanon and supported the Lebanese Front in 
holding back the Palestinian forces.95 In October 1976, two Arab summits held in Cairo and Riyadh 
established an Arab Deterrent Force, the majority of which was composed of Syrian troops.96 The 
Syrian intervention was motivated by three factors: Syria had historically regarded Lebanon with 
closeness even inseparability and shared deep linkages with Lebanon’s social and political 
developments.97 The second main factor was Syria’s security interests vis-à-vis Israel. Lebanon’s 
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southern border was seen by Syria as a defence frontier against any military thrust from Israel to 
Syria.98 Lastly, Syria and its regime feared that continued civil war could mean a partitioned 
Lebanon which would pose a direct threat to the borders of Syria99. The failure of power-sharing 
to be maintained during the war increased the need for foreign intervention to stop the fighting. 
But foreign intervention meant a continued weakening of the role of the state in bringing about an 
end to the war.  
The power-sharing agreement made it difficult for one leader, even the President, to have 
the upper hand in the conflict and instead dispersed power and weapons among various sectarian 
groups.100 The subsequent Israeli invasion in 1982 dealt a staggering blow to the Palestinians and 
the LNM and dramatically strengthened the Lebanese Front, bringing its leader, Bashir Gemayel, 
to the presidency.101 The 1982 invasion reduced the PLO’s freedom of action and refocused the 
Palestinian national struggle back into the Occupied Territories marking a decrease in their military 
action from within Lebanese borders.102 In parallel, the early years of the Israeli occupation saw 
the emergence of Hezbollah, a newcomer to the Lebanese political scene for the Shi’a had 
historically been organised around the Amal movement and that of Moussa Sadr. Hezbollah (Party 
of God) organised an armed resistance against Israel and allied itself with the PLO fighters in the 
south of Lebanon.103 Supported by the Christian Phalangists, the Israeli invasion was seen as a 
swift and necessary move by the Americans for Israel, one that would also to limit Syria’s armed 
power over Lebanon. The war gave Israel control over Lebanon’s Litani River, seizing the water 
source was also one of Israel’s long-term strategic goals.104 The following phase of the war, June 
1982 - October 1990, witnessed heightened outside intervention, beginning with the Israeli 
invasion and concluding with the Ta’if Accord of October 1989 under Saudi auspices.105  
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The foundations of power-sharing and the religious backing that sectarian leaders enjoyed 
as a result allowed them to forge their own international ties and secure sufficient resources to lead 
proxy wars in Lebanon. Bashir Gemayel, who was seen by the West as Israel’s Lebanese ally, was 
assassinated within days of his election to the Presidency, and his brother, Amin, was hastily 
elected to replace him.106 Following the assassination of Gemayel, Lebanese Phalangist groups 
angered by the death of their leader, with the Israeli military looking on from surrounding rooftops, 
entered the Palestinian refugee camp of Sabra and Shatilla, killing at least 1,500 Palestinians on 
the night of Friday September 16, 1982.107 Two days later journalists and reporters shared images 
of thousands of dead and mutilated bodies, which horrified the international community and 
pointed fingers at the collusion of the Israeli forces in the massacre.108   
The extreme instability and horrific images of the massacre of Palestinians led the US to 
form a coalition of American, British and French troops to help stabilize Lebanon.109 Hezbollah’s 
first overt operation was the bombing of US and French forces killing 299 servicemen in October 
1983.110 The suicide bombing led to a complete withdrawal of the US forces and the confirmation 
of Hezbollah as a new, serious threat to Israel.111 Israel began withdrawing from most Lebanese 
territories except a border strip in South Lebanon under the control of Israel's surrogate South 
Lebanon Army, a force comprised of Lebanese Christians. By 1985, Syria had regained most of 
the power over Lebanese affairs that it had lost to the Israelis and Americans in 1982.112 
The Civil War became increasingly inter-sectarian and witnessed battles between Lebanese 
factions. It was in many ways a sectarian civil war where armed sectarian groups sided with or 
against each other. In December of 1985, with the encouragement and support of the Syrians, 
representatives of the dominant confessional militias, the Christian Lebanese Forces, the Shi’a 
Amal Movement, and the predominantly Druze Progressive Socialist Party, met in Damascus and 
reached an agreement, known as the Tripartite Agreement, on political reforms and special 
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relations with Syria.113 By early 1986 the Tripartite Agreement was nullified after President 
Gemayel and Samir Geagea (intelligence chief of the Lebanese Forces) organised a coup against 
the Lebanese Forces’ leader Elie Hubayka, and ousted him from his position. The ouster and the 
resulting failure of the Tripartite Agreement was a result of the lack of a sharing of power, as the 
agreement did not provide for representation of the warring factions in such a way that would 
motivate them to end the violence. A state of political deadlock prevailed in Lebanon between 
1986 and the end of President Gemayel's term in September 1988.114  
At the end of Gemayel's term, the failure to elect a new president led to a complete political 
vacuum at the top of the Lebanese state. The deadlock was another facet of the failure of power-
sharing to maintain state institutions during the conflict. Gemayel appointed an interim cabinet 
headed by Army commander Michel Aoun, but the cabinet's authority was only accepted in the 
predominantly Christian areas; in West Beirut and other regions of the country, the original cabinet 
headed by Salim al-Hoss was regarded as the legitimate cabinet. The two cabinets were trying to 
function at the same time and claimed exclusive legitimacy. The subsequent war between Aoun 
and the Lebanese army had devastating human and political consequences, and instead of 
curtailing the Syrian presence in Lebanon, it caused an increase in the number of Syrian troops 
from around 30,000 to 40,000. In 1990, Syrian troops re-entered East Beirut and other 
predominantly Christian areas that they had been forced out of in 1978 during battles with 
Lebanese Forces armed group.115 
Lebanese deputies met in the city of Ta’if in Saudi Arabia to discuss national reconciliation 
on the basis of a document that had already largely been prepared by the Arab Tripartite Committee 
after much consultation with Syria, the United States and various Lebanese leaders. They reached 
an agreement on October 22, 1989 and the resulting treaty was known as the Ta’if Agreement or 
the National Accord Document (wathikat al wifak al watany)116 and represented the outcome of 
political reconciliation among the Lebanese, supported by the Syrians and the international 
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community.117 The United Nations Security Council Declaration on October 31, 1989 supported 
the agreement and the Lebanese authority resulting from it. Once again, foreign intervention was 
needed to reach a national political agreement and, as before, it would be in favour of a power-
sharing system among warring sectarian factions.118  
On January 30, 1990, another conflict broke out, this time between the army led by Aoun 
and the Lebanese Forces militia.119 This inter-Maronite war diminished the capacities of both 
forces to effectively reject or alter any political compromise, represented by the Ta’if Agreement, 
that had been reached and that was in the process of implementation. An inter-Shia war took place 
between the two Shi’a forces: Amal and Hezbollah. During the war, these two groups had been 
openly siding with the PLO’s armed resistance and had formed guerrilla bases in the South of 
Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut.120 The Ta’if agreement alone could not stop the war, 
it required foreign powers to substantiate and local zu’ama to adopt it before the war could come 
to an end.  
 
3.6 Post-War Lebanon (1990 – 2003): The Tai’f Agreement and Syrian Patronage   
Aside from the massive cost in human lives, and the displacement of thousands of people, 
the war brought in its wake economic havoc.121 This fourth phase of the power-sharing agreement 
put the Syrian regime as the predominant actor in local politics. The war led to a ‘crisis of state’, 
whereby public institutions were weakened and the state once again called for sectarian leaders 
and religious institutions to step in and assist in development and reconstruction.122 The settlement 
of the war in Lebanon by the Ta’if Accord was based on the reaffirmation of the principle of 
sectarian power-sharing. It enhanced the position of the Sunni Prime Minister as well as that of 
the Shi’a Speaker of the House, while curtailing some of the privileges that the Maronite President 
of the Republic had enjoyed.123 This redistribution of power created the need for consensus among 
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the three major sectarian leaders on all policies and decisions of the government, which further 
weakened the possibility for state institutions to provide oversight and accountability. The Accord 
specified equal representation for the communities in Parliament. The principle of equal 
representation continued to apply in the Council of Ministers. The essence of the political system 
thus remained unchanged from pre-war Lebanon.124  The Accord was negotiated by parties in the 
conflict and by the Parliament that had been elected in 1972, before the outbreak of the violence, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, the Agreement brought the same faces and families back into power.125 
The Ta’if Accord specified in Section 1 that “Efforts will be made to achieve 
comprehensive social justice through fiscal, economic and social reforms.” In Section 2 the 
Accord stipulated that the electoral district shall be based on the governorate (muhafaza), that the 
parliamentary seats were to be divided provisionally equally between Christians and Muslims and 
proportionately among the denominations of each sect. It also stipulated “With the election of the 
first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not sectarian, basis, a senate shall be formed and all the 
spiritual families shall be represented in it.” While the Accord specifies the body (to be chaired 
by the President of the Republic) that is supposed to initiate the process of national dialogue with 
the aim of reaching national agreement on the elimination of political sectarianism, it does not set 
a time frame for this purpose.126 Now, 18 years after the end of the conflict, this body has yet to 
be created. 
In general, the gradual revival of the state and its institutions only partially took place. The 
transition from war to peace between 1990 and 1992 was too swift to allow for any process of 
reconciliation and of state building. Public institutions were under-staffed and most buildings were 
war torn and were barely able to perform daily administrative functions.127 Rampant corruption 
was indicative of the post-war distribution of resources and resulted in the subjugating of state 
institutions to the interests of sectarian elite.128 Three parliamentary elections were held in 1992, 
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1996 and 2000 respectively. After the war, most militias were disarmed with the exception of the 
armed resistance against the Israeli occupation of the southern strip of the country, led by 
Hezbollah, which was permitted to continue.129  
Of relevance to this phase of the power-sharing system are two major breaches to the 
Accord. The first was the beginning of negotiations outside the Council of Ministers, which began 
in 1992. The “Troika,” a grouping comprising the President, the Speaker and the Prime Minister 
began, in close collaboration with the Syrian leadership, to dominate political life and to become 
the effective decision-making body.130 This meant that the parliament and executive branches were 
rendered ineffective and domestic as well as foreign policy issues were settled outside these 
institutions. The second breach of Ta’if was the long-lasting role of the Syrian military, leadership 
and intelligence services in Lebanon’s affairs.131 After the Gulf crisis in 1990, the U.S. had the 
added concern of containing Iraq and gaining Syrian support for the Gulf War coalition. It is often 
noted that Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon was supported by the Americans in return for Syria’s 
role in the First Iraq War.132 The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
strengthened American influence in the Middle East and allowed it to pursue its policy objectives 
in Lebanon and other parts of the region. The U.S. supported the Ta’if negotiations and lent its 
support, both in Arab circles and through Syria, toward the successful completion of those talks. 
Despite the end of the war being a critical juncture for Lebanon, the following era of Syrian 
tutelage reinforced sectarianism and foreign patronage through granting specific Ministries to pro-
Syrian Sunnis, Shi’a, Druze or Maronites, depending on agreements among sectarian leaders.133  
Initially the main priorities of political leaders were security and the re-establishment of 
public institutions. But pressures from Damascus and the post-war economic strains led to the 
resignation of three short-lived governments.134 The fourth post-war government was headed by 
Rafik Hariri (a Lebanese Sunni billionaire). Hariri had played a major role in Lebanon’s post war 
politics and reconstruction. Hariri remained prime minister, heading three consecutive 
governments, until the election of Emile Lahoud as president in November 1998. The first 
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government following the election of Lahoud was headed by Salim el Hoss. After the 
parliamentary elections of September 2000, however, Hariri again headed a new government. In 
March 2003, he tendered his resignation, only to be asked once more to head the new government 
again in April. Hariri’s terms in government before 2000, perhaps in a similar manner to that of 
Chehab, were supported by three main factors. He was liked by the international community and 
boasted friendships with the world’s most powerful leaders.135 He also had the support of other 
political leaders to undergo a number of economic reforms that boosted the country’s capital Beirut 
and revived a number of commercial and touristic sites. 
In pre-war Lebanon, the most common way of accessing benefits and services was through 
wasta or the equivalent of joining clientelistic networks controlled by political leaders or zu’ama. 
The Civil War disrupted these networks and replaced zu’ama clientelism with a new and more 
complex mix of clientelistic networks developed around militias, parties, resistance groups, and 
charities.  The Civil War brought new zu’ama, who benefited from the sectarian system to 
reinforce their power over state institutions. What emerged was a Syria-supported power-sharing 
system that enabled pro-Syrian elite to rise to power while maintaining the argument of 
coexistence through the nizam ta’ifi.136 
 
3.7 Post -Syrian Lebanon: Sectarianism Enshrined (2004 – 2010) 
The withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon for some observers in the international 
arena, as well as many of the Lebanese local groups, was meant to indicate a new era in Lebanese 
politics. Yet as the years between 2005 and 2009 would show, this fifth phase was characterised 
by more civil and political freedoms, but also the continuation of the basic form of sectarian power-
sharing. The power-sharing formula meant that no economic, social, security, or political reform 
could happen without the consensus of sectarian leaders. Those same leaders who had been 
involved in the Civil War – 12 out of 14 political parties currently represented in parliament existed 
as wartime militias –137 could not arrive at a consensus that served their interests, and therefore 
political deadlocks and civil strife would become frequent in post-2005 Lebanon. 138   
                                                          
135 Guilain Denoeux and Robert Springborg, “Hariri’s Lebanon: Singapore of the Middle East or Sanaa of 
the Levant?” Middle East Policy 6, no. 2 (2008): 158-173, at p. 160. 
136 See for instance Fakhoury, “Debating Lebanon’s Power-sharing Model,” 237-238.  
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The events that paved the way for Syria’s withdrawal were largely exogenous. That is not 
to say that there were no internal factors that accompanied the withdrawal, but the momentum 
came from the changing foreign policies of international actors, and the U.S. in particular.139 
Opposition against Syria from within Lebanon was weakened and the groups that had been 
outspoken were silenced through oppressive political, civil and media strategies that took place 
under Syrian tutelage. Crackdowns on demonstrators, journalists, student movements, unions and 
civil society leaders made it impossible to speak openly about Syrian intervention in Lebanese 
affairs.140 The attacks of 9/11, the beginning of the “war on terror”, and the subsequent U.S. 
invasion of Iraq, initiated a new era in U.S. foreign policy. Syria openly opposed the U.S.-led 
invasion in 2003; Syria, which had always been supportive of armed resistance against Israel in 
Lebanon, aligned itself even more closely with Hezbollah and Iran. Syria’s support provided 
Hezbollah with wide military and political backing throughout its areas of control and over the 
functioning of government.141 Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States envisioned a 
democratic domino effect in the region, launching a Middle Eastern democratic agenda known as 
‘The Greater Middle East Initiative.’142  
President Bush signed The Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act 
of 2003, which imposed various economic and political sanctions against the Syrian regime for its 
alleged support of Hezbollah.143 This Act called on Syria to immediately declare its commitment 
to completely withdraw its armed forces, including military, paramilitary, and security forces, from 
Lebanon, and set a firm schedule for such withdrawal. Sensing U.S. resolve, anti-Syrian 
confessional groups in Lebanon, mainly Maronite, Druze, and Sunni, initiated a campaign against 
the Syrian presence in Lebanon (known as the Bristol Gathering).144 They were opposed by pro-
Syrian groups, led primarily by the Shia and largely assembled around ―the Ain Al-Teenah Camp. 
                                                          
139 Karim Knio, “Lebanon: Cedar Revolution or Neo-Sectarian Partition?” Mediterranean Politics 10, no.  
(2005): 225-231, at p. 225.  
140 See for instance Makdisi, The Lessons of Lebanon. 
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142 See background of this in Katarina Dalacoura, “US Democracy Promotion in the Arab Middle East since 
11 September 2001: A Critique,” International Affairs 81, no. 5 (2005): 963-979.  
143 Full text of “The Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003” US 
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108publ175.htm, (accessed June 5th 2014). 
144 More on the Bristol Gathering and political dynamics of its leaders in Karam Karam, “Post-Syria 
Lebanon: Internal and External Determinants of a Crisis,” The International Spectator 41, no. (2006): 51-
68.  
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The confessional divide, much like that of war time Lebanon, continued to polarize the Lebanese 
and left the state unable to mitigate between two camps with competing interests.  
By the end of 2004, relations between Syria, on the one side, and Western powers, 
primarily France and the U.S. as well as pro-Western Sunni Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt, on the other, further deteriorated, with the latter accusing Syria of supporting the anti-
American insurgency in Iraq as well as arming the Shi’a Hezbollah in Lebanon.145 Syria responded 
in Lebanon in September 2004 by implementing an extra-constitutional measure that extended 
pro-Syrian president Emile Lahoud’s term in office for an additional three years.146 In turn, the 
U.S., France, and the U.K. reacted by passing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, demanding 
the immediate withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.147 What followed was the 
commencement of retaliatory violence against anti-Syrian political leaders that began with the 
attempted assassination of MP Marwan Hmadeh in October 2004. On February 14th, a massive 
bomb led to the assassination of the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri, and 25 other civilians 
including former Minister of Finance Bassel Fuleihan.148 
The Hariri assassination plunged Lebanon into intense polarisation, but this polarisation 
would not mean the end of the basic power-sharing agreement and subsequent Cabinets were 
comprised of actors from opposing factions. Because the basic foundations of the state rested in 
the agreement of sectarian leaders, even opposition and polarisation among them would need to 
be mitigated to maintain an independent Lebanon. The Shi’a factions were backed by Iran and 
Syria, while Maronite, Druze, and Sunni groups were supported by the U.S., France, and Saudi 
Arabia. On March 8, the Hezbollah-led factions organised a demonstration to ‘thank Syria’ and 
display their loyalty to the Assad regime.149 On March 14, one million protestors took to the streets 
to demand Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon chanting slogans accusing the Assad regime of 
Hariri’s assassination. The two factions came to be known as “March 8”, comprised of pro-Syrian 
and pro-Iranian blocs, and “March 14”, comprised of anti-Syrian and pro-US blocs.150 This 
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polarised political dynamic is one of the reasons why the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon can 
be considered a partially critical juncture.  
The March 14 protest was depicted by its supporters and Western media as a ‘Cedar 
Revolution’ or as the ‘Independence Intifada’ implicitly stating that it would lead to a new phase 
of freedom, sovereignty and democracy in Lebanon, and took its name from the cedar trees that 
are a symbol of Lebanon.151 Activists claimed that the March 14 movement was cross-sectarian 
and reformist in nature. But later analysis concluded that it was a mere reconfiguration of sectarian 
leaders’ grip on power.152 The March 14 movement promoted itself as able to bring about a 
Lebanon ‘spring’ after the dark winter that Syria’s domination over Lebanon represented.153 
Notwithstanding the polarisation at the time, March 14’s momentum did create a relative opening 
up in Lebanon’s political system, but this opening up was restricted to the newly found freedom 
of political agents to speak up against Syria.154  
In April 2005, Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon and in June 2005 the country held its 
first elections free from Syrian tutelage. I shall return to the description of these elections in the 
following chapter. But for now, suffice to say that the elections witnessed an entrenchment of 
sectarian strife, sectarian discourse, and again a sectarian division of power. Salamey and Payne, 
for example, describe the results of these and other elections as a type of “quotated” confessional 
representation within the legislative in Lebanon.155 The elections also took place with the backdrop 
of a series of assassinations that claimed the life of anti-Syrian critics, including Samir Kassir.156 
The assassinations continued until the end of the year with car bombs killing journalists, political 
actors, and civilians. 
While the political order was struggling to find stability in the aftermath of Syria’s 
withdrawal, a crucial event would prove extremely damaging for the country. On July 12, 2006 
Hezbollah’s abduction of two Israeli soldiers along the Lebanese-Israeli border led to the outbreak 
of a large-scale war in Southern Lebanon which resulted in the destruction of much of Lebanon’s 
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infrastructure and the death of 160 Israeli and 1,500 Lebanese civilians.157 Israel’s disproportionate 
retaliation to Hezbollah’s seizure of the two soldiers led to international calls for the application 
of United Nations Resolution 1559.158 During the 34-day war, Lebanese politicians made a show 
of unity regarding the war with Israel, but as soon as the conflict subsided the camps of March 8 
and March 14 displayed their opposition to each other again.159 
By December 2006, the newly forged coalition between Hezbollah and the Maronite leader 
Michael Aoun (who returned from forced exile in France) orchestrated a popular campaign to 
topple the March 14th dominated cabinet and parliament. Hezbollah claimed a ‘divine victory’ over 
Israel and tens of thousands of supporters called for the resignation of the March 14 Cabinet led 
by Fouad Seniora.160 Two days after Hezbollah’s gathering, the Lebanese Forces
 
staged a counter-
rally in the Christian area of Harissa in which they called for Hezbollah’s disarmament and pledged 
their support for Seniora’s cabinet.161  
This clash of demands crystallised with the resignation of pro-Syrian Shi’a ministers from 
the cabinet in December 2006, followed by the initiation of a massive year-long sit-in by the 8 
March camp in downtown Beirut surrounding the Grand Serail (the Prime Minister’s Office). The 
refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the existing Cabinet on grounds of its lacking 
consociationalism, the blocking of parliament from inaugurating a new president, and the Prime 
Minister’s attempt to tamper with Hezbolla’s telecommunication network, finally led to a 
Hezbollah-led armed insurgency in the capital during May 2008.162 This led the Arab League to 
endorse the diplomatic initiative, to the perceived neutral state of Qatar, in settling the Lebanese 
sectarian crisis. This came to be known as the Doha Agreement, which split the electoral districts 
once again among sectarian groups and signalled a new era of the deep enshrining of sectarian 
representation in the executive and legislative branches of the Lebanese political system.163  
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3.8 Power-sharing Intricacies in the Case of Lebanon 
 This chapter has presented the historical and contemporary roots for Lebanon’s state 
system. Lebanon’s sectarian power-sharing system has remained intact despite war and rounds of 
conflict exacerbated by external intervention. At each juncture, the power-sharing agreement was 
threatened enough to case the state to break down, but not enough to cause political leaders to 
reconsider it as a system. This is because the power-sharing system is self-serving for the zu’ama 
of the major sectarian groups. It reinforced patron client relations that began with feudal lords in 
the Ottoman era, who transformed into militia leaders during the war and remerged with pro-Syrian 
allies after the war. The periods reviewed here show how the state is incapable of mitigating 
tensions that arise because of sectarian struggles over resources and foreign policies. It is also 
unable to promote a unified sense of citizenship and identity in the face of grand sectarian zu’ama 
who keep citizens polarised and subjugated to the need to be protected by these very leaders.  
The Lebanese state is a tool that political leaders compete over and use to advance their 
own interests. By enshrining the three notions of co-existence, zu’ama and nizam ta’ifi, the 
political order is a priori opposed to reforms that would enhance a sense of citizenship outside of 
sectarian confines. Appeal and loyalty are to sectarian, not state leadership, which again reinforces 
a weak state system. The next chapter is a case study on the attempts to reform the electoral system 
and therefore encourage political competition outside of solely sectarian groups.  
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Chapter Four - Activism and Electoral Non-Reform in Lebanon 
 
“I have always voted for the same za’im and my children now do the same.  
What do you expect us to do? There’s no state here to protect us.”  
Anonymous, Lebanese voter  
 
4.1 Introduction  
Lebanon has held frequent elections since 1943 with only two exceptions. The first 
exception was when parliament automatically renewed its mandate at the peak of the Civil War 
(1975 – 1992), and the second most recently in 2013 amidst deep polarisation and disagreement 
over an electoral law.1 Although Lebanon has a longstanding electoral tradition and is formally a 
parliamentary democracy, no fixed and permanent law regulates Lebanon’s electoral process. Prior 
to each election, the elected parliament would convene to enact a new electoral law thereby 
changing districts, voting procedures and campaign regulations. This practice has long encouraged 
gerrymandering that favoured the status quo in sectarian representation.2 The fact that the law is 
designed and enacted periodically by parliament allows legislators to skew the electoral rules, 
providing an advantage to parties and representatives that are in power. As such, the actual 
legislative role of parliament becomes less of an oversight institution and more of a reinforcement 
tool in the hands of the sectarian zu’ama who initially nominated candidates for the incumbent 
parliament. Lebanon as a case will shed light on an under-theorised area of electoral systems; that 
which focuses on how electoral institutions are designed to maintain a status quo, specifically in 
power-sharing systems. Thus, by looking at the unheeded calls by civic organisations for reform 
this thesis will highlight how Lebanon’s political leaders adapt electoral institutions. 
This chapter has two main objectives. First, it presents key historical trends in Lebanese 
elections and electoral processes. Second, it analyses the main continuities and breaks between the 
period of Syrian tutelage and the post-2005 elections. I argue that the reforms undertaken in 2008 
were only partially significant and that the electoral system has remained largely intact following 
the critical juncture of 2005. I present a case study on electoral reform between the period of 2005 
and 2010 to demonstrate how the nizam ta’ifi and its sectarian leadership undermined the 
                                                          
1 Ekmekji, “Confessionalism and Electoral Reform in Lebanon.”  
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opportunity for reform after 2005. The critical juncture in this case is the mass anti-Syrian uprisings 
in the spring of 2005. The criticality of the moment is analysed against the propensity for electoral 
reform in the period that followed. The uprising as a critical juncture builds on Capoccia and 
Kelemen’s definition as a moment where “the probability that actors' choices will affect outcomes 
decreases after the critical juncture, this definition suggests that their choices during the critical 
juncture trigger a path dependent process that constrains future choices.”3 The chapter will show 
how the merely partial changes to the electoral system constrained future possibilities for reform 
and reinforced path dependency in the electoral law and practice. 
The chapter is comprised of six sections. I begin with a background on the electoral system 
under Syrian tutelage between the periods of 1992 and 2004. Then I present an analysis of the post 
2005 elections, highlighting the main pillars of continuity in the electoral process. The fourth 
section appraises the reform experience between 2005 and 2008 and the role of the Civil Campaign 
for Electoral Reform (CCER) in the years that followed Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. I then 
present the findings of the 2009 electoral observation mission and explain these findings as 
elements of continuity from the Syrian, and even pre-Syrian, era. Lastly, I conclude with the 
political and conceptual implications of the electoral reform process in Lebanon as having been 
only partially reformist due to the nizam ta’ifi and the sectarian foundations that favour co-
existence (aish moshtarak) over public interest (maslaha aama) and citizenship (muwatiniya). 
Thus, I argue, the elections of 2005 and 2009, which could have been critical junctures, were 
therefore only partially critical and could not overcome the institutional constraints that produced 
sectarian path dependent outcomes.  
 
4.2 Background to the Lebanese Electoral Process (1992 – 2004)  
The Lebanese power-sharing model allows for political actors to create an electoral process 
and institutions that rely on sectarianism as the basis of voting and of candidacy. As such they can 
also be considered as sharing the same ‘agency preferences’ which limit the dynamism of electoral 
institutions and favour the status quo.4 Because of this restriction on agency preferences, the 
historical institutionalism paradigm posits that outcomes constrained by institutions from the past 
                                                          
3 Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures,” 348.  
4 On the concept of agency and institutional dynamism see Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, “Structure, 
Agency and Historical Institutionalism,” Political Studies 46, no. 5 (1998): 951-957.  
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challenge the potential for change, despite a critical juncture.5 In themselves, elections comprise 
important junctures every four years that could reconfigure power and political representation. But 
the Lebanese elections have little capacity to be junctures that moderate conflict, and instead have 
exacerbated communal identities, consequently leading to reinforcing the role of zu’ama in the 
parliament.6 The blurry lines between public institutions, political parties, and the media have 
historically made Lebanese elections more plutocratic than democratic and characterised by heavy 
expenditures and vote buying.7 This section describes the influence of these electoral institutions 
as key to understanding the way in which the electoral reform process stood little chance between 
2005 and 2010.   
The Syrian troops that had entered Lebanon during the war were to withdraw within two 
years according to the Ta’if agreement in 1989, but Syria ended up only reducing the number of 
troops in the country and increasing its political influence through its extensive intelligence 
apparatus (mukhabarat).8 For the duration of its tutelage (wisaya), Syrian forces and intelligence 
orchestrated the parliamentary elections of 1992, 1996 and 2000 by manipulating the electoral law, 
nominating parliamentary candidates, and even forcing parliament to amend the constitution in 
order to maintain a pro-Syrian leadership.9 Of direct relevance to the reform argument in this thesis 
are the three ways in which the Syrian regime ‘manufactured’ or manipulated, the electoral process 
prior to 2005: districting, media, and intimidation or bribery of voters.10  
Districting is the electoral choice of geographically dividing a country into electoral 
partitions and assigning a number of representatives to each district. This use of districting allowed 
Syria with its Lebanese allies to manipulate the intent of the Ta’if Agreement which stipulated that 
elections would be held on the basis of large districts or governorates (muhafazat). Large districts 
                                                          
5 See for example one of the earliest accounts of this in Michael Suleiman, “Elections in a Confessional 
Democracy,” The Journal of Politics 29, no. 1 (1967): 109-128.  
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8 Gary Gambill and Eli Abou Aoun. Special Report: How Syria Orchestrates Lebanon’s Elections, Middle 
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would require candidates to appeal to a multi-sectarian constituency in order to win.11 But in 1992 
and 1996, the parliament, under Syrian pressure, reduced the districts to the Qada level, which 
reduced the size of the constituencies significantly and enabled pro-Syrian allies to win in the 
districts of Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, and Beirut.12 The 1992 elections were the first after the Ta’if 
Agreement and are a clear example of how the electoral law was created under pressure from the 
Syrian regime. The engineering of small districts was a grave violation of Ta’if and ensured that a 
sectarian numerical majority would favour a greater voice for pro-Syrian Muslim constituencies.13 
In particular, the first post-Civil War elections in 1992 were gerrymandered in favour of Syria’s 
allies and as a result were boycotted by Christian and Muslim parties opposed to the Syrians.14 
The elections in 1992 were not only uncompetitive, but were in favour of another state.15 This 
selective strategy by the Syrians continued in the next elections. 
The 1996 electoral law was passed by the 1992 parliament and led to pro-Syrian candidates 
winning 95% of parliamentary seats.16 Again, the districts were kept small and any opposition or 
non-conformity by voters was met by blatant intimidation.17 In the 2000 elections, the districts 
were then reorganised after a series of meetings between Syrian intelligence and senior Lebanese 
officials and divided the muhafazat into only 14 districts, combining together districts that were 
not even geographically contiguous and were not consistent in size.18  Although the 2000 elections 
took place after the death of Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad, his son and successor Bashar did not 
change this pattern, but merely increased Syria’s patronage and support for local pro-Syrian 
zu’ama.19 In addition, the 2000 elections tampered with the number of parliamentary 
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International, 2008). 
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representatives, again violating the Ta’if agreement by increasing the number of seats in the pro-
Syrian areas of the Bekaa and North Lebanon by 50 per cent and decreasing the representatives of 
the anti-Syrian electorates in Beirut and Mount Lebanon by 20 per cent.20  
With regards to the media’s role in the 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections, it was a 
straightforward strategy of promoting pro-Syrian candidates and making it difficult for opposition 
or independent candidates to get any space for visibility and the promotion of their platforms.21 It 
is important to note that the post-war pro-Syrian political elite, who joined the first Cabinet after 
the Ta’if agreement, directly owned Lebanese media stations.22 Campaigning also made use of 
public spaces such as municipalities, religious institutions, and government offices to support 
candidates. This misuse of public spaces was an indication of how the post-war weak state 
institutions were a tool in the hands of zu’ama who favoured Syria.23 Public authorities weakened 
by the war were turned into campaign offices for parliamentary candidates.24 One blatant case was 
that of the Syrian-backed list headed by the then Interior Minister Michel el Murr who was also 
responsible for administering the elections. Minister Murr used municipal workers to tear down 
his opponent’s pictures in the Metn districts and replace them with his pictures.25  
Another major tool for electoral tampering was vote buying and intimidation of voters. In 
the absence of pre-printed ballot papers in the elections before 2005, candidates would discover 
the voter’s choices and resort to repression, threat or violence unless voters were proven to have 
voted for list of the local za’im.26 Under Syrian tutelage voters were not required to vote behind 
curtains, which were intended to protect them from intimidation and ensure the secrecy of their 
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25 Gambill and Abou Aoun, “Special Report: How Syria Orchestrates Lebanon’s Elections.” 
26 Knudsen, “Precarious Peace building: Post-War Lebanon 1990 – 2005,” 12. 
 104 
 
choices.27 At the time, government officials claimed that voter secrecy and use of the curtain was 
‘optional.’28 Instead representatives of candidates would clearly instruct voters entering the polling 
stations to cast their votes openly. At the same time, representatives of independent or opposition 
candidates were routinely refused entrance to polling stations and were escorted out, or even 
arrested.29 Reports of vote buying were all over the news. Electoral observer reports often stated 
that the elections were not characterised by any form of freedom or fairness and the results of any 
election in these circumstances must be questionable.30 Due to the clientelistic system, vote buying 
and vote ‘trafficking’ in the post-Ta’if elections took on a variety of forms. One way was direct 
bribery by paying small amounts of cash, another way was through naturalising citizens31 
(providing citizenship status in return for votes and loyalties), and a third way was through the 
provision of goods, services and benefits (such as paying for healthcare, schooling, and providing 
jobs).32  
Civic activism under Syrian tutelage was limited in scope and oppression was used in line 
with the Syrian policy of clamping down on any opposition.33 Intimidation of activists and 
restrictions on freedom of assembly made any work on issues of political reform and citizenship 
very difficult. Activists were constantly followed and closely monitored by Army Intelligence 
(mukhabarat) who would often show up at events, including student clubs on most university 
campuses.34 Although the unaddressed humanitarian and developmental needs, a legacy from the 
Civil War, prompted a rise in the number of Lebanese NGOs, their efforts were mainly centred on 
welfare services.35 Immediately after the Ta’if agreement a pro-Syrian Ministry of Labour began 
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licensing new labour federations that were loyal to sectarian elites36 and the Ministry of Interior 
increasingly made NGO registration more difficult unless it was affiliated to sectarian or political 
leadership.37 During the Syrian era, the Ministry of Interior also interfered in the management of 
NGOs by issuing unreasonable administrative requests and threats of dissolution unless the NGOs 
complied.38  
Despite these challenges, the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE), a 
non-profit non-governmental organisation, was founded in Lebanon in 1996 with the sole aim of 
monitoring elections and advancing a national conversation about electoral reform. It was at first 
funded by volunteers and founding members but later began receiving financial and technical 
assistance from European Union, USAID, and other international specialised organisations. 
Between 1996 and 2000, the association played two main political roles. The first was actually 
pushing for, and raising awareness of, the importance of holding national and local elections on 
time. For instance in 1997, the campaign “Baladi, Baldati, Baladiyati” (my country, my town, my 
municipality) ran a nation-wide awareness campaign to demand the holding of municipal elections 
on time. The campaign started as a ‘rally’ for municipal elections and mobilised citizens and 
intellectuals to sign a petition calling for the government to respect their constitutional right for 
local elections.39 In 1996 and 2000, LADE’s role in highlighting the need for reform and in 
reporting on the process of the elections provided activists and several intellectuals with an outlet 
to oppose Syrian influence and attack the sectarian system. The association issued periodic reports 
on the need for reform and the frequent violations that took place during the elections before 
2005.40 
LADE filled a vacuum that was emerging as a result of the de-politicisation of political life 
under Syrian tutelage. It also played a part in the post-war demobilisation and stabilisation 
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processes attracting youth, intellectuals and even party members to its mission.41 The association 
benefited from the opportunity of an enabling legal environment although the political context was 
repressive.42 At a time when opposition political parties were either repressed or purely sectarian, 
or both, LADE provided refuge for hundreds of activists and dozens of intellectuals who could 
come together and advocate for a more free and fair electoral process. Thus, while the country was 
under Syrian influence, LADE served as a means to mobilize activists and reformers. Reporting 
on electoral violations, LADE typically issued one Election Day report via the media as a press 
statement and few weeks later published a report with detailed violations. Activists claimed 
intimidation and violent attacks on observers in several polling stations as LADE was not allowed 
by law to monitor or partake in the electoral process.43 Instead only official candidates and party 
representatives would be let inside the polls. But through sampling and choosing a few locations 
where LADE observers were allowed in, the association continued to train and deploy observers 
and report on the progress of the elections.44  
By end of 2004, opposition to the Syrian regime was gaining momentum. A number of 
civic groups, political parties, and student unions were already engaged in internal talks to oust the 
Syrians and formed a multi-sectarian opposition45. This was paralleled by a growing discontent 
within an embryonic alliance between Druze and Maronite leaders, with Prime Minister Hariri’s 
tacit support.46 Critics of Syria suddenly became more outspoken and journalists wrote overt 
articles about Lebanon’s democracy and the need for Lebanese sovereignty.47 Elections were 
scheduled to take place in spring of 2005. Considerable momentum against Syrian tutelage 
gathered after Prime Minister Hariri alongside 21 other civilians were killed in a massive car bomb 
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with several politicians accusing Syria of the assassination.48 Prior to this incident it was not 
possible for the public to call outright for Syria’s withdrawal, but Hariri’s assassination coincided 
with a rapprochement between political parties and a mass mobilisation of citizens from all sects.49 
On March 14, 2005 close to a million people (of Lebanon’s estimated population of four 
million) took the streets calling for freedom and sovereignty, for a timetable for the withdrawal of 
Syrian troops and the appointment of a neutral government to prepare parliamentary elections.50 
The elections that took place over four consecutive Sundays in May and June 2005 were the first 
in 30 years that were free from Syrian tutelage. This juncture allowed LADE to monitor the 
elections more openly and expand its work on electoral reform. The withdrawal of Syrians 
indicated the end of the era of violent repression by the Lebanese government on political activism 
and NGO work. The elections marked the start of a period of critical junctures in Lebanon against 
which the subsequent electoral process will be evaluated. In particular this chapter appraises the 
ways in which the 2005 parliament dealt with the question of electoral reform.  
In late 2004 and the spring of 2005, LADE and other NGOs working on political reform 
took centre stage. This was the beginning of a critical change in Lebanese activism. Despite not 
being given legal recognition, LADE had continued to operate in three main areas: electoral 
education and capacity building, electoral monitoring, and advocating for electoral reform.51 In 
2005, LADE was officially recognised by the Ministry of Interior for the first time52 and by 2009 
the electoral law would grant civil society organisations the right to monitor the elections (article 
20 of law 25/2008). Between 2004 and 2005, the rise in activism saw not only newly registered 
groups – there were 9,000 NGOs in Lebanon by 2009 – but also, the character of NGO involvement 
and type of engagement in the political process changed.53 While the ‘official’ line of demands of 
the March 14 uprising were calls for investigation into Hariri’s assassination, implementation of 
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UN Security resolution 1559, youth-led activism and demands were more about participation, 
accountability, and anti-corruption.54 These organisations regarded themselves as an alternative to 
sectarian parties, championing secular ideas and liberal democratic demands as their main 
priorities.55 Thus, whilst the post-Syrian withdrawal period again divided political parties between 
opposition and pro-government actors and brought the same sectarian leaders back in power, 
political life outside sectarian confines was filled by a number of new NGOs with similar 
demands.56 The weeks leading up to the ‘Cedar Revolution’ saw a number of organisations such 
as Amam ’05, Nahwa el Muwatiniya, and Leb-youth come together to work on policies and 
reforms by campaigning on issues such as citizenship, representation, youth rights, access to 
information and political accountability.57  
Quickly after the ‘revolution’ NGOs began organising internally and making their efforts 
more institutionalised and programmatic. Campaigns such as the Lebanese Parliamentary 
Monitor58 and the Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform (CCER)59 showed that civil society 
organisations were able to self-organise and provide a ‘third’ voice in the country’s polarised 
political order.60 This trend was coupled with a rise in international funding and donor assistance 
for so-called democracy and governance agendas in Lebanon.61 NGOs gained great leverage and 
took centre stage in politics, at least partially, by appearing in major conferences, news outlets, 
and political rallies.62 As one leading activist recalled, “at the time, we thought our success was in 
the number of newly funded initiatives, the number of media appearances, and the number of times 
politicians would shake our hands, but little did we know that this was only lip-service and that 
out politicians had no intention of reforming the system we revolted against in 2005.”63 
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In many ways, NGOs, during and immediately after the mass protests, created a new way 
for citizens, and especially youth, to participate in the political process. Establishing NGOs was a 
mechanism of ‘revolutionary’ de-mobilisation following the March 14 uprisings (otherwise 
dubbed the ‘Cedar Revolution’). A number of youth, student leaders, and activists who had taken 
part in the various movements to oust Syria retreated back to their offices and began to get 
organised in order to achieve their longer-term demands. “We understood that we could not expect 
change to happen overnight. Even though the Syrians had left, our corrupt politicians would need 
a longer time and more effort to be changed.” 64 By turning protest activism into more professional 
and organised activities, these civil society actors partially achieved their objectives, although as 
the next stage would show, the reform process remained constrained. In line with literature on 
post-revolution political spheres, the aftermath of the Cedar uprising saw a rise in the number of 
organisations that protestors joined. Although the NGO’s role in politics remained limited, they 
did manage to be an alternative to sectarian parties for members who aspired for a secular and 
democratic state.65  
 
4.3 Elections Post-Syria: Partially Competitive Process and Partially Representative 
Results  
 The main political protagonists after 2005 were the March 14 and March 8 alliances. The 
March 8 movement took its name from the pro-Syrian demonstration of 2005 that took place on 
that date. It included Hezbollah, the Shi’ite Amal Party (lead by the Speaker of Parliament Nabih 
Berri); General Michel Aoun’s Change and Reform bloc; the Armenian Tashnag Party; and a host 
of pro-Syrian/Iranian/Palestinian parties, including the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Baathists, 
and more.66 The March 14 movement was named after the anti-Syrian Cedar Revolution of March 
14, 2005 following the assassination of Hariri. The alliance included former Prime Minister Saad 
Hariri (son of Rafik Hariri and head of the Sunni Future Movement), Samir Geagea’s Christian 
Lebanese Forces; the Phalangist Party (headed by former Maronite President Amin Gemayel); the 
Armenian Ramgavar Party; as well as a number of Orthodox, Protestant, and other Christian 
minority groups.67 The two main schisms between the two alliances was (and is) about the support 
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of armed resistance against Israel (supported by March 8 and opposed by March 14) and the United 
Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon68 (supported by March 14 and opposed by March 8).69 These 
two themes divided voters and would be the main campaign issues in the 2009 elections.  
This section illustrates how elections in the post-Syrian era after 2005 failed to moderate 
sectarian conflict and encourage political competition.70 Although citizens can vote for candidates 
from various sects within the same districts, Salloukh explains that inter-communal and sectarian 
alliances were used instrumentally to “guarantee electoral victory in the context of electoral laws 
conducive to temporary sectarian coalitions.”71 These results are contrary to the expectations of 
power-sharing agreements that the literature suggests are more conducive to permanent inter-
ethnic alliances.72 Lebanese elections continued to rely on clientelism and sectarian loyalties 
similar to the electoral dynamics of the pre-war and Syrian tutelage eras. The theoretical approach 
used in this thesis suggests that weak state institutions, power-sharing agreements, and the 
marginalisation of NGOs from reform processes (as will be shown), pose constraints on the 
likelihood of reform. These constraints emanating from institutionalised patterns of electoral 
administration pose a challenge for any reform that favours greater competition and greater 
representation of citizens. As a result, elections are one major pillar fostering sectarian path 
dependency in Lebanon. To illustrate this argument further I assess the electoral framework below 
according to two dimensions.  
I categorize the dimensions of the electoral framework into two types: the political and the 
administrative.73 The ‘political’ dimension of the elections has a bearing on the level and type of 
representation that elections can bring about. Political dimensions also regulate the way citizens 
engage in the electoral process. The ‘administrative’ dimension refers to those aspects that have a 
bearing on how competition is managed and organised during elections. I refer to the two 
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categories of analysis as being able, at a minimum, to enable a competitive process and a 
representative result.74 The findings are based primarily on participant observation of the 
monitoring operations in 2005 and 2009 as well as reports by LADE. 75 Overall, they are in tune 
with the literature considering how the sectarian process inhibits open competition and accurate 
representation in the post-Syrian elections.  
 
Political Dimensions 
This section reveals how the choice of specific electoral tools enables a political 
manipulation of the electoral process and its results. It reviews the dimensions of districts, 
sectarianism, majoritarian systems, and the political economy of the 2005 and 2009 elections.  
Electoral districts: The districting of voters in Lebanon was undertaken to guarantee that most 
districts have a majority of one sect, which is loyal to the running list and/or local za’im. Under 
the Syrians these candidates had to be pro-Syrian, but after 2005 they had to be allies of high level 
national sectarian leaders. Because of the ways that sectarian communities are conglomerated and 
because of the sectarian nature of political parties, grouping votes in a homogenous manner can 
almost always ensure the victory of the sectarian leaders.76 This is even more problematic because 
Lebanese vote in the districts that correspond to their ancestral origins and not in their place of 
residence, making voter mobility difficult and further based on sectarian identity.77 Historically, 
the tampering of electoral seats and districts was the means by which the feudal lords (zu’ama) 
could settle issues without touching upon the representation of the various sects within the 
parliament.78 During the 2005 and 2009 elections, as in previous elections, most districts had an 
overwhelming majority of voters from one sect, thereby weakening political competition. In 2009, 
the only districts in which the outcome of the election was uncertain was in Christian-dominated 
areas which comprised no more than 8 out of 30 districts. The weak competition in most districts 
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can be observed in two ways. First, electoral campaigning in most districts is limited to a single 
list that is either uncontested or facing weak opposition. By observing the percentage of the vote 
obtained by the leading candidate who was elected and the percentage of voters who participated, 
this limited competition is made clear. For example, House Speaker Nabih Berri from the Amal 
movement won 90 per cent of the votes out of 34,315 mainly Shi’a voters in Zahrani.79 Mennieh-
Donnieh had 97,352 mainly Sunni voters out of which an average of 70 per cent voted for the pro-
Hariri list. The Hezbollah-backed list in Baalbeck-Hermel which had 126,038 registered voters 
received 86 per cent of the votes. The Druze Shouf had 181,949 predominantly Druze voters, 68 
per cent of whom voted for the pro-Jumblat list.80 Voters in the Christian areas of Keserwan and 
Jbeil voted almost equally at around 51 per cent for the winning list. Where there were no 
competing lists in the Christian areas, for example in Bsharreh, the Lebanese Forces backed list 
won 76 per cent of the votes81.  
There is a direct correlation between sect and block voting for a leading candidate. In some 
of these districts, winners had less than 20,000 votes – this means that the same number of votes 
that allowed a candidate to win in some districts were not enough for another candidate in other 
districts.82 For example, in Bint Jbeil Ali Mhanna won by 1 per cent of the vote, while in Beirut’s 
third district Najah Wakim lost though he obtained 21 per cent of the vote.83 In addition the number 
of seats voters get to vote for in office varies inconsistently and disproportionately across 
districts.84 For example, in Beirut’s first district 91,456 voters elect five Members of Parliament 
while in Minieh-Donineh 102,118 voters elect three Members of Parliament.85 The idea is to put 
together voters that support full lists headed by the major sectarian za’im of that community within 
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each district. Politicians adjust the number of seats in parliament to get results that favour them 
with no permanent number of MPs per district.86 
Sectarian representation: Although article 24 of the Lebanese constitution that was 
reinstated after Ta’if stipulates the abolishment of sectarian seats in parliament, this reform never 
took place. The allocation of seats per sect has therefore encouraged political actors to run on the 
basis of the sectarian patron-client relationship and provides no incentive for candidates to appeal 
to the nation as a whole, or to voters from outside their communities. The sectarian allocation of 
seats means that by default the sectarian leaders who have built their clientelist networks and 
reputation in localities have highest chance of collecting votes.87 It also provides little 
encouragement for intra-group cooperation among the different sects and little incentive for 
candidates to appeal to voters from sects outside their own religious groups.88 Instead, candidates 
are chosen to join lists of leading zu’ama, which in turn exacerbates the challenge of having 
confessionally homogeneous districts because minorities of a specific sect are then counted as 
voters for the leader of the majority sect. This is why even after the Syrian withdrawal voters 
within the Christian community, for example, continued to feel their representation was 
threatened.89 This is referred to in Arabic as the ‘mahdaleh’ system, which means ‘sweeper,’ 
indicating that lists sweep winning results with little or no competition and any minorities (ethnic, 
political or other) have to follow this leadership or else they would not stand a chance at winning. 
Lebanese leaders use “competitive clientelism” to compete amongst one another in their pursuit to 
gain access to state resources.90 Thus, voters elect the only option available to them in return for 
protection and basic services the zu’ama can provide as there are no alternative lists in most 
districts. 
Majoritarian system: The majoritarian system means that candidates have only to win 50 
per cent +1 of the votes in their districts. In principle this is not generally problematic for 
representation, but coupled with the list system and power-sharing, majoritarianism is a hindrance 
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to accurate representation in Lebanon. Consociational systems can appease tensions and encourage 
competition but in this respect, only Proportional Representation could lead to new forms of 
leadership and to more agenda-based competition.91 However, the majoritarian system in Lebanon 
also means that candidates will win with a disproportionate number of votes since the majority 
needed in one district may be different to that in other districts, because the number of voters can 
differ dramatically from one district to the other. The majoritarian system combined with the list 
system allows for election lists in each of the districts to become very difficult to defeat, thereby 
making the competition play out in favour of sectarian leaders.92 As a result, candidates who are 
local level zu’ama have to join lists-in-the-making or pre-existing lists based on the approval of 
the sectarian leaders (high level zu’ama). The majoritarian system coupled with small districts has 
nurtured a sectarian basis for voting and for representation. This in turn is a hindrance to structural 
political change and does not encourage national intra-communal electoral lists that appeal to 
voters from different sects and regions.93  
It is important to note here the character of Lebanese political parties. Unlike other Arab 
countries, Lebanon has a long history of political party politics, but one that is overshadowed by 
the sectarian nature of participation and representation in these parties. As such, we see that the 
majority of party members are from a single sectarian affiliation.94 The parties always display a 
strong clannish and personality attachment to their leaders and lack any kind of program, agenda, 
or stable membership from outside the followers of the za’im and the sect.95 This also continued 
after 2005. The political parties’ role as socialisation agents, platforms for political competition, 
and political organisations is almost non-existent.96 Political parties function within an overall non-
competitive electoral framework and remain highly centralised as political structures.97 Parties 
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have weak agendas and electoral platforms and as such are able to make alliances with opponent 
parties in some districts but not in others. Lastly, zu’ama and not political parties, nominate 
candidates in Lebanese elections.98  
Political economy of elections: The clientelistic nature of political life in the country 
facilitates high levels of corruption during the electoral process. Lebanon’s weak and politicised 
judiciary makes it impossible to track and control spending during elections.99 The patronage 
networks continued until after 2005 and were maintained by heavy expenditure during the electoral 
campaigns after 2005.100 Corstange asserts, using survey data that more than half of the voters 
admitted to selling their votes in the 2009 election.101 Joseph Maalouf, a Member of Parliament, 
stated that, “in 2009, a number of payments were made by candidates so that sectarian leaders 
would accept placing them on their lists, a large percentage of whom did not belong to political 
parties.”102 These two facets of vote buying and seat buying distort electoral campaigns and 
ultimately electoral outcomes. In addition, it means smaller, less established groups are unable to 
compete with longstanding zu’ama. The way the political economy of Lebanese elections works 
is to the advantage of wealthy individuals supported by sectarian leadership.  
 
Administrative Dimensions  
This section details how four administrative dimensions of the electoral process, namely 
campaign finance, media regulation, supervisory commission, and the provision of ballot papers, 
limit competition and representation. The administrative dimensions, like the political ones, 
underscore how the electoral framework in Lebanon continues to be to the advantage of its 
sectarian elites.   
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Campaign Finance: Wealthy leaders continue to be able to buy electoral votes, utilize 
media campaigns for their benefit, and incentivize voters through social or charitable activities.103 
Usually, in vote buying half of the amount of the money is given beforehand and the second half 
is given after Election Day to ensure that clients vote for their patron.104 The electoral system and 
law never mentioned limiting or managing the financing of electoral campaigns until 2009. Article 
59 of the 2009 law, which was designed to regulate campaign finance, left many areas wide open 
for exploitation when it stated that “help and services that were provided regularly for no less than 
three years by candidates or organisations owned by candidates are not prohibited.” This meant 
that charities and other associations so commonly sponsored by Lebanese sectarian leaders would 
continue to operate during an election, thereby securing the loyalty of voters.105 In practice, older 
and more established parties would therefore have an advantage in being able to spend high sums 
during their campaigns, whereas new and smaller parties would be banned from such activities.106 
All election reports have noted cases in which candidates paid for tuition fees, cars, health services 
and accommodation.107 Civil society observers presented at least 20 documented cases of vote 
buying to the prosecutor general during the 2009 elections, though no action was taken.108 The 
2009 vote has been flaunted as the most expensive election on a per-capita basis in Lebanon’s 
history.109 Campaign finance is so unregulated that most candidates openly set up offices where 
they offer voters cash during the weeks leading up to Election Day.110 
Media: Media outlets are an important socialisation agent, influencing public opinion and 
voter behaviour during elections. Lebanon’s law on audio-visual media prevents ownership from 
being in the hands of one person, especially owners belonging to a single sectarian group, and 
places a 10 per cent ceiling on ownership by a single person. Despite this, a study of 55 media 
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institutions revealed that political financing of media outlets is the source of funding that keeps 
Lebanon’s media stations alive.111 Lebanese politicians practically own the major media outlets of 
the country. During the Civil War unlicensed broadcasting was sustained by taxes levied by 
militias in districts that they controlled.112 After the war, media ‘frequencies’ were distributed 
among private owners while others were shut down.113 Private ownership continued after 2005 
and allowed for media outlets to become mouthpieces of sectarian zu’ama and to promote whoever 
was sponsoring them.114 During an election this bias is evident in the distribution of ratings and 
media space allocated by the various media stations to the various candidates. Media monitoring 
reports, for example, point to the fact that Future Television promoted almost entirely the Future 
Movement candidate in 2005 and 2009 elections.115 Similarly, Al Manar gave the most space to 
Hezbollah candidates in 2005 and 2009. Print media observation reports noted similar results.116 
This also means that less established candidates who do not have the same access to their own 
networks are unable to appear in the media and advertise their campaigns to the same extent during 
an election.  
Supervisory Commission for Electoral Campaigns (SCEC): The Ministry of Interior and 
Municipalities administers Lebanese elections. For the first time, the 2008 electoral law called for 
the establishment of a Supervisory Commission for Electoral Campaigns to oversee election 
campaigns.117 The SCEC’s prerogatives were to supervise the compliance of candidates and mass 
media to the law by monitoring and reporting on spending and media advertisements in the run up 
to the election. Finally, the SCEC would draw up a report on its activities and share it with the 
Ministry of Interior and Municipalities before it is published in an official gazette.118 Although the 
SCEC’s establishment was an improvement to past years, it would continue to be controlled by 
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the Ministry. It had no prerogatives to sanction candidates or media stations for violations to the 
law. Without the ability to penalize violations, the commission was a token regulatory institution 
that issued reports during the election to the Interior Minister. As a result, international observers 
and ordinary voters had to rely on the pre-election reports of LADE for information on violations 
and electoral campaigns.119 The commission was of no help to the reform process and once the 
elections were over its ten members packed up and emptied their offices.120 Internal squabbles, as 
well as lack of internal capacity and experience, also meant that SCEC members were not taken 
seriously by politicians.121 As such, by and large, campaigns and media performance during 
elections continued to be unregulated. 
Ballot papers: Lebanon has never had pre-printed ballot papers. Instead, citizens are kept 
waiting until just before an election to know the names of candidates and the lists in their respective 
districts.122 Voters then obtain lists either from party campaigns or develop lists themselves.123 
Political leaders, party representatives and candidates usually distribute ballot papers with their 
preferred lists of candidates to citizens around the time of the elections and/or on Election Day. 
The 2009 electoral law (no. 25/2008) prohibited campaigning on the day of elections and within 
the premises of polling stations, but this did not stop campaigners from driving around in cars 
distributing ballots and paying visits to voters throughout the period of the electoral campaigns.124 
Ballot papers are designed using different fonts, colours, and sequence of names, all of which 
makes them traceable.125 Since voters vote in polling rooms that are segregated by gender and 
confession, and since the counting takes place in front of candidate representatives, it is with great 
ease that the number of ballots (from every shape and size and colour) can be counted and traced 
to voters (and counting takes place in polling stations).126 Political parties and candidate 
representatives are widely known to be able to know, with high accuracy, which families voted for 
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them because of this.127 A member of the campaign team of a parliamentary candidate recalled 
that in 2009 “we noted several incidents where bribes were promised to be paid after voting to 
make sure that the voter indeed would case his/her vote for this candidate.” 128   
Based on the preceding analysis, a summary of each of the dimensions of the electoral 
process for the two elections that took place in post-Syria Lebanon indicates the following 
evolutions: 
Political dimensions  
Comparison 2005 2009 
Districting 26 districts with 
majority of same 
sect in each district 
Unchanged   
Sectarian seat 
allocation 
Unchanged Unchanged 
Majoritarian 
system 
Unchanged Unchanged 
Political economy 
of elections 
Unchanged Unchanged 
Administrative dimensions  
Campaign finance Unregulated Partially regulated under Article 59, 
which allowed for spending on 
expenses that have existed for three 
years 
Media regulation  Unregulated Partially regulated in Article 68 which 
prohibits slander, defamation and hate 
speech 
Ballot papers  (Still) Unavailable (Still) Unavailable  
 
The analysis shows clearly that the practices of tampering with districts, media, and votes 
have been carried on from the pre-2005 era under Syrian tutelage. For instance, though the 
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electoral law is meant to regulate the elections, in reality the judiciary and the supervisory 
commission has little capacity to control how the political and administrative dimensions play out. 
The Ministry of Interior and Municipalities is unable to provide independent management of the 
electoral process and campaigns.129 The prospects for reform continued to be dismal because of 
the absence of any incentive to which parties, leaders, and voters would respond130. While it is 
generally argued that shocks to the political order, such as regime change, can often lead to a new 
electoral framework, this was not the case in Lebanon after 2005. 131 Although the Syrian 
withdrawal coincided with the new government’s formal adoption of partial reforms, the key 
dynamics of the electoral process remained very similar to those of the Syrian period and electoral 
institutions displayed elements of continuity that constrained the impact of the partial reforms that 
took place in 2005. As such, the major tools for manipulating the process and the results exhibited 
a path dependence grounded in sectarianism and on the role of zu’ama, which made Syria’s 
withdrawal only partially critical to the political order. 
 
4.4 Activism for Electoral Reform: The Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform  
In an attempt to bolster its presence and increase the pressure for more free and fair 
elections, after 2005 LADE established a nation-wide campaign to demand electoral reform. An 
important change from its pre-2005 role, LADE began to focus more on lobbying and rallying 
citizens and decision-makers in favour of electoral reform. This section will appraise the 
experiences of the Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform (CCER) and explain why it failed to 
influence electoral reform after 2005.   
Electoral reform had been on LADE’s agenda since before 2005.132 Since its establishment 
by activists and intellectuals in March 1996 it was a non-governmental organisation with the 
objective of ensuring free and fair elections in Lebanon, primarily through reforming the electoral 
                                                          
129 Al-Hindy, “The Dilemma of Human Rights in Lebanese Electoral Laws,” 28.  
130 Corstange, “Vote Trafficking in Lebanon,” 483-505. 
131 Pippa Norris, “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems,” 
International Political Science Review 18, no. 3 (1997): 297-312.  
132 LADE is a membership-based organisation with a General Assembly of 500 members, a Board of 
Directors, and a number of staff that range from 5-35 depending on funding available and electoral cycles. 
LADE’s programs have ranged from electoral monitoring (including parliamentary, municipal, syndicate, 
and student union elections), raising awareness (through workshops for voters, candidates, media, political 
parties and government institutions), and electoral reform (through the Civil Campaign for Electoral 
Reform or CCER established in 2007).   
 121 
 
system and educating the public.133 After 2005, LADE took the leading role in mobilising youth, 
lobbying parliamentarians, and bringing together various movements and NGOs in support of 
electoral reform. LADE and its affiliate the CCER have also been one of the largest umbrella 
initiatives in Lebanese civil society. According to activists, at least $10 million has been spent by 
foreign donors in election-related grants, not counting the sums allocated for ‘technical assistance’ 
that the Lebanese government received for electoral reform.134  
In 2005, LADE was given the first official approval to monitor and report on elections. The 
2005 elections were monitored over four weekends by more than 500 observers.135 The 2005 
observation results emphasised the significance of the first election after Syrian tutelage, lamented 
the assassinations that preceded the elections in Spring of 2005, and reported a rise in sectarian 
discourse, tensions, and vote buying. More importantly, the observation report shed light on the 
urgency of reform.136 The demands for reform were accompanied by a serious governmental 
initiative to study the possibilities and priorities of electoral reform for the first time. On August 
8th, 2005 Prime Minister Fouad Siniora set up an independent commission headed by ex-Minister 
Fouad Butros to propose a new electoral law for Lebanon.137 When in 2005 the Prime Minister 
established the commission it was welcomed by LADE and other civil society activists. The 
formation of the National Commission for the Reform of the Electoral Law, which comprised of 
experts in political science and law and civil society activists, was appointed to represent the major 
sects in the country.138 The establishment of the Commission marked a departure from the 
historical practices of laws enacted at the last minute and signalled that the political class was, 
potentially, beginning to study the opportunity for electoral reform. But according to one 
commission member, “unfortunately, although it was meant to be a reformist committee, the 
conversations internally reflected the external sectarian discourse. It was as if we were 
camouflaging the old system in a new set of practices.” 139  
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The Commission proposed a draft electoral law in May 2006 that included the following 
reforms:  
 A mixed electoral system with proportional representation introduced in parallel to the 
majority system with dual districting; 
 An independent electoral commission to oversee the elections; 
 Out-of-country voting; 
 Regulation of campaign spending; 
 Regulation of the media coverage of electoral campaigns; 
 Lowering the voting age from 21 to 18 years; 
 Voting from the voter’s place of residence; 
 Holding national elections on one day; 
 Introducing a women’s quota on candidates’ lists;  
 Acknowledging the special needs of voters with disabilities. 
 
In 2007, to support these reforms, LADE launched the CCER with the purpose of 
increasing grassroots support for electoral reform, educating citizens and decision-makers on 
electoral reform, and pressuring political leaders to adopt electoral reform.140 From 2007 onwards, 
CCER adopted the law proposed by the Botrous Commission while continuing to note that its 
members sought a more substantive reform but would accept the Botrous Commission’s version 
as a first step. The recommendations by the Botrous Commission were aimed at combating vote 
buying, encouraging minatory representation, and providing a better administration of the 
elections.141 
LADE became a reference for electoral reform and educational activities between 2005 
and 2010, especially after the formation of CCER as a nation-wide campaign with more 70 local 
organisations including Nahwa el Muwatiniya, the Lebanese Physically Handicapped Union, 
Baldati, Kafa, and the Women’s Democratic Gathering among others that joined efforts to call for 
electoral reform. CCER activists held weekly town-hall meetings at the local level, lectured in 
universities, spoke on the television, issued booklets and awareness material, and trained thousands 
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of young voters on their rights and on the required reforms.142 The campaign activities between 
2006 and 2009 were based on a two-pronged strategy: to create pressure for electoral reform from 
citizens and to persuade decision-makers of the need for reform.143 The campaign conducted 146 
town-hall meetings to educate citizens on electoral reform, gathered 5,500 petitions signed by 
citizens supporting the reforms, held 150 meetings with Members of Parliament to demands 
reforms, staged tens of protests demanding proportional representation among other reforms, and 
issued publications and periodic press releases.  
CCER succeeded in putting electoral reform on the public’s agenda and on the agenda of 
Members of Parliament.144 CCER activists closely followed and tried to influence the political 
debate and influence the discussion around electoral reform.145 They offered specialised training 
courses on the required reforms and their implications for candidates, voters and public 
administration. They were even asked by political parties to train party leaders on electoral 
reform.146 This type of ‘professional’ activism was new to Lebanon, especially considering the 
scale of the campaign, which reached rural areas and all the electoral districts. It marked a 
significant difference from the covert work of activists under Syrian tutelage.  
Following the 2006 war with Israel, Lebanon entered a political deadlock (between 2007 
and 2008) that ended in street clashes initiated by the March 8 movement.147 During the Doha 
negotiations between the two political factions, CCER activists accompanied the attendees and 
gave Members of Parliament a briefing of the key reforms.148 While most MPs would pay lip 
service to the reforms their voting records would go against these promises.149 Out of the Qatari 
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sponsored Doha Agreement in 2008 emerged a new electoral law that adopted (at least in words) 
parts of the demands that CCER had been advocating for. After months of debate and work by 
both the Botrous Commission and CCER, the one week Doha Agreement settled strategic issues 
in the electoral law and allowed Lebanese politicians to ‘pick and choose’ from a list of reforms 
recommended by the Botrous Commission and CCER. The outcomes were as follows: 
 
CCER Demands Electoral Law 25/2008 (Doha Law) 
1. Proportional Representation  Not adopted 
2. Independent Elections Commission 
and Supervisory Committee 
Adopted partially (Supervisory Committee for 
Electoral Campaigns appointed by Minister of 
Interior and Municipalities) 
3. Out of Country Voting Adopted but not implemented  
4. Pre-Printed Ballot Papers Not adopted 
5. Campaign Finance Regulation Adopted partially (article 59 still allowed for 
spending to continue) 
6. Women’s Quota of 30% on Lists Not adopted 
7. Decrease Voting Age from 21 to 18 Not adopted  
8. Media Regulation  Adopted partially  
9. Access for Citizens with Special 
Needs 
Adopted  
10. Right to Vote for Military 
Personnel  
Not adopted  
 
In retrospect, the CCER experience benefited from the invigoration of civil society after 
the Syrian withdrawal. The campaign succeeded in keeping electoral reform on the agenda of 
Members of Parliament and in forcing political party leaders to address demands for reform. The 
campaign did not, however, leverage sufficient grassroots and political support to pressure 
successfully for the enactment of reforms. The CCER’s role after 2005 helped in attracting 
hundreds of volunteers and activists as a form of remobilisation after the uprising against the 
Syrians. But mobilisation efforts proved to be difficult to maintain when it came to pressuring 
Parliament for reform. Although, Parliament became officially aware of the issues and demands, 
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the activists and the movement in general were not powerful enough to get the system to accept 
significant demands and make important concessions  
At the strategic level: The activists used ‘old’ strategies of observing and reporting on the 
elections. Though LADE varied the methodology and duration of observation, the basic premise 
of attempting to ‘safeguard’ the electoral process still stood. While this might have been more 
strategic under Syrian tutelage, it was not relevant to the political process after 2005. The 2005 
and 2009 elections did take place on time, the basic deadlines were respected, and there were no 
overt tactics used to oppress voters. Instead, the rules of electoral engineering were deeply 
embedded and could not be reformed via observation and raising awareness. Observation was still 
important as a means to raise the awareness of citizens but it had no direct political consequence 
as it was not geared towards reforming the electoral system. Instead LADE set up CCER as almost 
a separate arm to lobby and advocate for reforms without linking findings of violations to their 
advocacy strategies. The 3,500 LADE-trained observers were not part of the CCER efforts and 
instead CCER brought in other NGOs to help its work and activities at the local level.150 Another 
strategic shortcoming was that both LADE and CCER directed their efforts towards Members of 
Parliament. Because of the weak state structure, the Parliament is not the main decision-making 
body in the reform process. As it appeared in 2008, for the electoral law to come about, both the 
March 8 and March 14 factions sought outside support to ‘settle their differences.’ The Doha 
agreement essentially redistricted the constituencies to enable both factions to retain a voting 
majority in their districts.  
At the organisational level: CCER remained highly centralised. Although more than 70 
NGOs were in the coalition, decision-making and planning was restricted to representatives from 
3 NGOs.151 Essentially this disconnected the work of the campaign from the work of its partners 
in rural areas; the campaign was run by a few Beirut-based experts who had the time to meet face-
to-face. The organisational challenge meant that NGOs outside of the capital often disagreed with 
the campaign strategies but could do little to influence them. For example, many activists claim 
that CCER gave in by opting for the reforms of the Botrous Commission and should have instead 
kept pushing for more substantive reforms.152 Others say that CCER got ‘too close’ to the political 
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class, became too friendly with Members of Parliament and that it should have employed a more 
confrontational strategy.153 CCER also was disconnected from the 2009 monitoring operation. 
While the observers in 2009 noted crucial information for reform, LADE did not release the final 
report until a year later, diminishing the results that could have been useful for the advocacy and 
lobbying efforts of CCER.154  
At the discursive level: Campaign organisers indicate that demands for democratic reforms 
to the electoral system were not very popular at the local level. The sectarian system does not make 
advocacy a useful tool for citizens. Campaign organisers claimed that people were not used to 
‘pressuring’ politicians for their demands. Instead, the list-system led to local zu’ama-pressured 
citizens to vote and accept results. In town-hall meetings, participants would express their 
conviction in the need for reforms but were not persuaded that these reforms could secure their 
interests.155 Citizens in the municipalities would say that it was more in their interest to support 
the za’im in return for favours and benefits than to side too closely with the demands of CCER.156 
Although the campaign succeeded in having a media platform, it was disconnected from everyday 
social and political concerns of citizens and voters. This discursive mismatch was an obstacle 
especially as voters are made to respect candidates and not question the performance of Members 
of Parliament. Inherently, the job of the Members of Parliament is not legislative but is geared 
towards giving favours to constituencies;157 this made the demands for substantive electoral reform 
somewhat irrelevant both to citizens and to their decision makers. 
 
4.5 Insights from the 2009 Elections: Consequences Old Practices in a New Law  
Politically, the Doha agreement ended a deadlock of 18 months and facilitated the election 
of a new President of the Republic (Michel Suleiman), the formation of a new Cabinet and the 
scheduling of new Parliamentary elections.158 In December 2008, a new electoral law was adopted 
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by Parliament and the elections were scheduled for June 7 2009. These elections took place under 
the partial reform system administered by the Minister of Interior and Municipalities (Ziad 
Baroud), who was a leading figure from civil society, a human rights lawyer, and LADE Board 
Member for over four years. His presence in government facilitated the work of the observers and 
created open channels of communication that had historically been closed to civil society activists.  
The observation mission of 2009 brought together the largest number of organised 
volunteers since the 2005 uprisings (more than 3,000 trained and deployed observers followed a 
strict methodology that was intended to provide data for future reform efforts).159 LADE expanded 
its operations by engaging in the following key actions: 1) electoral education and training of 
observers (holding over 400 workshops and training courses for 5,000 citizens), 2) establishing 27 
LADE district offices under the management of LADE’s coordinators in all electoral districts, 
opening up the process of submitting violations from citizens via district offices (10 per cent of 
incidents reported from candidate campaigns), SMS reporting and an online portal (22 per cent of 
violations were reported via the portal). LADE also established a detailed methodology with 267 
legal and practical indicators for what is considered a violation to free and fair elections (68 per 
cent of violations noted from trained observers). It launched a public monitoring campaign and 
achieved more than 100 television and radio appearances in national and foreign media. Using 
SMS real-time reporting of violations through the work of both fixed and mobile observers LADE 
noted 1,011 critical violations. A 24-hour hotline was dedicated to receiving complaints and 
infringement reports (80 per cent of callers were citizens inquiring on the electoral system). LADE 
issued three pre-election reports that recorded 313 documented violations and two Election Day 
reports.  
The 2009 elections exhibited the following elements of continuity that were documented 
in the LADE reports namely in increased sectarian tensions, use of smaller districts, and vote-
buying. The most significant issues were:  
(i) Vote-buying: Candidates resorted to a variety of methods in ‘paying’ for votes. These 
ranged from direct payments, the payment of the travel costs of diaspora residents, payment of 
school tuition, medical services, and employment opportunities.160 (ii) Hate-speech and sectarian 
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discourse: Candidates relied on instigation of violence, defamation and slander in their speeches 
(in direct violation of article 68 of the electoral law). (iii) Use of public spaces for partisan gains: 
Candidates used the premises of religious institutions, and of municipalities for their personal and 
party campaigns (in direct violation of Chapter 6 of the electoral law). This practice turns public 
resources into private mechanisms of support for some candidates and places high barriers to 
entering the political arena for independent or new candidates. (iv) Weakness of judicial control: 
While the Botrous Commission law called for the establishment of an independent electoral 
commission, the Doha agreement resulted in a law that only established a Supervisory Commission 
for Electoral Campaigns (SCEC) which had a very limited influence.161 While LADE reported 
over 225 pre-election violations and 250 critical violations by the Ministry on Election Day, the 
SCEC received a mere 92 complaints from 705 candidates.162 LADE also reported on 20 
documented cases of vote buying and informed the prosecutor general but no steps of investigation 
were taken.163 
 
4.6 Conclusions and Implications of Non-Reform  
The electoral framework in Lebanon is one of the main institutional pillars of the sectarian 
power-sharing system. Studying the way the elections are managed helps further our understanding 
of the dynamics of power-sharing in Lebanon, as well as the ineffectiveness of civic organisations 
in reform processes. The intricacies of Lebanon’s system exhibit high path dependency despite the 
change in domestic policy after 2005. Whilst the Syrian tutelage of 30 years was not helpful to the 
reform process, Syria’s withdrawal did allow for activists to work more extensively on reform, but 
ultimately failed to create enough support for electoral reform.  
The 2005 events were a partially critical juncture in three ways. Firstly, the Lebanese 
parliament began to formally recognise the need for electoral reform. This recognition is 
exemplified by the government’s creation of a specialised commission to study these reforms. 
However formal recognition did not translate into practical political changes, as most reforms were 
not enacted. Secondly, NGOs could more openly work on political reform and relay their demands 
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to politicians. CCER is one example that illustrates well the role of NGOs in advocacy and 
awareness raising. The activists however, continued to use old tactics of reporting on electoral and 
reform processes and although the monitoring was more professional, the advocacy efforts of 
CCER remained traditional. Thirdly, the 2009 elections were, for the first time, supervised by a 
government institution, the SCEC, but continued to support sectarian interests because the SCEC 
was weak. Much like other public institutions, the SCEC required the support of political 
leadership and lacked the authority to sanction violators. As such vote buying, sectarian discourse, 
and misuse of public office prevailed the 2009 electoral campaign process.  
The 2005 withdrawal of Syrian troops reinvigorated the role of civil society, as can been 
in the case of LADE. But the main role that such NGOs could play was educational; they could 
raise citizen awareness and could inform parliament of what was needed, but it could not garner 
enough support to create more critical reforms. The ability of political leaders to not only lead the 
‘revolution’ but to take advantage of its gains derives from the agreement to retain the same 
formula of power-sharing and sectarian representation.164 According to one leading activist, 
politicians in 2005 changed their rhetoric demanding Syria’s withdrawal but the main tools they 
used to govern remained in place.165 Even if these NGOs were ‘new’ and aimed to be an alternative 
political society, they had to interact with and solicit the approval of the sectarian elites to advance 
their agenda and to continue their activities. As such Clark and Salloukh contend that the sectarian 
system after 2005 besieged nascent NGOs and challenged their ability to reform the system.166  
The electoral framework supports the sectarian power-sharing institutions, which causes 
votes to be intimately tied to sectarian loyalties and exchanged for benefits and services that the 
state is incapable of providing.167 This electoral framework and its institutions did not allow 
therefore for 2005 to be a fully critical juncture. CCER benefited from a window of opportunity 
for reform that was created after the Syrian departure, but the 2005 Parliament proved non-
reformist and the 2009 elections were just as manipulated as previous ones. CCER activists 
                                                          
164 See Amal Hamdan, “The Limits of Corporate Consociation: Ta’if and the Crisis of Power-sharing in 
Lebanon since 2005,” in Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution. Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr, eds., 
(London: C Hurst and Co. Publishers, 2012) 
Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr, (London: C Hurst and Co. Publishers, 2012).  
165 Gilbert Doumit, General Coordinator of 2009 observation operation, interview with author, Beirut, 
February 2012.  
166 Clark and Salloukh, “Elite Strategies, Civil Society and Sectarian Identities in Post-War Lebanon,” 742. 
167 Iskandar Bashir, “Al-Ta_ifiyya fi Lubnan ila Mata? [Sectarianism Until When?] (Beirut: University 
Institute for Studies – Arabic, 2006) and Binder, Politics in Lebanon.  
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presumed that advocacy could yield results if they amplified their efforts and widened their 
networks. Essentially, advocacy could not work because Members of Parliament do not seek to 
please voters and campaigners, rather, voters and campaigners seek to please Members of 
Parliament. As Omar Abdel Samad, CCER activist and LADE Board Member, notes, “people want 
to please politicians and thus cannot actually put pressure on them.”168 It is this type of relationship 
that stands in the way of citizenship identity and culture in Lebanon, and instead supports a 
sectarian, fragmented identity and an only partially competitive electoral process. Rather than 
changing this, the juncture of 2005 has made the sectarian system even better at controlling and 
manufacturing elections in Lebanon.  
 
  
                                                          
168 Omar Abdel Samad, LADE Board Member, interview with author, Beirut, March 2013. 
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Chapter Five - Libya: Intricacies of a Stateless Society 
 
“The state is therefore constructed out of, and given legitimacy by,  
society, which also retains the authority to dissolve the government if it acted unjustly...”  
Saif Al Islam Al-Gadhafi, PhD thesis for LSE, 20071 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Libya’s chequered history and volatile situation at present place challenges on reform 
emanating from both the social and political spheres, and from the interaction between them. From 
a historical institutionalism perspective, Libya, as a post-colonial society, had undergone a brief 
period of state building that was later transformed into a personified state order under Mu’amar 
Gadhafi. In this sense, the Libyan state was strong, but highly centralised on Gadhafi and his 
loyalists. However, this personification contributed to weakening the capacity and legitimacy of 
public institutions. Libyans have also endured a history of tight control over political and civic 
organisations, as such the main avenues of activism have been through religious, ethnic or tribal 
organisations. In more contemporary Libya there has been a rise in civil society organisations as a 
result of the juncture of the 2011 uprising, but the role and influence of these organisations is still 
to be assessed.2 Lastly, Libya has begun to adopt a system of national power-sharing as a means 
of involving various communities and political factions in the transition. This in turn may have 
weakened the ability of ordinary citizens and civic organisations to meaningfully take part in the 
transition or to hold political leaders accountable, particularly in the process of constitutional 
development. This chapter lays the foundation for an analysis of the forms of path dependence that 
the Libyan transition has experienced between 2011, when the uprising began, and 2013 when an 
electoral law for the Constitutional Drafting Assembly was enacted.  
Libya’s political order is still an under-theorised topic in the literature on political studies 
in the MENA region. For decades the international community, and the academic community, had 
little access to what was happening in the country and Libya’s own citizens were marginalised in 
                                                          
1 Saif Al-Islam al Gadhafi, “The Role of Civil Society in the Democratisation of Global Governance 
Institutions,” PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science, (September 2007), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/49315517/Saif-Gaddafi-s-PHD-thesis, (accessed December 1st 2012).  
2 See for instance Jason William Boose, “Democratisation and Civil Society: Libya, Tunisia and the Arab 
Spring,” International Journal of Social Science and Humanity 2, no. 3 (2012): 310-315. 
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the political process.3 Unlike Lebanon, Libya was never a parliamentary democracy and had very 
little experience regarding elections or civic movements. That is not to say that there was no civic 
opposition to Gadhafi’s authoritarian rule, but much of the activism was confined to diaspora 
groups or to marginalised areas inside Libya.4 Libya had also experienced a brief electoral period 
between 1952 and 1969. Also, much like Lebanon, the formation of the state after independence 
was rather swift and followed a process of ad-hoc unification. As such, the three regions, known 
at the time as Fezzan (South), Tripoli (West) and Cyrenaica (East), harboured unresolved tensions 
and disparities that continued after independence.5 Traditional allegiances, such as those between 
tribal actors, continued to play a dominant role in representation and conflict mitigation after 
independence. Like Lebanon, though for different reasons, Libya exhibits a ‘crisis of state’ that 
exacerbates factionalism, conflict and the empowerment of non-state actors at the expense of state 
institutions.6 Ultimately, such historical, regional schisms would feed into a very unstable political 
order after Libya’s recent juncture: the 2011 uprisings.7  
The Libyan state from colonial times onward has been quite exclusionary, as it did not arise 
from a locally rooted process of popular legitimation. The state has always been constructed at the 
hands of leaders who swiftly rose to power and who were not particularly representative of Libya 
as a nation.8 Following the 2011 uprisings, Libyans are facing similar challenges, to those of the 
Lebanese, as evidenced by the difficulty of the new state institutions in launching a formal 
constitutional process. My case study of civil society activism in the development of a new 
                                                          
3 Luis Martinez, “Libya: The Conversion of a Terrorist State,” Mediterranean Politics 11, no. 2 (2006): 
151-165, at p. 152. 
4 See for instance Ethan Daniel Chorin, Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution 
(New York: PublicAffairs, 2012).  
5 See Manal Omar, “Libya: Legacy of Dictatorship and the Long Path to Democracy,” in Elections and 
Democratization in the Middle East. Mahmoud Hamad Mahmoud and Khalil Al-Anani eds., (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 67-88.  
6 Regarding the use of this term in Libya see Youssef Mohammad Sawani, “Post-Qadhafi Libya: Interactive 
Dynamics and the Political Future,” Contemporary Arab Affairs 5, no. 1 (2012): 5. As for the reference to 
the term for the case of Lebanon see Fiona McCallum, “The Role of the Maronite Patriarch in Lebanese 
History,” 924.  
7 Marie-Louise Gumuchian, Marie-Louise, “Libya struggles to contain tribal conflicts.” Reuters April 8, 
2012 www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/08/us-libya-violence-idUSBRE83702Z20120408, (accessed on 18 
May 2014). 
8 See for instance Larbi Sadiki, “Wither Arab ‘Republicanism?’ The Rise of Family Rule and the ‘End of 
Democratization in Egypt, Libya and Yemen.” Mediterranean Politics 15, no. 1 (2010): 99-107.  
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constitutional order between 2011 and 2013 analyses how new and old tensions undermined the 
critical juncture and instead brought about only a partial change to the political order. 
This chapter provides a historical background to the state and political order in Libya with 
the aim of understanding the challenges to political reform that Libya faces at present. The chapter 
is divided into six parts. At first, I explore three Libya-specific concepts that affect the dynamics 
and trajectory of the new constitutional process. The chapter then provides an overview of the 
history leading up to Libya’s independence and troubled unification. It then discusses the dynamics 
and political order under the Libyan monarchy between 1951 and 1969. The fourth section 
describes the ‘stateless’ character and de-politicisation of the legal and political order under what 
came to be known as Gadhafi’s Jamahiriya. The last part lays a foundation for analysing Libya’s 
critical juncture of 2011 and the undercurrents of the uprising that ousted Gadhafi’s regime. The 
chapter concludes with the implications of the path dependence approach when interpreting the 
challenges to political reform in today’s Libya. 
 
5.2 Libyan Centric Terms 
This section explains three concepts that are salient in the Libyan political lexicon. They 
are signs of Libya’s historical path dependence regarding specific power struggles emanating from 
a centralised and exclusionary state that lacks support from its citizenry; the terms are used by 
political leaders to explain specific decisions and defend their stances at various critical junctures. 
At the same time these terms also point to deep divisions, mistrust, and weak representation among 
Libya’s diverse citizenry.   
Revolution (al thawra) has carried different political and ideological notions at three 
critical junctures in Libya’s history. Initially, the thawra was the impetus to seek independence 
from Italian colonial control. Symbolised by the armed uprising of Omar Al Mukhtar, the early 
use of the term revolution meant a movement directed toward ridding the country of external 
control and establishing an independent Libyan state.9 Then, King Idriss who ‘won’ this first anti-
colonial revolution established a centralised political order that allowed him the freedom to 
construct his own foreign and local economic policies without having to strengthen state 
                                                          
9 Hala Khamis Nassar and Marco Boggero, “Omar al-Mukhtar: The Formation of Cultural Memory and the 
Case of the Militant Group that Bears His Name,” The Journal of North African Studies 13, no. 2 (2008): 
201-217, p. 202.  
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institutions.10 Subsequently, in Gadhafi’s rhetoric, revolution was propagated as a new political, 
social, economic and ideological movement, initially in terms of Arab nationalism and later on for 
the construction of a new populist political order. When Gadhafi and the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC) took over following the 1969 coup, their revolution called for a full evacuation of 
foreign forces, national and Arab unity, and the end of political parties. To eliminate political 
opposition the RCC transformed the national bureaucracy into a political mechanism for citizens 
to formally participate in the system in exchange of their loyalty to this new revolution.11  
When this research took place, the General National Congress and the National 
Transitional Councils had aimed at filling the political vacuum that emerged after the revolution 
of 17 February 2011. Yet both entities often lacked the capability to reinvigorate public institutions 
and create mechanisms for citizens to take part in the ‘new’ Libya.12 In this context, while the term 
thawra can signify political novelty, it also pointed to a lack of a reconciliation process and formal 
state building process. It appears that every critical juncture that involved a revolution rejected the 
past but was unable to reconcile internal conflicts and schisms through a viable state structure. 
This is why the foundations of the Libyan state are weak, as they do not rest on a unifying political 
order that all Libyans can identify with.13 As a result, Libya’s public institutions and government 
structures have undergone three administrative ‘revolutions’ that left them fractured and incapable 
of offering post-revolution stability and security, as will be explained later in this chapter. 
The second term pertinent to an account of why the Libyan state and its institutions have 
been weakened over time is the contested relationship between Libyans in different areas of the 
country. Regionalism (jihawiya) is a key political term and also a statement of an administrative, 
political and cultural belonging to a specific region (jiha). According to Davis, Libya is 
“geographically an agglomeration of the fringes of other areas.”14 The South is culturally closer to 
the African Sahel than to Libya’s coastal areas. Tripoli and the Western parts are closer to the 
Maghreb cultures of Tunisia and Algeria. The Eastern region shares a border and cultural traditions 
                                                          
10 Carole Collins, “Imperialism and Revolution in Libya,” MERIP Reports 27, (1974): 3-22, at p. 15.  
11 Collins, “Imperialism and Revolution,” 17.  
12 Jason Pack, ed, The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Gadhafi Future (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 6 -7 . 
13 See for instance Sadiki “Wither Arab ‘Republicanism?’ 104  
14 John Davis, Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution: An Account of the Zuwaya and their Government 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 25.  
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with Egypt.15 Historically, the unification of the South (Fezzan), East (Cyrenaica), and West 
(Tripoli) was not accompanied by state policies to support equitable social and economic 
development.16 As such, since the independence of Libya in 1951, local leaders representing ethnic 
minorities, tribes, and Islamist organisations were detached – geographically and politically – from 
a weak central authority established under the monarchy.17 With Tripoli as the political capital, the 
Western regions enjoyed greater investment in social and economic development at the expense 
of other regions under the monarchical system.18 After 1969, Gadhafi, whose family is from Sirte 
in the Western region, also favoured the towns surrounding Tripoli over other areas. King Idriss’ 
supporters in Cyrenaica were seen as being punished and deliberately impoverished by Gadhafi.19 
In turn, this is one of the reasons why the strongest opposition to Gadhafi would come from the 
Eastern parts of the country in the run up to the 2011 uprising.  
At the outset the 2011 uprising united Libyan regions and non-Arab ethnic groups (the 
Amazigh, Tabu and Tuareg) against the regime.20 But this was an alliance among bedfellows who 
had only a single shared purpose - the removal of Gadhafi.21 The uprising witnessed violent 
struggles against the regime’s military in the East, West and Southern regions, indicating a nation-
wide opposition to Gadhafi. But there was little agreement among these groups beyond the need 
for regime change and, as the transitional period would reveal, there were deep contradictions 
among the regions and groups about how the new Libyan state should be shaped.22 The transition 
following the events of 2011 resulted in regionalism of a more organised nature and weakened the 
legitimacy of the National Transitional Council. At present (2014), jehawiya is a serious obstacle 
to the building of an effective central government in Libya, as residents in the regions still harbour 
                                                          
15 Davis, Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution, 25.  
16 See an early account of this in Ragaei El Mallakh, “Affluence versus Development: Libya,” The World 
Today 24, no. 11 (1968): 475-482.  
17 Pack, The 2011 Libyan Uprisings, 18  
18 See more on the economic and social policies in Libya after independence in Dirk A. Vandewalle, A 
History of Modern Libya (London: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 45-50.  
19 King Idriss legitimacy was very weak outside of the Benghazi in the Eastern region and Gadhafi’s strategy 
as early as 1973 was to economically deprive the East and socially fragment possible opposition from 
clerics and tribal leaders and dislodging the elites who had been loyal to the Monarchy. Vandewalle, A 
History of Modern Libya, 76-80.  
20 Youssef Mohammad Sawani and Jason Pack. “Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Gadhafi: 
The Islamist, Regionalist and Amazigh Challenges,” The Journal of North African Studies 18, no. 4 (2013): 
523. 
21 Saski Van Genugten, “Libya after Gadhafi,” Survival 53, no. 3 (2011): 62. 
22 Sawani and Pack, “Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Gadhafi,” 525. 
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fear and scepticism about a unified political order. Demands, especially from the Eastern part of 
the country, for a federal Libya stand in the way of creating a central security apparatus and an 
infrastructural planning authority.23 As such, Libya is once again unable to push for national, social 
and economic policies that would address the priorities and disparities across the regions. The 
constitutional dialogues investigated in the next chapter will further reveal how residents in each 
jiha have varying priorities that could well be too challenging for a central government to address. 
The third key term here is Libyan identity (al-hawiya al libiya) and what it means to be 
Libyan in the political sense. Libyan identity has historically been influenced by shades of Arab, 
African, Islamic, tribal and ethnic roots. This ‘mixed identity’ has affected the historical patterns 
of political participation and has been used by Libya’s rulers to either unite or divide Libyans. To 
begin with, the Islamic religion has been a salient element of Libyan identity throughout the 
country’s history. Islamic identity is first an assertion that all Libyans are Muslims and therefore 
a statement of pride and belonging.24 It is secondly a unifying proposition that political leaders, 
use or abuse, to shape political behaviour and choices at different junctures. According to Joffe, 
Libyans themselves “are the products of an Islamic environment and still evaluate the world in 
terms intimately connected with their faith.”25 Thus, at every successful thawra and critical 
juncture the new regime has had to justify legitimacy by using the Islamic faith as a shared basis 
for Libyan identity.  For instance, as soon as Gadhafi took over power in 1969, he adopted the 
Islamic lexicon and formulas as a strategy to unite people and show his respect for Libyan culture 
and Islam.26 In 2011, the head of the National Transitional Council’s first speech was a statement 
that Islam would be the basis of legislation and that the new regime would allow polygamy as an 
assertion of the Islamic identity of all Libyans.27 Islam and Islamist organisations were also sources 
of opposition to Gadhafi; although highly repressed by campaigns of imprisonment and violence, 
the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as a key player in the ‘new’ Libya after Gadhafi’s ouster.28 As 
                                                          
23 Pack, The 2011 Libyan Uprisings, 18.  
24 See for instance Lisa Anderson, “Religion and the State in Libya: The Politics of Identity,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 483, (1986): 61-72.   
25 George Joffe, “Islamic opposition in Libya,” Third world quarterly 10, no. 2 (1988): 615-631, at p. 621. 
26 Anderson “Religion and the State in Libya.” 
27 Gadhafi had outlawed polygamy, a marital practice that Islam allows, see Elizabeth Ann Mayer “Building 
the New Libya: Lessons to Learn and Unlearn,” Journal of International Law 34, no. 2 (2013): 365-387, at 
p. 375. 
28 Wolfram Lacher, “Families, Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution,” Middle East Policy 18, no. 4 
(2011): 140-154, at p. 153. 
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the constitutional dialogues would reveal after 2011, the Islamic religion is one of the key 
determinants of the types of freedoms and rights that Libyans expect from the new political and 
constitutional order.  
Islamic actors, however, can be seen as casting a shadow over a more complex Libyan 
identity, or identities. In part, this is because the issue of minorities (akaliyat plural akaliya) is a 
politically loaded topic, and Islamic identity is only part of this issue. Thought it may be true that 
Islam is the religion of the majority, if not all, Libyans29 the question of whether Libya is primarily 
African, Arab, Islamic, or all of these three, is still a troubling issue for Libyans.30 Islam, therefore, 
is only a partially unifying factor regarding Libyan identity. The existence of ethnic groups and 
the way in which the monarchy and then the Jamahiriya addressed the issue of minorities, has led 
to a fragmentation of Libyan identity and to great levels of tension and mistrust between ethnic or 
tribal minorities. More importantly, masked by the state strategy of promoting Islamic ideals at 
different junctures, there are also significant levels of mistrust and tensions between the minorities 
and the state.  
In addition to the Islamic faith, tribes, or clans, in Libya play an important role in shaping 
Libyan identity and structuring political demands.31 There are around 140 recognised tribes, of 
which the most well know are the now ‘anti-Gadhafi’ Warfalla tribe and the Misurata tribe (which 
takes its name from the district of Misurata).32 There are also ‘pro-Gadhafi’ tribes whose members 
filled senior governmental positions during the Jamahiriya, such as the Al-Awaqir tribe and 
Gadhafa tribe.33 After 1969, Gadhafi curbed the power of some tribal elites and established 
                                                          
29 The few hundred registered Jewish minority had departed before the 1969 coup and Christians were 
confined to a small group of foreign workers, See George Joffe, “Minorities in the New Libya,” in 
Multiculturalism and Democracy in North Africa: Aftermath of the Arab Spring. Edited by Mona Ennaji, 
(New York: Routledge, 2014), 293. Therefore, Libya is generally described as religiously a conservative 
society where Islam plays a dominant role and creates a relatively religiously homogeneous society. There 
are no religious minorities, Christian or Shiite in the country. The Amazighs, as also Muslim but follow the 
Ibadi madhab (orientation). See Yahya H. Zoubir and Erzsebet N. Rozsa, “The End of the Libyan 
Dictatorship: The Uncertain Transition,” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 7 (2012): 1267-1283, at p. 1277.  
30 Bruce St. John, “Post Gadhafi Libya,” in Multiculturalism and Democracy in North Africa: Aftermath of 
the Arab Spring. Edited by Ennaji, Mona. (New York: Routledge, 2014), 279.  
31 See Frank Ralph Golino, “Patterns of Libyan National Identity,” The Middle East Journal 24, no. 3 
(1970): 338-352. 
32 Stephen Kurczy and Drew Hinshaw, “Libya Tribes: Who’s Who?” Christian Science Monitor (2011), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0224/Libya-tribes-Who-s-who, (accessed 10 June 
2014). 
33 Kurczy and Hinshaw, “Libya Tribes: Who’s Who?”  
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alliances with other tribes to secure support for his new local and national structures.34 Tribes in 
Libya are not only part of the Libyan identity, but are a key mechanism for political participation 
and sources of political opposition. Although the post-Gadhafi era brought new faces to power 
they were all from old tribes and old families.35 Because of these informal political structures, 
Libyan political leaders, like those in post-Syrian Lebanon, derive their power and legitimacy from 
ties that date back to the Ottoman Empire and tribal and ethnic factors in Libyan politics diminish 
from the role of Islam as a unifying force. Despite the junctures that occurred through the 
restructuring of the administration under the monarchy, or through encouraging direct participation 
under Gadhafi, and most recently the mass uprisings, the tribes have survived long periods of 
turmoil and are still the entities providing political, social and ethical organisation in society.36  
Additionally, and despite the attempted strategy of spreading Islamic ideals and controlling 
tribal groups undertaken by both the monarchy and Gadhafi, ethnic identities play an additional 
important role in shaping national identity and political participation. Four main groups are 
regarded as non-Arab minorities: the Tabu, Tuareg, Tawergha and Amazigh (Berber). The Tabu 
are mainly based in the south of central Libya, sharing borders with Chad and Niger.37 The Tabu 
as an ethnic group inhabit a traditional territory which does not conform to the territorial 
boundaries established as a result of colonial penetration.38 The Tabu have long been persecuted 
in Libya, particularly under Gadhafi who implemented policies of ‘Arabisation’ aimed at a form 
of ‘ethnic cleansing’ by denying citizenship, housing and employment to the Tabu community. 
Although they joined the 2011 uprising against Gadhafi, the Tabu are still largely excluded from 
the state and face challenges to obtain citizenship and access to public services.39  
                                                          
34 Lacher, “Families, Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution,” 145.  
35 Ibid, 142 
36Zoubir and Rozsa, “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship,” 1271. 
37 Around 4,000 Tabu are reported to live in the town of Kufra which has a total population of 44,000. 
Summary of Stakeholders’ submissions to the Universal Periodic Review of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
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38 Golino, “Patterns of Libyan National Identity,” 345. 
39 See Laura Van Waas, “The Stateless Tabu of Libya?” Statelessness Program, Tulburgh Law School and 
Open Society Foundation, (2013), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/52aace474.pdf, (accessed on 15 June 
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The 1951 constitution stated that “all Libyans are equal before the law”, affirmed Islam as 
the religion of the state and declared Arabic to be the official language.40 However, Gadhafi’s 
subsequent Arabisation project embodied his vision of a ‘stateless’ society by excluding diverse 
political identities in order to perfect direct democracy.41 This signified the beginning of organised 
discontent by the Berber-speaking Amazigh community. The Amazigh community, which 
comprise of close to 500,000 citizens, was banned from using their language in schools, courts and 
media. Those in the South of Libya were even denied citizenship.42 The Tuareg, however, were 
able to ally themselves with Gadhafi by serving in the military and gained the protection and 
benefits of the state in return for their loyalty. The Tuareg therefore fought with the regime in 2011 
and currently suffer from displacement, violence and oppression as a result of their past 
allegiances.43 Lastly, the Tawergha, who are descendants of former slaves and whose greatest 
concentration is in a town called Tawergha east of Tripoli, were historically closer to the regime, 
but during the uprising they split into pro- and anti-Gadhafi factions.44 As the transition period will 
reveal, these three ethnic groups, as well as the internally displaced Tawergha, add to the tensions 
along with Islamic organisations and tribes, making unification and national reform even more 
challenging. The actors described here have different histories and also different expectations from 
the transition explored in this study. The constitutional dialogues will reveal these differences as 
one element of continuity that has its roots in Libya’s turbulent history. 
The three notions covered here embody the features of path dependence in Libya. These 
notions of revolutionary rhetoric and practice, regionalism, and the complexity of Libyan identity 
continue to challenge Libya’s ability to build a strong state. Because identity and loyalties are 
fractured and dispersed between regions and ethnic groups, actors during the post-2011 transition 
often saw power-sharing as the most suitable solution to their problems. In turn, this approach 
continued to weaken state institutions and challenge the relationship and role of civic organisations 
                                                          
40 Republic of Libya, Constitution of 1951, articles 11 and 15. 
41 Joffe, “Minorities in the New Libya,” 294. 
42 Aisha Al Rumi, “Libyan Berbers Struggle to assert their Identity Online,” Arab Media and Society, 
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Misurata have displaced them entirely and they now live in camps. See Elvin Aghayev, “Analysis and 
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with regard to the state. It made the state in Libya difficult to reform but also weak enough to adopt 
changes that promote religious, tribal and regional power-sharing mechanisms, or that invite 
autocratic rule, as will be illustrated in the next chapter.  
 
5.3 Libya under the Ottoman Empire and Italian Colonisation  
Libya prior to independence exhibited two key characteristics relevant to the study of 
political reform. First, the tensions between its three geographical regions (Fezzan in the South, 
Cyrenaica in the East, and Tripoli in the West) have their roots in the Ottoman period. Second, the 
influence of colonial powers and subsequent independence contributed less to building a strong 
state than to making Libya more of a stateless society. Both these factors undermined the 
emergence of a strong nationalist movement at the time of independence. This section provides 
the background to these two issues before moving on to present the dilemmas surrounding the 
unification of Libya.  
 The Ottoman Empire administered Libya as three separate territories from the sixteenth 
century until 1911. By 1835, the Ottoman Empire had occupied Tripolitania, Fezzan and Cyrenaica 
during three campaigns of conquest and practiced direct rule for 76 years.45 These territories were 
internally unstable and the local economy was undermined by years of local feuding. Most of the 
political and economic power was centred in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, whose respective 
governors (mutasarref) had to report directly to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Istanbul. By the 
mid-1850s the provinces underwent reforms dictated by Istanbul (tanzimat) that included 
administrative, commercial, and educational reorganisation and further centralisation. The 
consolidation of Ottoman control in the province of Tripoli between 1850 and 1880 made this 
province the de facto administrative and political centre for all three regions.46  
 The Ottoman regime sought to undermine and weaken the leaders of tribes, and to disperse 
their prominent members, in their attempts to contain any potential opposition.47 But tribal 
loyalties and the role of tribes in providing social and political protection to their members 
remained significant during this time.48 The Ottomans used tribal connections to select leaders 
                                                          
45 Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 11-15.   
46 Ibid, 15. 
47 Lisa, Anderson, “Nineteenth-Century Reform in Ottoman Libya,” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 16, no. 3 (1984): 329.  
48 See Golino, “Patterns of Libyan National Identity,” 325-348, at p. 347. 
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who were supportive of their policies and weakened leaders who were not considered to be 
reliable.49 For an entire century the Ottoman local and foreign policies were geared toward 
countering European expansion by administering a centralised political system and following a 
strategy of undermining local leaders who were not aligned with Istanbul.  
Following the outbreak of hostilities between Italy and the Ottoman Empire in 1911, Italian 
troops occupied Tripoli. The Ottomans and their Libyan subjects continued to fight the Italians 
until 1914, by which time Italy controlled most of Tripolitania.50 Following the 1918 peace treaty 
between the Turks and the Italian, Italy gained nominal control over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. 
In 1929 Italy gained control over Fezzan despite resistance from local tribes.51 At the time of Italian 
colonisation, Sayyid Idriss was the grandson of the Grand Sanusi (Sayyid Mohammad Ali Al-
Sanusi), a Sufi leader born in Algeria who preached the purity of Islam as an alternative to the 
classical interpretations of the traditional religious authorities (ulama).52 Sayyid Idriss settled in 
Cyrenaica where he became the leader of the Sanusi brotherhood in 1916 and the armed resistance 
of the brotherhood to Italian rule led to his recognition by the Italians as the Emir of Cyrenaica in 
1920.53 In 1922, Sayyid Idriss accepted the rule of the Emirate of Tripolitania and became Emir of 
both Cyrenaica and Tripolitania.54 Idriss attempted to negotiate full independence from Cyrenaica 
from Italian rule; however, he lost the ensuing war and was forced into exile in Egypt in 1922.  
From Egypt, Idriss waged and supported asymmetric warfare against the Italians. While 
Idriss and with local supporters in the East gained ground against the Italians, another source of 
resistance came from Umar Al Mukhtar, who organised resistance (jihad) against the Italians. Al 
Mukhtar was captured and executed by the Italians on September 16th, 1931.55 Al Mukhtar’s 
supporters held a united Libya as their main priority, while Idriss was keener on the independence 
of the Sanussi Emirate, even if it meant separation from Tripoli.56 The Italian colonial era 
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dismantled the existing political and economic system in the provinces and replaced it with a new 
political, social and economic system that was based on the repression of local notables, the 
confiscation of lands, and the institutionalisation of a colonialist project across Libya without room 
for local political participation.57  
In 1934 Italy formally united Tripolitania and Cyrenaica as the colony of Libya and later 
adopted the name “Libya” as the official name of the colony that comprised the three provinces of 
Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan. The modern dynamics of jihawiya initially emerged as 
separatist claims that were voiced most prominently from the Eastern region. Al-Sayid Idriss was 
popular throughout Cyrenaica, but was regarded with scepticism in the Western and Southern 
regions.58 Italy’s rule over Libya continued until World War II, followed by a short period of 
administration by the French and British. Idriss succeeded in forming strategic ties with the British 
military administration in parts of Tripoli and the Western region.59 Under the terms of the 1947 
peace treaty with the Allies, Italy relinquished all claims to Libya.60 King Idriss returned to his 
hometown in 1947.61 In November 1949, the UN voted and stated that Libya should become 
independent.62 For the British, Al-Sanussi was a convenient ally who could guarantee Libya would 
not experience the same kind of upheavals caused by the nascent Arab nationalism that was 
beginning to emerge in Egypt.  
Under the auspices of the United Nations, representatives of the three provinces of the East, 
West and South of Libya formed a National Assembly, which at its first meeting on 2 December 
1950, agreed that Libya was to become a constitutional monarchy, and that Idriss al- Sanussi would 
be the head of state of the United Kingdom of Libya. Libya adopted a federal system of governance 
that gave wide powers to the three provinces.63 King Idriss displayed an accommodating attitude 
towards Western power by signing an Anglo-Libyan treaty in 1954, which was unpopular in the 
country.64 The post-independence governmental institutions could not mitigate social tensions or 
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create a representative public bureaucracy. Owing largely to the fragmentation of political 
authority among the three regions after political oppression under the Ottomans and fascist Italy, 
Libya at independence did not have significant political parties. Ethnicity, family, and tribe 
continued to play an important role in the political and economic orientations and relations of the 
internal actors post-independence.  
 
5.4 Libya’s 1951 Independence and First Constitution  
While other countries in the region, including Lebanon, had the chance to carve out a 
nationalist movement that worked towards independence and that united several geographical 
areas, Libya’s swift accession to independence did not facilitate the building of a national identity 
and was more of an unexpected event rather than a process.65 According to Vandewalle, Libya 
moved from colonialism to independence by decision of the Great Powers and the United Nations, 
“without a unifying ideology or a movement whose goals and aspirations were shared throughout 
the country.”66 The political momentum between Tripoli and the Great Powers that paved the way 
for independence was largely detached from the rural areas. In these areas traditional elites 
continued to be the main focal points for social and political mobilisation, and the elites derived 
their claims for leadership from lineage, tribe, wealth and Islamic piety.67 The monarchy therefore 
faced several challenges in attempting to unify the three regions and, with a very small central 
administration, had to rely on family and tribal relations to organise social and economic life.68 In 
addition, deep economic disparities and entrenched poverty also limited the ordinary citizens’ 
ability to participate in the process of state building.69 
In 1951, the National Assembly, supported by UN Commissioner Adrian Pelt, drew up 
Libya’s first constitution.70 Pargeter notes that “this was no easy matter. Given the divergent 
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interests of the different regions, and particularly those of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, what 
emerged was a complex and cumbersome political system, comprising a parliament, a federal 
government and powerful provincial councils, whose heads were appointed by the king.”71 
Appointment of heads of councils was an indication that despite the federal structure the monarchy 
sought to create a strong central government. The 1951 constitution created a federal constitutional 
monarchy that placed substantial power in the hands of local provincial governments. It gave 
considerable executive and judicial powers to the monarch, who had the power for instance to 
issue political amnesties to convicted criminals and to declare a state of emergency (article 70).72 
Although the constitution guaranteed the right to form political parties (article 26), the monarchy 
strictly limited political activity and undermined civic and political movements by restricting 
freedom of assembly. The monarchy established a form of governance that de facto made families 
and tribes the principal structure of political competition.73   
The process of developing Libya’s first constitution was nonetheless a partially inclusive 
and representative process. While the Lebanese constitution was developed by elite political 
leaders with the support of the French, the Libyan constitution engaged a large number of actors 
through a dialogue with local elites. According to a Libyan constitutional expert, the significance 
of the first constitution resides not in the content of the constitutional text, but rather in the 
inclusive process of drafting it.74 An appointed drafting committee spent at least 25 months and 
conducted more than 187 meetings with representatives of local notables, economic actors, 
intellectuals, and tribal leaders from the three provinces.75 This process is perceived today as 
exemplary by activists and intellectuals for several reasons;76 firstly, the Libyan ‘founding fathers,’ 
who were members of the elite, according to constitutional lawyer Mohammad Berween displayed 
a great deal of political awareness by reviewing the experience of other countries and seeking help 
from outside.  
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A second distinguishing feature was the role of UN commissioner Adrian Pelt, whose name 
is fondly recalled by contemporary activists in Libya today.77 Pelt spent weeks in each of the three 
provinces surveying the attitudes of notables in the three provinces before selecting a consultative 
committee for the drafting of the constitution.78 This was particularly important for the Southern 
region whose voices at that stage had not been included thus far in the new state. Pelt ended up 
choosing four representatives, one from each of the Eastern, Western and Southern regions and an 
additional person to represent non-Arab minorities to guide his work and that of the provisional 
National Assembly. These representatives were called the ‘working group’ and were responsible 
for aiding the Commission in its consultations and relations with local notables. At the time 
minorities did not include ethnicities that originated from Libya, but only those who were non-
Libyans.79 Berween and others have explained this first constitution was developed having in mind 
a diverse, democratic Libyan society that would treat citizens equally.80  
The third important characteristic of the 1951 process was the creation of a committee of 
twenty-one members that was selected by the Pelt Commission to prepare a plan for the 
appointment of the National Assembly. Although there were demographic disparities, this 
committee agreed to appoint the same number (seven) of representatives from each region to give 
an equitable hearing to each of the regions.81 The representatives were able to give input on the 
end result of the committee: the appointment of a National Assembly that was comprised of 60 
members, 20 from each province and that was responsible for drafting the constitution.  
But although the 1951 constitution was the result of much of time and effort spent on local 
consultations, it did not completely succeed in appeasing tensions and mitigating challenges 
among the three regions and the tribal and ethnic groups. The committee did not fully consider the 
significance of separatist demands in the East, nor the extent of marginalisation in the South. The 
process also laid the ground for Libyan ethnic communities to become disillusioned with the 
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depiction of Libya in the new constitution as an Arab nation and allowed for subsequent state-
controlled policies to Arabise the history and identity of Libyans. The 1951 ‘dialogue’ process 
ended only with a recommendation by the UN Commission to include one representative on behalf 
of Libyan minorities.82 In addition, although tribal leaders were consulted on broad constitutional 
issues, the sample that Pelt surveyed was not representative and as such represented only a partially 
inclusive process. As it turned out the constitution would be short-lived. 
In 1952 Libya held its first general elections in which pro-government candidates won the 
majority of seats.83 The elections were followed by riots that led King Idriss to ban all political 
parties.84 The riots were motivated by the lack of agreement among Libyans on the form of 
government the state had adopted. This indicated that the decision of the constitutional drafting 
committee to adopt a federal system was not endorsed by many Libyans. Initially, King Idriss 
allowed for the operation of political parties in Tripoli that were calling for unification. But after 
the first elections in 1952, the King became less tolerant and stifled demands for unification.85 The 
partially inclusive constitutional process was replaced with a more authoritarian governance 
system that the monarchy was able to control more centrally. The discovery of oil a decade later 
made unification an administrative requirement for effective management of the oil sector. 
Although state institutions lacked the competence to properly regulate the oil sector and manage 
its financial returns, centralising decision-making facilitated control over the country’s wealth and 
oil revenues.  
In 1963 the King, aided by the constituent assembly, turned Libya into a unitary state to 
gain control of oil resources and of the local councils.86 The 1951 federal system had created 
provincial councils in the regions of Tripoli (West), Benghazi (East), and Sebha (South), but by 
1963 the need for unified legislation, especially for to the oil sector, led to a constitutional 
amendment to make Libya a unitary state system.87 From the perspective of the monarchy, the 
federal structure between 1951 and 1963 was hampering the ability of successive governments to 
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make decisions and execute policy.88 The 1963 amendment did not directly strengthen the role of 
the central state or build a stronger sense of national identity. Libyans were coerced into accepting 
the unification, but at the local level would continue to identify with region and tribe.89  
The 1951 constitutional experience was the first potentially critical juncture which, judging 
by the political outcome in 1952, provided the foundations for partial reforms under the monarchy; 
the subsequent amendment for Libya to become a unitary system however was the most significant 
of these reforms, but was not welcomed by the majority of Libyans. The constitutional amendment 
was a swift political decision that allowed the King to centralised power and consolidate his 
personal grip over oil resources and resource distribution. The amendment lacked an 
administrative and institutional structure to support economic and social development of the three 
regions. By vesting power in King Idriss, the 1951 constitution in article 62 effectively allowed 
the King to promulgate laws (article 62) and even enjoy a veto power over legislation (article 136).  
From a political perspective, oil revenues in the 1960s did not contribute to strengthening 
the state’s legitimacy. Oil revenues made Libya a capita-surplus nation, but that richness was not 
‘felt’ by the population as the economic policies of the monarchy redistributed wealth unevenly 
and the central administration itself was seen as largely corrupt and self-serving.90 The monarchy 
therefore distanced itself from most of rural Libya, from minorities, and from the masses. It also 
made Libyans even more connected and loyal to the smaller informal units that appeared to be 
protecting them from the biased policies of the monarchy. Tribal and ethnic relations once again 
emerged as the keystone of identity and social stability, especially in the peripheries.91 The King 
failed to transform tribes and ethnic minorities into supporters of the monarchy; he could force 
them to comply with his demands, but could not undermine their legitimacy at the local level.92 
The monarchy’s main source of legitimacy increasingly came from the economic patronage it 
provided through its use of oil revenues. 
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5.5 Gadhafi’s Regime (1969 – 2011)  
By the mid-1960s the monarchy had very little legitimacy and lacked support, especially 
outside of the Eastern region. Its effort to retain authority through centralisation backfired by 
causing resentment within Libya’s military institutions. Backed by arms and popular support from 
within the military, new leaders began disrupting the chain of command within the administration 
and threatening the King’s policies. In particular, the King’s closeness to the West and his 
unbalanced economic policies caused young military leaders to lose trust in the new system and 
challenge the monarchy. This prompted a bloodless coup by the then 27-year-old Colonel Gadhafi 
on September 1st, 1969. The twelve officers leading the coup came from lower-middle-class 
backgrounds and represented the three South, East and West regions of Libya.93 This group had 
previously formed the ‘Central Committee’ of a secret organisation within the Libyan army called 
the ‘Libyan Free Unionist Officers Movement’. They subsequently renamed themselves the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and declared the creation of the Libyan Arab Republic 
with Gadhafi as the new leader.94 The revolutionaries were lieutenants and captains under 30 years 
of age who had no experience in managing political institutions and no overt tribal allegiances.  
Colonel Muammar Gadhafi was young, charismatic and, like many of his generation, 
deeply dissatisfied with the monarchy. By the time he made a bid for power, Egypt’s President 
Jamal Abdel Nasser had already established himself as the leader of the new Arab Nationalist 
movement that was threatening older regimes across the Middle East. Nasser was a fundamental 
inspiration to Gadhafi’s personal and revolutionary development. Gadhafi’s subsequent rule 
proved to be full of contradictions. First, Gadhafi put in place a strong authoritarian centralised 
structure while his rhetoric focused on a more populist, direct rule by the people. Second, his 
attempt at unifying Libyans under a new national identity was coupled with the repression of tribal 
and Islamic leaders that were part and parcel of this identity. Lastly, his attempt to modernize and 
open up Libya to the world was coupled with a de-politicisation and marginalisation of social and 
political actors. Three elements of continuity from the period of the monarchy are particularly 
relevant: a weak central administration that did not provide equitable social and economic 
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provisions, a ban on political and civic organisations that de facto made tribes the key socio-
political organisations, and regional tensions and disparities between East, West and South.  
This section reviews the articulation of the abovementioned tensions during four main 
periods of the Gadhafi era. The first phase was between 1969 and 1973 and was characterised with 
Gadhafi’s attempt at bolstering national unity through his support for Arab Nationalism. The 
second phase, from the mid-1970s until the 1990s, was characterised by the institutionalisation of 
the regime’s revolutionary practices. The third phase began in early 2000s when the regime 
consolidated its power by replacing local administrations with loyal revolutionary committees and 
began the suppression of all opposition. The final period followed the 2011 uprising and ended in 
Gadhafi’s demise.  
Between 1969 and 1973 the regime focused on three main strategies to prop up its 
popularity: promoting Arab nationalism, fighting imperialism and corruption, and combating 
Western imperialism (including the confiscation of the assets of Italians and Jews).95 Gadhafi and 
his comrades used a populist socialist ideology, most apparent in the holding of public trials for 
the wealthy and the taking over of a number of private properties.96 They also asked the Americans 
and British, whose armed forces had been stationed in Libya since independence, to evacuate their 
military bases. Importantly, they nationalised the American oil companies. Gadhafi’s Arabism 
strategies also included a vision to Arabise Libya’s non-Arab minorities.97 
The new regime had to grapple with two key forces that could weaken its base. The first 
of which was the role of tribes. Gadhafi understood the importance of not attacking the tribal order 
frontally and advertised his Bedouin tribal origins. At the highest levels of the military and political 
echelons Gadhafi succeeded in placing members of his own tribe and other tribes as a means of 
co-optation. The tribes loyal to him were referred to as the privileged class (khassa) and were 
awarded military and political positions.98 To a certain extent, in his early period Gadhafi had to 
adopt a power-sharing agreement by professing to guarantee representation of tribal groups. His 
second dilemma was with the role of Islam. Libya has an overwhelmingly Muslim majority and a 
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rather conservatively-minded population.99 If Gadhafi was to distinguish himself from the 
monarchy, he had to articulate an important role for Islam in his new ideology. He recognised 
Islam as the religion defined by the regime, and as a means for religious and ethnic unity enhanced 
his own image. Gadhafi therefore focused on the centrality of Islam and argued that Islam was a 
divine concept that applied to anyone who believed in God.100 In proclaiming that, he diminished 
the need for guidance from religious leaders and called for a more individualistic form of Islamic 
belief based on a direct relationship with God. He did so to weaken the role of religious leaders 
(traditional ulama and sufi) in social and religious socialisation. By preaching the need to embrace 
Islam as a whole he was discrediting the role of religious leaders, who he feared might teach 
Libyans to question his authority. His initial strategy to bring the principles of Arab nationalism 
to Libya was not convincing for many Libyans, who were practicing Muslims, many of who 
adhered to the Sanusi order.101 He wanted to appeal to the Islamic faith as a source of legitimation, 
but in parallel he antagonised Islamist groups. In practice, by trying to appropriate the Islamic faith 
he was effectively dismantling its political structures.   
The new regime suspended the constitution and announced a constitutional declaration in 
December 1969 that designated the RCC as the highest political authority who could appoint the 
Council of Ministers.102 As a result, successive governments would be comprised of individuals 
loyal to the RCC and close to Gadhafi.103 If the constitutional order was manipulated under the 
monarchy, it was completely undermined after the coup of 1969. Gadhafi’s neo-Sultanist style of 
government thrived in a situation where the arbitrary use of state power was the norm. The RCC 
then purged the administration of officials who had served under the monarchy. In parallel, the 
Libyan army started to emerge as a major source of employment as the RCC replaced most officers 
above the rank of major with a younger generation of Libyans.104  
RCC members then tried to encourage people to participate in the congresses but the new 
regime had little connection to the grassroots population and could only mobilize limited support 
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for the process.105 These were the first attempts to de-institutionalize the models of representation 
that had characterised the old regime and to replace its institutions with new leadership structures. 
But these new structures were not aligned with the religious, ethnic and political organisations that 
were valuable to Libyans. In the face of resistance to change, Gadhafi soon realised that he had to 
adopt a more centralised and coercive form of political representation if he was to stay in power. 
In June 1971, the regime announced the creation of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), inspired by 
that of Egypt’s Nasser and of a one-party populist rule in an effort to bypass traditional authorities, 
tribal organisations, and provincial structures.106 
This second period could be described as the era of ‘Gadhafism” because of the deep 
personalisation of his rule. On the eve of the anniversary of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday on 
April 15 1973, Gadhafi’s ‘Zuwara’ speech spelled out the five pillars of the new era: getting rid of 
‘deviants’ who opposed the revolution, abolition of ‘reactionary laws,’ arming the revolutionary 
masses, undertaking administrative and bureaucratic revolution, and declaring a cultural 
revolution. The speech called for a system where people could “govern themselves by 
themselves.”107 Behind these five pillars was the ideology of the ‘Third Universal Theory’ which 
Gadhafi was promoting as a political system based on Arab unity, socialism, Islam and direct 
popular democracy. In doing so, he was delivering to the tribes, minorities and ethnicities a final 
blow and subjugating all sub-national identities under a nation-wide Arab Islamic identity of which 
he was the guardian. After the famous 1973 speech, people’s popular committees were put in 
charge of all national administrations including Ministries, universities, hospitals and factories. By 
the end of 1973, more than 2,400 locally appointed popular committees were approved by the 
RCC’s councils and took up tasks at the provincial level.108 Gadhafi also changed Libyan 
citizenship to “Arab citizenship” and amended that the right to nationality be given to anyone who 
claimed allegiance to the Arab nation.109 
In 1975 Gadhafi published the Green Book, in which he expressed his new philosophy and 
Third Universal Theory. This marks the second period of institutionalisation reviewed here. The 
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Green Book stated that the country’s citizens directly managed its political and economic life via 
a form of direct democracy.110 Gadhafi denounced the idea of a constitution, of a parliament, of 
elections and of democracy, claiming that these notions were based on propaganda and demagogy. 
He claimed that political parties were modern forms of dictatorship, Gadhafi thus stated that “this 
new theory is based on the authority of the people, without representation or deputation.”111 
Libya’s population was to be organised through grassroots people’s congresses (lijan shaabiya) 
from which several People’s Committees were formed and appointed by the congresses. 
Committees were responsible for managing municipalities, hospitals, schools and business under 
the guidance of the congresses.112 They could also make proposals and suggestions to the General 
People’s Congress that brought together representatives of the local congresses.113  
A third power structure was made up of Revolutionary Committees (lijan thawriya), whose 
mission was to direct and control all work undertaken by congresses and local committees.114 The 
Revolutionary Committees were effectively a paramilitary organisation that had the power to 
arrest, imprison and execute perceived enemies of the regime, outside of any law. Naturally, the 
Revolutionary Committees were closely monitored by Gadhafi’s Coordination Office.115 But the 
local congresses were far from a direct democracy as funding and policing tools were outside their 
remit. In this sense, they were para-public, as they could not provide oversight of the public 
bureaucracy, which was directly controlled by Gadhafi and his allies. Lastly, to overcome intra-
elite struggle, Gadhafi stifled opposition to his appointees to local congresses and committees 
through his intricate internal security apparatus.116  
This policy of local congresses illustrated a logic of “deinstitutionalisation” that entrenched 
Gadhafi’s personal rule and created an institutional vacuum. The multiplicity of ad hoc committees 
with overlapping responsibilities generated an anarchic structure without a clear chain of 
command. Instead, congresses supported by the Revolutionary Committees would use patronage 
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and local connections to select working committees responsible for running public services and 
for representing their respective municipalities in the provincial congresses.117 In the late 1970s 
Gadhafi’s revolution became a more openly cultural revolution (thawra thakafiya) as the regime 
frequently exiled members of the Amazigh and burnt books on the Amazigh and other non-Arab 
groups.118  
Through the redistribution of wealth obtained from oil exports Gadhafi was able to co-opt, 
silence or sponsor the various ethnic and regional groups that were historically antagonistic to the 
state. Once Gadhafi’s enthusiasm for Arab Nationalism diminished, the basis upon which 
nationality was to be granted also changed as he opened up the door to immigration from Africa 
through Libya’s South as a means of co-opting more non-Arab supporters. This resulted in the 
formation of three categories of Libyan nationals having distinct rights and who were not all 
equally recognised: (i) nationals from the 1954 law under the Monarchy, (ii) nationals from after 
the period of institutionalisation in the 1970s, and (iii) notable families with formal identification 
and recognition from the state.119 In the south-eastern town of Kufra for instance, Gadhafi brokered 
a fragile peace between the Zuwaya, an Arab tribe, and the Tabu, by paying both groups and 
offering citizenship to some of their members to keep the peace despite their conflicts over land 
and citizenship.120  
After 1977 in particular, the institution of government in its traditional legal-bureaucratic 
sense was dismantled, and the ‘people's authority’, exercised through people's congresses and 
committees, was proclaimed. This new political order led to the official renaming of the country 
to the Jamahiriya – a neologism from jamaheer, meaning the masses. By 1977, the “era of the 
masses” had arrived and Gadhafi officially announced the renaming of Libya as the Arab Socialist 
People’s Libya (al Jamahiriya al Arabiya al libiyya al shaabiya al ishitirakiya).121 As it happened 
earlier with the Arab Socialist Union party, Gadhafi did not succeed in garnering political support 
for the system. This failure led Gadhafi to become more repressive internally. Ahmida concludes 
that “in the 1980s, excessive centralisation, heightened repression by security forces, and a decline 
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in the rule of law undermined Gadhafi’s experiment in creating an authoritarian regime based on 
indigenous populism.”122  
Gadhafi felt increasingly challenged by the Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood 
throughout the 1980s. For the most part, the regime succeeded in confining Islam to the social and 
private spheres. Yet, the rise in Islamic activism across university campuses and in local 
communities was seen as a direct threat by the regime. The appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood 
especially among youth indicated that Gadhafi’s attempts to present his own version of Islam was 
not well received. In 1984 two students were hanged on the campus of Tripoli Al Fateh University 
and in 1987 Libyan television aired the public execution of nine other people linked to Islamic 
groups.123 Such crackdowns on Islamic groups publicly silenced the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Islamist factions while covertly strengthened their appeal as a protest movement and also a source 
of identity.  According to an activist who was convicted of being a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood at the time, it was Gadhafi’s initial appeal to Islam that facilitated the growth of 
Islamic groups; “but when the Revolutionary Councils started to oppress devout ulama, we knew 
that Gadhafi’s agenda would go against what we considered to be ‘Libyan’ and that it was to be a 
good Muslim.”124 
Gadhafi’s own idiosyncratic version of Islam insulted Libyans as he tried to reinterpret the 
words of the Quran, but Libyans could do nothing, as any objections were brutally suppressed. No 
matter what Gadhafi did, Islamist groups continued to be highly respected across Libya and 
enjoyed the highest levels of popularity in the eastern cities of Darna, Benghazi and Ajdabia.125 
Although the Muslim Brotherhood was officially silenced by the end of the 1980s, the 1995 
establishment of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) grounded the main source of 
opposition to Gadhafi’s rule in Islamic ideology and ideals.126 This more radical form of opposition 
was in part a reaction to historical repression and years of marginalisation. The LIFG saw Gadhafi 
as oppressive and non-Muslim and sought to build a new Islamic state. Armed with weapons 
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gained from fighting abroad, the LIFG entered into a confrontation with the Gadhafi regime and 
was brutally oppressed, with thousands of its members being imprisoned.127 After weeks of intense 
fighting, the LIFG formally declared its existence in a communiqué calling Gadhafi’s government 
“an apostate regime that has blasphemed against the faith of God Almighty” and declaring that 
overthrowing Gadhafi was “the foremost duty after faith in God.”128 Fighting continued to escalate 
until July 1996 when the government carried out a massive number of arrests and launched air and 
ground assaults on LIFG bases. By the end of the 1990s Gadhafi had militarily defeated any 
potential challenge from a number of Islamist movements, mostly centred in eastern Libya. LIFG 
operatives who were not killed or imprisoned by the regime are said to have fled to Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Sudan.129   
To continue defusing internal challenges and to discourage potential defectors in the 
military, Gadhafi reduced the capabilities of the army by withdrawing resources, leaving only a 
few well-equipped brigades with the sole mission of protecting the Leader and his allies from 
internal threats. Instead, he set up a number of paramilitary organisations manned by his own 
relatives and sons.130 In 1993, tribal tensions had led to an attempted coup by the Warfalla tribe. 
To counter this, Gadhafi tried to gain support for his policies through populist local councils, where 
he claimed that the tribes bore collective responsibility for the actions of their members.131 This 
was an outright threat; if anyone were accused of dissidence, entire families and tribes would pay 
the price. The 1990s were a juncture that the regime only partially managed to control and marks 
the second period of the Gadhafi era in this research. The brutal response to Islamists and the rise 
of tribal politics did not do much to increase the regime’s credibility or popularity. It also indicated 
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that both tribe and religion were the main forces shaping loyalties and political participation, even 
under the strict order of the Jamahiriya.  
Regionalism again was fuelling tensions against the regime, particularly in the eastern 
region. Benghazi and its neighbouring towns were economically deprived and, politically, the most 
oppressed under Gadhafi. The regime’s neglect infrastructure and social services in Benghazi was 
seen as a purposeful strategy to impoverish and weaken these areas.132 Fearing loyalists to the 
Sanussi order, Gadhafi paid close attention to potential dissidence and uprisings in the East by 
employing strict measures against families associated with Islamic groups and student movements 
sceptical of the regime.133 A scandal in 1996 over the infection of 413 children with HIV/AIDS in 
Benghazi led to a culmination of anger among citizens in the Eastern region who felt it might have 
taken place on the orders of the regime.134  Another blow to the regime’s popularity came from an 
event on June 28th, 1996 when following prison riots 1,270 men were massacred in Abu Slim 
prison.135 There is not sufficient information about the detainees but their arrests during the 1990s 
does suggest that the regime accused them of being affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood and to 
the LIFG.136 At the time even being considered to have ‘offended’ the regime was enough to get 
some young men detained in Abu Slim.137 
At the level of foreign policy, in an attempt to increase its standing in the world, after the 
death of the Arab Nationalist dream, Gadhafi in the 1980s and 1990s was supporting terrorist 
organisations worldwide and had earned itself economic sanctions and political isolation from the 
international community.138 At this time, Libya’s foreign policy indicated Gadhafi’s attempt to 
diminish internal opposition to the regime by increasing external opposition to the West, and the 
US in particular. The regime sought to appear to share Libyans’ suspicion of outside interference 
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by sponsoring anti-Western terrorism activities.139 The foremost of this was Libya’s sponsorship 
of the 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 that exploded over Lockerbie, in Scotland, killing 259 passengers 
and crew and 11 residents of the town. .140 Accusations were made against two state-sponsored 
Libyan nationals and the subsequent social and economic sanctions by the UN Security Council 
on Libya for promoting international terrorism further isolated the regime.141  
The end of the 1990s brought the first signals that the regime was willing to make changes 
to avoid growing domestic unrest and alleviate the economic difficulties caused by the sanctions. 
Gadhafi could no longer ignore the potential unrest that came from worsening socio-economic 
conditions and from isolation from the international community. Socio-economic sanctions 
diminished the regime’s ability to co-opt tribes and the purposeful strategy to withhold financial 
support to the East were both making Gadhafi less and less popular. This third phase was marked 
by a change in foreign policy through a rapprochement with the US and Europe at the start of the 
2000s sparked by Gadhafi realising he was lacking popularity and capability inside Libya and with 
the international community.142 After denouncing terrorism the regime sought to restore its 
standing in the international community notably, in 2003, by providing reparations to the families 
of individuals murdered in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie.143 The UN Security 
Council voted on 12 September 2003 to lift its 11-year regime of economic sanctions and the arms 
embargo that had been in place for 18 years.144 Economic growth was positively affected in the 
2000s and was accompanied by a degree of economic liberalisation. 145 
This third period of the regime corresponds with Gadhafi’s rapprochement with the West 
and increasing economic liberalisation in the country illustrates attempts of reform from within the 
regime.146 Gadhafi’s eldest son (from his second marriage), Saif al-Islam, began to gain 
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prominence at this juncture. 147 Saif’s image represented a younger face that believed in free market 
economics and was educated in Austria and the U.K. Saif had already established and headed the 
Gadhafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations, which worked since 1996 to provide 
humanitarian assistance across Libya.148 This position had enabled him to play a key political and 
economic role in the country as he claimed to represent ‘civil society’ in Libya. This civil society, 
like his father’s political society, was largely defined by Saif himself. It was Saif appearing on all 
media outlets and claiming to represent the people’s demands for reform.149 Since there were no 
recognised civic organisations, Saif was able to monopolize the debate. In practice, the regime did 
not formally recognise civil society organisations outside the sphere that Saif had delimited. In this 
way, the regime constructed a Libyan civil society around a succession project that would facilitate 
Saif’s accession to power. However, the social order, dominated largely by tribal loyalties as well 
as by Islamic groups, proved impossible for Saif to subdue.150 His efforts were mainly a ‘media 
stunt’; an attempt to appear liberal and in control when in fact Libyan opposition movements 
continued to be on the rise.   
In 2004, rapprochement with Europe and the US151 lead to the lifting of bans on imports, 
exports and bank loans.152 The year 2004 was also notable for Saif’s creation of a committee to 
work with international experts to draft a new constitution. Their efforts produced a draft charter 
of 152 articles (which would later be leaked to the press) but actual constitutional reform never 
took place.153 The declared intent of the regime to write a new constitution suggests that Gadhafi 
was aware of the need to change the system in order to accommodate discontent. Saif also 
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announced his intention to reform the media and liberalize the economy.154 His liberalising efforts 
between 2006 and 2010 ensured that a number of media outlets were allowed to operate and, for 
the first time, could broadcast talk shows discussing political issues, nepotism and corruption.155 
However, because of the weakness of state institutions and lack of private sector experience, the 
regime could not easily liberalize the economy. Gadhafi’s institutional set up allowed him to direct 
resources, services and benefits to a small group of his supporters and to keep such benefits away 
from his potential opponents. Although the 2000s witnessed a partial liberalisation of the public 
sphere, the new constitution did not see the light of day and activists continued to be subjected to 
torture and repression. Saif publically called for human rights in Libya but violent repression 
continued.156 
 While Saif Al Islam grew in the prominence through his leadership of the Gadhafi 
International Foundation for Charity, the underlying repression of political activism remained in 
place.157 The tensions between this tentative liberalisation process, aimed at the international 
community, and very strict internal control was evident in the protests that broke out in 2006, 
predominantly against the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad released by a Danish media outlet, 
but they also openly included anti-regime slogans.158 The lack of meaningful reform made Libyans 
increasingly frustrated at the anomaly of a state that had such significant oil income yet was unable 
to address many basic needs of its population. The reform project of Gadhafi’s son Saif did allow 
some space for Libyan intellectuals and diaspora to at least discuss the possibility of change from 
within the regime.159 One of the most significant movements that grew out of the period of regime 
tolerance to civil associations was the ‘truth seeking’ committee that was set up in 2009 and headed 
by Fethi Terbil, a lawyer, who had lost his brother, cousin and brother-in-law in the Abu Slim 
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massacre.160 Emboldened by Saif Al Islam’s reformist rhetoric, in 2009 the victims’ families 
demanded, through peaceful protest that the regime provide them with an account of how their 
loved ones had died.161 The demonstrators were fewer than 30 people and held protests every 
Saturday for years in Benghazi despite threats of arrest and despite the government’s offer of 
money in compensation for their loss.162 These movements were very new and bold in the Libyan 
context, as the mere mention of abuses committed by the government was enough to have had 
others killed. 
The 42 years under Gadhafi brought out stark contrasts in the meanings of revolution, 
regionalism and Libyan identity. On the one hand, Gadhafi sought to use these notions to 
strengthen his rule but, on the other hand his policies exacerbated the appeal of these notions to 
fuel discontent against his regime. The thawra quickly turned into an autocracy and attempts at 
unification only led to greater jihawiya. Gadhafi had to use ‘power-sharing’ mechanisms by 
formally recognising and working with tribes to foster loyalty to his regime. On the other hand, 
his un-sharing of power was by oppressing Islamic authorities and Islamist groups. But unlike the 
Lebanese case after the civil war, the regime did not really grant representation for groups outside 
of a rather narrow ruling elite. Gadhafi’s enmity with Muslim Brotherhood and Ulama reinforced 
Islam as an opposition discourse and unifying identity. Lastly, Gadhafi’s system, nominally based 
on the participation of the masses, completely outlawed political and civic organisations. This 
marginalisation of civil society completely de-politicised the public sphere and created apathy 
among the masses. They harboured discontent, but could do little about it. The critical juncture 
created by his revolution only reinforced path dependence in the form of revolutionary sentiment, 
regional inequalities, and Islamic and ethical ideals. 
 
5.6 Preamble to the 2011 Libyan Uprising  
The 2011 Libyan uprisings revealed how many internal enemies Gadhafi had made over 
the years, as the revolution united the ethnic minorities that he had marginalised, the Islamic groups 
that he had repressed, the intellectuals that he had banished, the activists that he had persecuted, 
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and many other groups.163 Many of the protestors from the city of Benghazi where the uprisings 
erupted noted that initially these protest movements were not particularly anti-regime or anti-
Gadhafi, but that the brutality with which the regime responded united Libyans against him.164 
Some analysts suggested that if Gadhafi had heeded calls for minor reforms he might still be in 
power today.165 This section presents some of the characteristics of this revolution and the three 
key changes it brought to political life in Libya. The uprising reignited revolutionary rhetoric that 
typically destabilises and weakens public authorities. It opened the door for Islamist and ethnic 
actor and facilitated the return of jehawiya and separatist demands.  
Whilst other autocratic regimes had opened up spaces for public engagement and 
recognised new political freedoms in the 2000s, Libya had remained extremely repressive.166 
Hence, the main actors in the 2011 uprising were not political parties and civic groups (as was the 
case in Lebanon’s uprising for example), but local self-help groups, charities, families, private 
entrepreneurs and diaspora members.167 Terbil, the head of the truth seeking commission that was 
set up in 2009, explains that the issue became a personal matter, the revolutionaries were set against 
Gadhafi as hundreds of families had felt outraged and targeted by the regime.168 Terbil, alongside 
a group of young Libyans, had been in the process of organising “A Day of Rage” planned for 17 
February. This day was to comprise a mass demonstration in which Libyans would take the streets 
to call for reforms, including the introduction of a new constitution. These preparations were 
directly linked to the semi-liberalised political space that Saif had created through his pro-reform 
activities. On February 15th 2011, seven cars from the General Security Directorate drew up 
outside the modest house of Fethi Terbil to arrest him.169 The planned ‘Day of Rage’ was not 
insignificant: it was on 17 February 2006 that 14 Libyans had been killed when popular protests 
broke out in Benghazi against the cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammad. 
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With images of the ‘Arab Spring’ on television and the activists’ belief that the regime 
would not respond so violently, Terbil and others went ahead and planned a symbolic protest.170 
The planned Day of Rage was not intended as a call for the overthrow of Gadhafi.171 But as news 
of Terbil’s detention reverberated through Benghazi, the families he was representing began 
gathering at the gate of the General Security Directorate in Benghazi demanding his release and 
were joined by lawyers and other professionals, who added their voices.172 In this context, the 
mobilisation for the planned Day of Rage was de facto starting two days early. To make matters 
worse, these initial protests were soon reported in the international media. Activists desperately 
reached out to the world’s TV audiences to come and protect the Libyans from the regime’s 
brutality. Despite the release of Terbil, on 17 February demonstrations erupted at various locations 
across the city, while the lawyers and families of the Abu Slim massacre began a full-blown protest 
in front of the Benghazi courthouse, where other demonstrators soon joined them.173 The emerging 
movement against Gadhafi was accompanied by a change in the foreign policies of the U.S. and 
European states. A long-standing enemy to the West and sponsor of terrorism, Gadhafi’s regime 
appeared weakened by the protest movements against him and by the violence of the regime. The 
international community saw an opportunity to get rid of Libya’s ‘eccentric’ ruler and initiated a 
UN Security Council resolution against Gadhafi referring him to the International Criminal 
Court.174  
The events that followed exhibited a pattern of repression-fuelled defiance. The conflict 
intensified after international actors joined the fray and authorised the use of military action – 
including against tanks and heavy artillery on the ground – in order to protect civilians. On 19 
March, two days after the UN Security Council voted to impose a no-fly zone, the attacks began. 
Much like with the ousting of the Syrians from Lebanon, this enabling international and regional 
environment coincided with local demands by Libyans, especially in the Eastern region. The 
militarisation of the conflict, however, should not overshadow the massive unarmed insurrections 
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that broke out in neighbourhoods across the country. The initial uprising was non-violent and 
spread to across the country in a matter of days, indicating an underlying and deeply entrenched 
resentment and opposition to the regime.175 The National Transitional Council (NTC) was formed 
late in February, was officially announced on March 5th, 2011, and was comprised of self-
appointed defectors, exiles and intellectuals who declared that the NTC would work to ensure 
elections took place.176 By July the international community had officially recognised the NTC. 
Militarily, the final turn of events took place in August when armed insurgents took over Gadhafi’s 
compound in Tripoli. Gadhafi died in the battle for Sirte on 20 October 2011.   
 In parallel to the military events and the formation of the NTC as a new political institution, 
changes were happening in the social and civic spheres. Libyans were suddenly able to speak up. 
Women activists who had been stigmatised for many years, and who were linked to Gadhafi’s 
bodyguards, were now playing a role in supporting the revolution and in mobilising the youth.177 
Civil society organisations that had been almost completely absent, except for Saif’s Charity and 
few associations for the disabled, were now flourishing.178 The majority of these efforts during the 
revolution went to humanitarian assistance, support for the fighters, and neighbourhood initiatives 
to guard the streets.179 This early mobilisation of activists laid the foundation for the emergence of 
thousands of civic organisations after the end of the armed insurrection against the regime. 
The personalised rule of Gadhafi for the 42 years of the regime made it possible for of 
activists from diverse backgrounds to unite against him. His subsequent threats to cleanse the 
streets one by one (zanga zanga) and get rid of the ‘rats’ (protestors) further fuelled anti-Gadhafi 
hatred.180 An intellectual and activist in the uprising from the London diaspora declared that “it 
was easy to hate him, every house, every family had a son who was either kidnapped, imprisoned 
or killed in those 42 years and so when the time came, every family could unite for one thing: we 
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Director of the Centre for Civil Society, interview with author, Tripoli, February 2012. 
179 Activists in Misurata, focus group conducted by author, Misurata, February 2012. 
180 Zoubir and Rozsa, “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship,” 1268.  
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wanted him out.”181 The streets of Tripoli and Benghazi were full of graffiti for months during and 
after the uprisings, belittling and insulting Gadhafi.182 But with the demobilisation of the mass 
uprising and the military confrontation came to a halt, the period of transition was characterised 
by an array of often contradictory demands. Transition to democratisation would effectively 
require solid political reforms that the new state elite was incapable of spearheading. Libyans 
called for freedom and liberation, but decades of de-institutionalisation meant that there was no 
strong structure of governance that could provide the required services to citizens or that could 
strengthen a process of political consensus building.183 The attempts at developing a new 
constitution for Libya highlight both elements of change and of continuity in the political order in 
the polity. The constitutional case study in the next chapter will shed light on the political dynamics 
after the uprising and how weak state institutions, power-sharing agreements, and ineffective civil 
society actors posed constraints on the development of a new political order between 2011 and 
2013.  
To a large extent, the Libyan uprising can be credited to the efforts of domestic actors. In 
part it was due to changing foreign policies.184 But it was also the result of the mistakes and failed 
promises of a populist regime that nurtured hatred and resentment for decades.185 The combination 
of these factors marked a significant juncture for Libya. Yet without an enabling environment for 
civic activism and reform, this juncture would be only partially critical for the country. 
 
  
                                                          
181 Faraj Najem, intellectual and activist, Director of the Africa Research Centre in Tripoli, interview with 
author, Tripoli, February 2012. 
182 See for instance a detailed account on the graffiti implications in Soumiea Abushagur, The Art of 
Uprising: The Libyan Revolution in Graffiti (Tripoli: Lulu.com publishers, 2011). 
183 See Zoubir and Rozsa. “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship,” 1268. 
184 Much like the stance of the United States on the ousting of the Syrian regime from Lebanon discussed 
in chapters 3 and 4. 
185 See Genugten, “Libya After Gadhafi,” 62. 
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Chapter Six - Libya’s Activists Struggle for a New Constitution 
 
“I have been shocked three times in my life: the day my father was released from prison,  
the day Gadhafi was killed, and the day I lamented the Gadhafi regime.” 
Participant in a workshop on active citizenship, Tripoli August 2013 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Libyans will remember the year 2011 as a year of radical change. It was the year where 
resentment against the regime became insurmountable and, with support from foreign troops, the 
end of Gadhafi’s rule became a reality. Gadhafi’s procrastination or disregard for meaningful 
reforms to the Libyan state in the 2000s paved the way for the demise of his regime and the 
termination of his populist thawra.1 On 20 October 2011 Gadhafi was killed brutally by rebel 
fighters with the support of NATO forces. The brutality of the leader’s death showed the extent of 
the hatred Libyans felt towards all that Gadhafi represented. A rebel fighter commented that, “the 
world might have looked disgustingly at images of his body dragged down the streets, but for us 
in Misurata the day he (Gadhafi) was finally captured and killed was like a wedding celebration. 
We felt liberated from the depths of our souls.”2 For decades Gadhafi had either knowingly or 
unknowingly deluded himself, believing he was popular, but the spread of the uprisings from East 
to West to South finally proved that he was not popular among his own people.   
The end of the regime signalled a transitional period that would bring fresh challenges for 
the Libyan people. Gadhafi’s grip over power and his patronage of loyal families and tribes made 
political succession very difficult. His centralisation of power and authority stifled the rise of 
political leaders who could potentially fill the role of statesmen. The challenges of the transition 
phase, studied here as the period between 2011 and the end of 2013, emanated from the absence 
of an established and participatory political space to cope with regionalism, tribalism, Islamism 
and governance. There had not been any inclusive political processes to address marginalisation, 
regional differences, and mistrust among Libyans and between Libyans and state institutions. 
                                                          
1 Zoubir and Rozsa, “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship,” 1276. 
2 Rebel fighter in Misurata Katiba (battalion) who claims he was the first to transport Gadhafi’s body when 
it arrived from Sirte to Misurata, interview with author, Misurata, February 2012. Gadhafi’s his body was 
washed and laid out for four days in a meat locker in Misrata. See for example Lisa Anderson “Libya: A 
Journey from Extraordinary to Ordinary,” in The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-
Gadhafi Future. Edited by Jason Pack, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 229-232.  
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Whilst the most recent thawra has dispersed power and authority among several groups, Libya’s 
formal state institutions were still too weak address differences and manage this diversity. As a 
result, the 2011 juncture was only partially critical, as the transitional period was characterised by 
path dependence and past practices. In particular, the results of the constitutional debates presented 
in this chapter display strong links to past tensions and conflict as well as to old practices.  
 The 2011 uprisings in Libya were supported by many ordinary citizens. Like other mass 
mobilisation moments, these uprisings saw the involvement of citizens and groups that would not 
otherwise be so engaged in politics.3 Libyans had not been able to engage in the public sphere, 
much less in the political process, for decades. Now thousands could take the streets and even join 
the armed insurgency against the regime.4 This process of mobilisation continued in different 
shapes after the mass anti-Gadhafi uprising had ended. Although militant groups and armed rebels 
had not yet disarmed and order had not been restored, after the killing of Gadhafi Libya entered a 
transitional period where institutions were starting to be rebuilt and political reform partially took 
off.5 Foremost among these reforms was the launching of a process to develop a new constitution 
for Libya. Understanding how citizens engaged in this process and how the political institutions 
responded to citizens and civic organisations can help us to understand how elements of continuity 
have persisted and have made the reform process highly challenging. The main assumption in 
assessing this process is that for the uprising to be considered a critical juncture the new 
constitutional order would have to be both inclusive and responsive to citizens needs in order to 
legitimize the new state system.  
 The actors in the 2011 revolution organised themselves into political movements and civic 
organisations after the uprising. Among these were the youth movements of February 17, 
comprised of urban youth who were highly active on social media and in the protests. Armed 
forces and rebel fighters ranged from defectors from the military, to local militias, to Islamist and 
jihadi groups who joined the fight against the regime. Another set of newcomers in the revolution 
who were also pursuing their own agenda were the civil society organisations within Libya and 
                                                          
3 On revolutionary mobilisation and challenges to regime change see Henry E. Hale, “Regime Change 
Cascades: What We Have Learned from the 1848 Revolutions to the 2011 Arab Uprisings,” Annual Review 
of Political Science 16 (2013): 331-353. 
4 Mustafa Sagizly, Head of the Warriors Affairs Commission, interview with author, Tripoli, July 2012.  
5 See for example Anderson, “Libya: A Journey from Extraordinary to Ordinary,” 230. 
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among the diaspora.6 The evolution of this last set of social actors highlights some key elements 
of continuity in how weak state institutions and emerging power-sharing agreements impose 
constraints on the establishment of a new constitutional order.  
This chapter explores the debates about the new constitution during Libya’s early 
transition. This period corresponds to the time between the issuing of the National Transitional 
Council’s (NTC) constitutional declaration in August 2011 and the proclamation of Law 13/2013 
determining the electoral framework for the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) in October 
2013. The chapter has two main objectives. First, it highlights how the challenges of political 
reform in the post-uprising phase were shaped by: (i) the weakness of central state institutions and 
(ii) the emergence of a power-sharing agreement. Second, the chapter appraises the role that civic 
organisations played in the constitutional process by studying the case of the Forum for 
Democratic Libya (FDL), a non-governmental organisation that led a national constitutional 
dialogue initiative between February 2012 and May 2013.  
The chapter is comprised of five parts. At first it explains how the transitional period 
opened up Libya’s ‘Pandora’s Box’, revealing multiple social and political struggles that had been 
contained for decades. In doing so it explores how the constitutional process became the central 
battlefield for political reform. The second section sheds light on the emergence of a multitude of 
civil society organisations during the transition. In the third section, I present empirical findings 
from a series of constitutional dialogues that FDL organised across Libya and analyse their 
implications for the development of a new constitutional order in Libya. Finally, I conclude with 
an assessment of the constraints on political reform and the limitations of civic activism, which 
contributed to making the 2011 uprisings only partially critical for Libya.  
 
6.2 Opening Up Pandora’s Box: Power-sharing in Disguise  
Gadhafi’s regime, much like other autocratic regimes, forcefully controlled a dynamic and 
differentiated socio-political fabric for decades. Gadhafi even imposed the colour green on Libya’s 
public spaces and commercial hubs.7 It is not surprising therefore that his demise would signal an 
                                                          
6 Tempelhof and Omar, Stakeholders of Libya’s February 17 Revolution. 
7 See for instance how Green continues to represent Gadhafi loyalists in “Libya’s Opposition: Where Green 
Refuses to Fade,” The Economist 29 June 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-
africa/21580161-muammar-qaddafis-hometown-band-loyalists-flaunt-his-favourite-colour-where-green-
refuses-to-fade.com, (accessed 10 June 10th 2014).  
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opening up of a multitude of demands, identities, grievances, agendas and groups. The differences 
in opinion among those who joined the revolution appeared mild at first, as they all shared the 
same purpose: toppling Gadhafi’s regime. But as soon as the revolution subsided, these groups 
realised that they had very little in common. Whilst this is far from surprising, the challenge for 
the new elites resided in institutionalising the revolutionary demands for freedom and democracy. 
The historical construction of revolutionary rhetoric, regionalism, and Islamism are some of the 
factors that constrained reform during the transition. A new emerging power-sharing formula was 
also emerging, signalling a potential break from the previous centralisation of power among one 
political elite, chosen by Gadhafi. But power-sharing, with the veto powers it introduced, was also 
a major constraint on national reform and on the role of the nascent civil society organisations.  
The National Transitional Council (NTC) was formed early on in the uprising of 27 
February 2011 and by early March proclaimed itself the representative of the Libyan people.8 The 
NTC members included representatives from the main tribes in an effort to win the support of 
Libyans across the country.9 It also included key figures that defected from Gadhafi’s regime 
including NTC head Mustapha Abdul Jalil (Gadhafi’s former Minister of Justice).10 The NTC 
acted as the political arm of the revolution and gained international recognition shortly thereafter. 
It operated alongside the ‘military’ arm (or thuwar meaning revolutionaries) that was made up of 
former LIFG operatives, tribal groups, military defectors, ordinary citizens and youth who joined 
battalions across Libya.11 The NTC as an interim transitional entity had a complicated relationship 
with the armed fighters. Since the NTC did not have a monopoly over force and could not enforce 
many of its decisions, the transitional period turned Libya into a stateless society without a working 
state structure, but with a political order maintained by numerous armed groups at the local level. 
The formation of the NTC also shows elements of continuity from Gadhafi’s regime, such as the 
marginalisation of some ethnic groups, disagreement over the role of Islam, the prominence of 
tribes in politics, and the anarchic management of the country’s natural resources.  
                                                          
8 Zoubir and Rozsa, “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship,” 1276. 
9 Sawani, “Post-Qadhafi Libya,” 4.  
10 See Zoubir and Rozsa, “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship.” 
11 Ibid. 
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When Tripoli was captured and ‘liberated’ in August 2011, the mood was characterised by 
euphoria and widespread support for the thuwar (revolutionaries).12 Shortly thereafter, the 
assassination of Defence Minister of the NTC, Adul-Fattah Younes, signalled that many 
revolutionaries refused to make compromises with the old guard.13 NTC political leaders were 
afraid to take measures that could upset armed militias and effectively acted as a mere caretaker 
government.14 Gradually the NTC asked the main brigades to keep peace and stability in Tripoli. 
The public bureaucracy that the NTC inherited from Gadhafi lacked the technical and institutional 
capacity to implement many reconstruction, developmental, or economic policies. In Tripoli as 
well as the Eastern and Southern parts of the country, law and order were kept in the hands of 
militias who referred to themselves as the revolutionaries.15 The NTC was dealing with the 
aftermath not of a mere uprising, but of civil war with thousands of people displaced, over 20,000 
killed, and an entire infrastructure that was often badly damaged.16 The weak capabilities of the 
NTC played into the interest of armed militias who could put forward their agenda and make 
political demands during the transition.  
At the same time, a weak NTC could not meet the demands of the new civic and political 
associations that were calling for political reforms after the uprisings. The NTC had set three main 
tasks for itself: to provide official representation for the 17 February uprising, to appoint a 
constituent drafting assembly to draft a constitution, and to organise democratic parliamentary 
elections.17 The NTC recognised that as an unelected entity they were not suited to drafting Libya’s 
new constitution although they did lay down the rules of the game by which the constitution should 
be formed.18  On August 3 2011, the NTC put forward Libya’s Constitutional Declaration which 
was intended to remain in effect until a new constitution was enacted. The constitutional 
declaration stated that the prerogatives of the NTC would include the design of a new electoral 
                                                          
12 They were regarded as heroes of the revolution who saved Libya with their blood, Mohammad Sagizly, 
Head of the Warriors Affairs Commission, interview with author, Tripoli, July 2012.  
13 Lacher, “The Rise of Tribal Politics,” 162. 
14 Sawani and Pack, “Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty,” 526.  
15 In February 2012, I visited Misurata and there were no local policy forces but young militia men keeping 
a watchful eye on streets and residents. They were saluted as heroes by the locals and 16 year old were 
revered by 70 year olds passing them by. 
16 See a brief on the security situation Christopher S. Chivvis and Jeffrey Martini, Libya after Qaddafi: 
Lessons and Implications for the Future (Washington DC: Rand Corporation, 2014). 
17 About the National Transitional Council, www.ntc.gov.ly, (accessed March 5th 2014). 
18 Pack, Jason and Hailey Cook, “The July 2012 Libyan Elections and the Origin of Post-Qadhafi 
Appeasement,” Middle East Journal (Forthcoming 2015). 
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law for Libya’s National Assembly, the appointment of a Higher Commission for National 
Elections, and the calling of the elections to a National Congress/Assembly. Following the 
declaration Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, head of the NTC, announced on 23 October 2011 that the Shari’a 
would be the source of legislation for marriage and family laws in an early sign of the NTC’s intent 
to appease Islamic groups.19 
This elected Congress would then assume the responsibility to appoint, within 30 days, a 
new transitional government, a constitutional drafting body that in turn was required to submit a 
constitutional draft within 60 days of its appointment.20 The declaration also stated that a 
referendum on the constitution would be held that would require the votes of two-thirds of eligible 
voters. The declaration itself marked a departure and a critical juncture from past practices as no 
referendum had taken place in the two previous constitutional experiences in Libya.21 Bolstered 
by the support of new civil society actors, the NTC declaration gained widespread acceptance in 
Libyan society.22 
The NTC helped successfully organise the first ‘democratic’ elections for a General 
National Congress (GNC) on 7 July 2012.  The elections to the General National Congress brought 
in a 200-member assembly representing 73 districts and had a voter turnout of 60 per cent of 
registered voters (with 80 per cent of eligible citizens being registered to vote).23 However, the 
elections also witnessed regional tensions, federalist unrest, and expressions of concern from 
ethnic minorities.24 By the time the GNC took over, the public approval of the NTC and the 
transitional government had greatly decreased. Omar remarks that, “they had come to be seen as 
incompetent, corrupt, ineffective, and lacking transparency. Many decisions were put off until the 
GNC was elected, and the government excused itself from tackling any of the pressing problems 
such as security and transitional justice.”25  
GNC results showed the popularity of NTC Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril’s National 
Forces Alliance that won the majority of seats. Jibril’s group won 64 seats, the former Gadhafi 
                                                          
19 This stressed the Islamic identity of the future state, see Sawani and Pack, “Libyan Constitutionality and 
Sovereignty Post-Gadhafi,” 539. 
20 NTC Constitutional Declaration on 11 August 2011, Democracy Reporting http://www.democracy-
reporting.org/files/bp_22_constitutional_declaration_libya_2.pdf, (accessed July 1st 2014). 
21 Ibid 
22 Sawani and Pack, “Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Gadhafi,” 532. 
23 Omar, “Libya: Legacy of Dictatorship,” 73. 
24 Ibid  
25 Ibid, 76.  
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public official was known as the ‘technocrat’ and promised economic and social development 
while the Muslim Brotherhood (some of whose members had links to the LIFG) appeared less 
popular, winning only 34 of the GNC seats.26 However, this did not mean that Islamist appeal was 
absent in Libya; rather as mentioned earlier, the conservative nature of Libyan society regarded 
Islam as having a very central role almost by default, indeed, many Libyans would say that they 
did not need the Muslim Brotherhood to further ‘Islamize’ Libya.27 Pro-Jibril Libyan voters stated 
that the political arena was inherently Islamic because the Libyan people were Muslim. They 
considered that Libya’s laws did not need to derive exclusively from the Shari’a and that Libya 
did not necessarily need political leaders with religious credentials for the state to be considered 
legitimate in an Islamic sense.28 Because his party did not have an overall majority in parliament, 
Jibril offered to form a grand coalition with federalist and Islamist forces within the GNC; a move 
that facilitated a dynamic of power-sharing and its associated problems of veto powers.29  
At the time of writing, the GNC’s main promised deliverable, the drafting of a new 
constitution, is yet to take place. The GNC was unable to decide on the method for appointing a 
constitutional committee until February 2013. In April 2013 it amended the Constitutional 
Declaration of August 2011 instead opting for the direct elections of this committee in order to 
appease GNC federalist members and armed groups in the East who were calling for that step.30 
This decision to hold an election for the constituent assembly has undoubtedly pushed back the 
establishment of a drafting committee. This indicated both the political and military strength of 
the Eastern parts of the country and Benghazi in particular, which feared that an appointed 
committee would mean centralised orders from Tripoli and less than fair representation.31 But it 
also meant that the GNC dissipated its authority by beginning to accommodate the demands of 
                                                          
26 Jibril was the interim Prime Minister and head of the NTC, 55 seats were won by independents, Alexander 
Kjaerum, Ellen Lust, Line Fly Pederson and Jacob Wichmann, “Libyan Parliamentary Elections Result,” 
JMW consulting (2012) http://jmw-consulting.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Libyan_Parliamentary_election_study.pdf, (accessed July 6th 2014). 
27 Faraj Najem, intellectual and activist, Director of the Africa Research Centre in Tripoli, interview with 
author, Tripoli, February 2012. 
28 Many Libyans said they were insulted by the Muslim Brotherhood’s obvious attempts to appear more 
pious and religious than ordinary Libyans. Personal observation. See also Sawani and Pack, “Libyan 
Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Gadhafi,” 541. 
29 See Frederic Wehrey, The struggle for security in eastern Libya. (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2012). 
30 Sawani and Pack, “Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Gadhafi,” 535.  
31 See Wehrey, “The Struggle for Security in Eastern Libya.” 
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federalist and armed protestors.32  Article 30 of Libya’s Constitutional Declaration of August 2011 
was amended in March 2012 to determine that the constitutional drafting body would not be 
appointed, but would be elected directly by citizens with 20 members representing each of the 
three regions (just as it had been done with the 1951 drafting committee). 33 
While the change from appointment to election appeased the federalists, it increased the 
concerns of minorities including the Amazigh and women’s groups. The Amazigh demands in 
terms of the constitution were first limited to the recognition of their language and culture.34 But 
signs that these demands might not be met prompted Amazigh activists to make more political 
demands for representation within the constitutional committee that were not resolved to their 
satisfaction.35 These dynamics were early indications that the political debate revolved around the 
GNC’s concern with appeasing the federalists and the religious authorities. The main debate was 
focused on issues of representation (of regions) stemming from heightened sense of jehawiya and 
Islam (stemming from the need to address the role of Shari’a law).  
The new committee of 60 was meant to draft the constitution within 60 days of its formation 
and submit it to the GNC before putting it to a referendum -- an ambitious timeframe according to 
experts on the matter.36 But on 9 April 2013, the GNC made another critical amendment to Libya’s 
interim Constitutional Declaration to prevent former public officials under Gadhafi from holding 
positions in government.37 On 14 May 2013, spurred by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and 
Construction Party, the GNC formally approved legislation number 13 on ‘political and 
administrative isolation’ that prohibits individuals who held public positions between September 
1969 and October 2011 from holding any public positions in the future.38 This was an effort by the 
                                                          
32 Pack and Cook, “The July 2012 Libyan Elections and the Origin of Post-Qadhafi Appeasement.”  
33 NTC Constitutional Declaration on 11 August 2011, Democracy Reporting http://www.democracy-
reporting.org/files/bp_22_constitutional_declaration_libya_2.pdf, (accessed July 1st 2014), and see Sawani 
and Pack, “Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Gadhafi,” 530. 
34 Anthony Shadid, ‘Libya struggles to curb militias as chaos grows’, New York Times 8 February 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/world/africa/libyas-new-government-unable-to-control-militias, 
(accessed 7 June 7th 2014). 
35 Gadhafi’s regime denied minority (Amazigh, Tubu and Tuareg) rights to exercise their cultural and 
linguistic identities. See Sawani. “Post-Gadhafi Libya,” 21. 
36 Adam Styp-Rekowski, Head of Assistance to Building a Constitution UNDP program, interview with 
author, Tripoli, February 2012. 
37 See “Political Isolation Law Passed Overwhelmingly,” Libya Herald 5 May 2013 
http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/05/05/political-isolation-law-passed-overwhelmingly/, (accessed 10th 
December 2013).  
38 Libya Herald, “Political Isolation Law Passed Overwhelmingly.” 
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Justice and Construction Party to limit the capacity of Jibril’s party in order to gain a majority 
within GNC. This law directly undermined Article 6 of the constitutional declaration which states 
that ‘Libyans shall be equal before the law. They shall enjoy equal civil and political rights without 
discrimination due to religion, doctrine, language, wealth, race, kinship, political opinions, and 
social status, tribal or eminent or familial loyalty’.39 According to former Prime Minister 
Mahmoud Jibril, the new law could exclude as many as 500,000 people from state politics and 
public sector positions.40 The isolation law constitutes an element of continuity in that the new 
‘revolutionary’ or democratically elected authorities have created laws to enable them to target the 
representatives of the old regime. Many revolutionaries wanted to seize complete power and bring 
in new faces that had nothing to do with the past, much like Gadhafi did when he came to power. 
Regarding the capabilities of state institutions, the political isolation law was final a blow for most 
senior officials and bureaucrats, the people who had the experience and expertise to manage 
government agencies.41   
In July 2013, the GNC passed an electoral law allowing for the election of the sixty-
member constituent assembly commissioned to draft the new constitution. But the GNC did not 
put together a formal body to lead the consultations about the constitution with the population at 
large. Hence there was a risk that the drafting process would remain in the hands of the elites and 
leave out the concerns of ordinary citizens and minorities.42 The GNC could also not realise its 
role in keeping the peace and had no reliable police force. It had to rely on tribal or ethnic power 
brokers to handle crises. For instance, tensions raised by federalists in the East called for the GNC 
to formally dispatch informal armed groups to keep the order. In August 2013, the GNC mandated 
that the Libyan revolutionary brigades secure Tripoli.43 The GNC therefore remained subservient 
to these groups, whose loyalties were not to the state, but to their own commanders, regions and 
ideologies. 
                                                          
39 Bodyszyski and Pickard, “Libya Starts from Scratch,” 90. 
40 See Libya Herald, “Political Isolation Law Passed Overwhelmingly.” 
41 Bruce St. John, “Not Inclusive Yet,” SADA journal, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/09/26/not-
inclusive-yet/gobh, (accessed February 10th 2014). 
42 Adam Styp-Rekowski, Head of Assistance to Building a Constitution UNDP program, interview with 
author, Tripoli, February 2012. 
43 Alisson Pargeter, “Why Elections Won’t Save Libya,” Al Jazeera News, 4 July 2014, 
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/libya-council-
ofdeputieselectionsislamistssecuritybenghazi.html, (accessed July 15th 2014). 
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Despite the military chaos, the GNC tried to push on with the constitutional process. On 
September 23 2013, Libya's High National Election Commission (HNEC), an independent 
government agency appointed by the GNC, announced that the registration of candidates from the 
“Constituent Assembly” to the drafting committee was to start by mid-October. The electoral law 
included a 10 per cent allocation of seats for women and only two seats in total for the Tabu, 
Tuareg, and Amazigh minorities, which constituted a dramatic underrepresentation.44 Politically 
it indicated that the GNC saw non-Arab Libyans as a single cultural and political entity.45 
Meanwhile the security situation deteriorated, with the frequent assassination of members of the 
former regime. The chaotic security situation due to the spread of armed brigades reached its 
symbolic climax when the Prime Minister and head of the NTC, Ali Zeidan, was kidnapped and 
later released by members of the revolutionary militias in October 2013.46  
Gradually the GNC’s popularity began to dwindle and the public started to lose faith in the 
ability of its members to respond to demands on issues such as women’s rights, justice, minorities 
and more.47 The HNEC announced on 12 November 2013 that registration for candidates for the 
drafting committee had closed. Immediately afterwards, a group of 12 Amazigh, Tabu and Tuareg 
lawmakers, as well as representatives of women’s organisations, held a press conference to state 
that they would not put forward candidates, nor vote in this election.48 This move illustrated the 
GNC’s inability to address demands for better representation by groups who had felt marginalised 
in the past. It also reasserted the role of Islam, especially after religious authorities had rejected 
demands for a quota system that would grant seats to women and ethnic groups.49 Instead, it 
                                                          
44 St. John, “Not Inclusive Yet.” 
45 Tuareg fought mostly with Gadhafi while the Tabu and Amazigh joined the ranks of the thuwar, see 
Sawani, “Post-Gadhafi Libya.”   
46 See Zahra Langhi, “Gender and State-building in Libya: Towards a Politics of Inclusion,” The Journal 
of North African Studies 19, no. 2 (2014): 200-210. Also, Chris Stephen and Nicholas Watt, “Libyan Prime 
Minister Ali Zeidan Calls for Calm after Kidnapping,” The Guardian 10 October 2013, 
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47 Sami Zaptia, “GNC is Coerced and Laws Passed Are Legally Unsound,” Libya Herald 18 January 2014, 
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zeidan/#ixzz2qlHeVNXQ, (accessed April 15th 2014).  
48 To date the elections have not been completed and no new timeline for putting up the constitution for 
referendum has been assigned. 
49 Sawani and Pack, “Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Gadhafi,” 530. 
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adopted a provision of alternating between male and female candidates.50 Owing much to the 
absence of effective and inclusive state institutions, the constitutional declaration and subsequent 
political reforms by the GNC de facto have brought a new power-sharing formula to Libya. 
Islamists, federalists and other disgruntled groups can now ‘veto’ the political process. The grand 
coalitions in favour of the Political Isolation law, the rejection of a quota system for minorities, 
and the guaranteed election of 20 members from each region,51 are indicators of an emerging 
power-sharing order. Although these practices did not formally recognise ethnic minorities, they 
are signs of a parliament based on consociationalism. Two key attributes of power-sharing, namely 
grand coalitions and veto powers, had already become mainstream during the Libya transition. By 
failing to agree to a third attribute, segmented authority, the elites brought back Gadhafi’s policy 
of ignoring the representation rights of minorities. In theory, grand coalitions mean that the 
political leaders of all of the significant segments of a plural and deeply divided society govern the 
country jointly. Segmental autonomy means that decision-making is delegated to the separate 
segments of the state as much as possible. This in turn supports fragmentation in identity and in 
citizenship, as political participation is contingent upon the willingness of these separate segments 
to engage with their communities.  
 
6.3 Civic Activism in the ‘New’ Libya  
The 2011 uprising was primarily a critical juncture for freedom of assembly in Libya. 
Activists called the transition “the phase of the New Libya” (Libya al jadeda) and demonstrated 
their commitment to newly found freedoms of speech, assembly, and political participation.52 
Numerous civic groups worked tirelessly during the revolution to counter Gadhafi-sponsored 
media outlets and provide humanitarian and political support to the rebels.53 The reliance on 
community bonds and local identities that were strengthened by Gadhafi’s methods of governance 
were a strong unifying force during the uprising.54 For the first time in Libya the 2011 uprisings 
                                                          
50 “Elections in Libya: Frequently Asked Questions,” International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
(2012), 
http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2012/IFES_Libya_FAQs_General
_National_Congress.pdf, (accessed July 5th 2014).  
51 East, West and South are the same three districts that prevail from the Ottoman to the Colonial period 
52 Libya al jadeeda is a common term to the post-Gadhafi era used in most meetings I conducted in 
Benghazi, Tripoli and Misurata 
53 See Wollenberg and Pack, “Rebels with a Pen.”  
54 Anderson, “Libya: A Journey from Extraordinary to Ordinary,” 232. 
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marked a drastic change in the degree to which citizens had the right of freedom of association, 
allowing for civil society organisations to operate with a degree of freedom.55 The important role 
of civil society was echoed by political society and it became common practice for party leaders 
and GNC members to attend and support events and activities organised by civil society groups.56 
This relative degree of openness in social and political interactions was a critical break from the 
past autocracy. Libyan GNC members from both Tripoli and the rural areas boasted that they 
supported multiple initiatives from civil society. For example, in the Southern town of Merzok 
GNC member Mohammad Abul Nabi Baggi began working with local NGOs to raise awareness 
among voters prior to local elections.57 In the Eastern town of Darna, GNC member Fariha 
Barkawi helped raise funds for local women groups working on enhancing the rights of women in 
the new constitution.58 My interviews with civil society activists from all over Libya indicated that 
civil society organisations were a novelty in the country and that they carried demands that were 
different from what was demanded by more traditional Islamists and regionalist voices. That is not 
to say that many of the activists opposed Islamist or federalist groups, but that civil society 
organisations had additional demands revolving around democracy, participation, and 
accountability in the new Libya.  
In terms of the typology of emerging civil society organisations, Libyan groups shifted 
during the transition from a revolutionary role to one of support for the state-building process – 
i.e., service providers, public awareness groups, unions and political activism groups.59 During the 
conflict the groups sporadically came together to offer humanitarian relief and to raise awareness 
about the fight against Gadhafi. Following the uprisings, the gradual return to normal life meant 
that protestors went back to their families and their jobs. Overall, the number of mass protests and 
demonstrations declined and, as a result, civil society actors started to lose their leverage on the 
                                                          
55 See for example “Libyan Civil Society Organisations Unite to Observe Historic Vote,” National 
Democratic Institute, http://www.ndi.org/Libyan-CSOs-unite-to-observe-vote, (accessed March 5th 2014).  
56 For example Omar Bou Life asserted that civil society organisations are a crucial partner in the transition 
process, Head of the Legislation and Constitution Committee at GNC, meeting for Tripoli-based NGOs 
attended by author, Tripoli, August 2013. 
57 Mohammad Abul Nabi Baggi, GNC member from Merzok, statement in press conference attended by 
author, Tripoli, August 2013. 
58 Darna is historically home to both communist parties and Salafi groups, known to be among the most 
culturally conservative towns and hence highly challenging for women’s rights but Barkawi’s support for 
nascent women groups in the town has enhanced their image and is helping expand their work. Fariha 
Barkawi, GNC member from Darna, Interview with author, Tripoli, June 2013. 
59 See types of activities and how these organisations are grouped in chapter two.  
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NTC and the GNC. Yet the period between 2011 and 2013 also exhibited a great deal of persistence 
on the part of civic organisations in Libya. After more than four decades the Jamahriya had 
fragmented both formal and informal structures and so the emergence of organised political and 
civic activity was a surprising phenomenon after 2011. Analysts referred to the sudden increase in 
the number of activists, and areas of activism, as “a genuine craze by the population to take part 
in the reconstruction and development process.”60 After the uprising several of these groups 
disintegrated as their members had to ‘go back to normal life’ but many chose to institutionalize 
their efforts and established formal NGOs that would participate in the political process. Going 
back to normal civil activism would mean having to deal with the state bureaucracy, as well as 
vexing social and economic problems. As such it is possible to view NGOs during the transition 
as having passed through three phases: euphoric enthusiasm, institutionalisation, and formal 
articulation of their demands for the new Libya. 
Under the Jamahiriya the only recognised ‘civil society’ organisation was the Boy Scouts 
Association and there were very few registered charities which were service-driven and 
government funded.61 Today, these associations “carry the stigma of redirecting Gadhafi’s money 
and policies to society,” says a Founding Board Member of the Centre for Civil Society Support 
in Libya.62 However, by July 2013 (less than two years after Gadhafi was killed) there were already 
2,700 formally registered civil society organisations working on a variety of issues, of a wide range 
of sizes, degrees of specialisation, and levels of membership.63 Some observers reported as many 
as 5,500 organisations operating in the different regions of Libya.64 Out of the 798 registered 
groups that held details of their memberships, the average number of founders was about 13, quite 
a large number, showing that most of these groups were not a ‘one man show’ but were a gathering 
                                                          
60 “Assessing the Needs of Civil Society in Libya,” Foundation for the Future (2011) 
http://www.foundationforfuture.org/en/Portals/0/PDFs/ASSESSING%20NEEDS%20OF%20CIVIL%20S
OCIETY%20IN%20LIBYA.pdf, (accessed 9 June 9th 2012). 
61 Mohammad Zoubair, Chairman of the Board for the Centre for Civil Society, interview with author, 
Tripoli, August 2012. 
62 Lamia Abu Sedra, member of the Humanitarian Relief Coordination platform in Benghazi and later 
Director of the Centre for Civil Society, interview with author, Tripoli, February 2012. 
63 Database of registered civil society organisations, obtained by author from the Chairman of the Centre 
for Civil Society, list updated until July 2013. 
64 Duncan Pickard, constitutional specialist working from Libya with Democracy Reporting International, 
interview with author via skype, December, 2012.  
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of citizens working on a variety of issues.65 This, in addition to the array of reform issues in which 
these NGOs are involved in (including women, constitution, environment, education, youth and 
citizenship), is indicative of the dynamism of these new avenues of mobilisation. In Sabha (in the 
Southern region formerly known as Fezzan) for instance, an umbrella organisation involving tens 
of local NGOs began working on awareness, elections, and social development issues, especially 
in the historically marginalised towns of Merzok and Ubari.66 “Local response and support for our 
NGO has been overwhelming, and people even want the activists to run in the next election, but I 
feel my role should remain nonpartisan so I can focus on educational programs in my area,” states 
Abul Ozoum who runs the umbrella organisation for civil society in Fezzan.67  
This sentiment reflects a growing realisation among activists that their role is separate from 
that of public officials. They see in their non-partisan stance an opportunity to hold the GNC 
accountable and monitor the process of electing a new constituent assembly. In Benghazi, the 
Commission to Support Women’s Rights in Decision-Making and Politics is one of the most active 
on the issue of women’s representation in the constitution.68 “Civil society actors in Benghazi are 
more important and more respected than politicians. We have submitted full legal drafts for 
consideration by the GNC,” said Hana in response to why she chose to join an NGO.69 NGOs are 
also perceived as having more capacity and flexibility to act. These statements testify to the great 
commitment of activists and their view of civil society as a vehicle for political participation and 
reform. A ‘Civil Society Support Centre’ was set up, following a decision by the Prime Minister 
in 2012, with its headquarters in Benghazi. The Centre’s Chairman explained that although state 
resources and funds were still very limited, myriad organisations had registered and were operating 
across the full spectrum of political, social and economic initiatives.70  
                                                          
65 Average calculated from data on registered civil society organisations, obtained by author from the 
Chairman of Centre for Civil Society, list updated until July 2013 
66 These areas have high numbers of Tabu community who had been denied citizenship and access to public 
services under Gadhafi, see Van Waas, “The Stateless Tabu of Libya?”  
67 Abulozoum Al Lafi, Director of Fezzan Coalition/Gathering, interview with author, Tripoli, June 2013.  
68 See an article mentioning their efforts in Benghazi “Libyan NGOs Call for Peaceful Celebrations,” Libya 
Herald 11 February 2013, www.libyaherald.com/2013/02/11/libyan-ngos-call-for-peaceful-celebrations-
or-demonstrations/#axzz35llebl1j, (accessed June 10th 2014).  
69 Hanan Al-Fakhakhry, activist in the Commission to Support Women’s Rights, interview with author, 
Tripoli, June 2013.  
70 Mohammad Zoubia, Chairman of the Centre for Civil Society Support, interview with author, Tripoli, 
June 2013. 
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The remainder of this section takes a closer look at the case of the Forum for Democratic 
Libya (FDL), which was one such organisation taking a leading role in the (re)emergence of civil 
society activism and conducting a nation-wide dialogue entitled “My Demands in the New 
Constitution” (Nebbi f Dostoori).” The empirical findings from the FDL case highlight two 
patterns in the nascent civil society scene in Libya. Former opponents to the Gadhafi regime, 
diaspora members, academics and business leaders established FDL in the early days of the 
revolution in 2011. According to founder and Board Chairman Amr Ben Halim, “the main 
motivation was to contribute to the revolution by creating citizen awareness about democracy, 
instilling accountability, and ensuring that civil society can participate in the transition.”71 At first, 
Ben Halim pooled together resources to support rebels and families who had suffered from war 
and destruction. FDL’s work has since developed along three axes: building the capacity of the 
Libyan youth in terms of outreach and facilitation skills (the Ruwad program),72 developing active 
citizenship and democratic participation skills, and facilitating participation in the constitutional 
dialogue.73  
 To provide an overview of the perceptions that civil society activists had about their role 
and the transitional period, I conducted a survey of 600 individuals engaged in the activities of the 
FDL between January and May of 2013 in various towns across Libya including Benghazi, Tobruk 
and Darna in the East, Misurata, Sirte and Bani Walid in the West and Sebha, Ubari and Merzok 
in the East.74 Respondents were asked to define issues of importance and the ways in which citizens 
and civil society were taking part in the political process.75 Overall, the responses regarding 
participation in the constitutional process were quite homogeneous, and revealed a dominant 
perception of an ineffective civil society, of an unresponsive political order, and of a complex 
reform process. The following observations are particularly relevant in this respect.  
                                                          
71 Amr Ben Halim, Chairman of the Board of the Forum for Democratic Libya, interview with author, 
Tripoli, January 2013.  
72 For two years the Ruwad (pioneers) program selected and trained more than 50 youth on a citizenship 
curriculum and on facilitation skills to enable them to implement workshops and dialogue sessions on 
citizenship and civic participation with over 1,600 citizens. 
73 Who We Are, Forum for Democratic Libya, www.fdl.ly, (accessed January 10th 2013).  
74 The survey translated into English with a sample of answers is in annex two. 
75 The survey had some open ended and some close ended questions. It was inserted and analysed on SPSS. 
The 572 respondents were divided into 75% males and 25% females which is quite normal given women’s 
reluctance to participate openly in the areas visited. The respondents were 27.7% from the South, 31.3% 
from the West, and 41% from the East which makes the sample representative of regional aspirations and 
perspectives. 
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Only 13.6 per cent of the respondents stated that they viewed civil society as ‘highly’ 
effective; the rest expressed doubts that they can have an influence on the political process. The 
main reason for respondents’ participation in the constitutional debates organised by the FDL was 
a desire for ‘representation.’ Respondents also were sceptical about the level of openness and 
responsiveness from decision-makers, with only 13.9 per cent of respondents believing that 
decision-makers had a high level of openness to citizens. It is also interesting to note that the 
respondents perceived civil society to have a strong political connotation (46 per cent linked it to 
politics, while under 30 per cent linked it to a social or organisational role). When asked about the 
priority areas for civil society to work on, the constitution was indicated in most of the answers 
(70 per cent of respondents) and other prominent aspects included education, the military, media, 
promoting peaceful dialogue, and justice.  
While casting doubt on the responsiveness of decision-makers, most respondents believed 
that the average citizen should have a role in shaping the constitution (76.7 per cent of participants). 
This role was said to be generally through ‘direct actions’ (66 per cent) that included taking part 
in dialogues, participating in conferences, voicing opinions (in the media), and voting in 
referendums. Also 79 per cent of respondents believed that participation in the constitutional 
debates was beneficial to them and that by doing so, they gain more representation, influence and 
knowledge. This political connotation was specified as civil society having to do with: democracy, 
citizen movements, representation, and accountability among other terms. In addition 91 per cent 
of respondents said that civil society has a role in “rebuilding Libya,” despite being pessimistic 
about the response of public officials to their inputs. According to 89 per cent of respondents this 
input is indirect, through media, political parties, and social interaction rather than through formal 
face-to-face meetings and consultations. The survey also revealed that Libyans saw their personal 
role as mostly taking place through actual civic actions (61 per cent) as opposed to membership of 
organisations (30 per cent) or by occasionally supporting specific issues that NGOs are working 
on (8 per cent).  
 The survey results are generally in line with the literature on how civic activism boomed 
in Libya after 2011.76 The results also illustrate shortcomings in the ability of government 
                                                          
76 See for instance the notion of counter-power that civil society can create during and after an uprising in 
Benoit Challand, “The Counter-Power of Civil Society and the Emergence of a New Political Imaginary in 
the Arab World,” Constellations 18, no. 3 (2011): 271-283. See also the role of civil society in a democratic 
transition Boose, “Democratization and Civil Society: Libya, Tunisia and the Arab Spring.”  
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institutions to respond to citizens’ demands for greater participation. Despite these shortcomings, 
64 per cent of respondents supported the need for the government to have a role in regulating the 
work of civil society. This was due to the perceived need to find a regulatory framework as many 
interviewees pointed to the fact that the work of NGOs is often duplicated, that there was a lack of 
capacity and weak collaboration.77 In the absence of a supportive regulatory framework, new civic 
organisations face severe competition from tribal and religious organisations that still play the 
main role in mediation processes, service provision or political debates.78  
 Respondents also questioned whether the GNC was serious about engaging with this new 
civil society. One GNC member serving on the Women’s Issues Committee explained that the 
scepticism is mutual, “At the GNC we feel NGOs only want to scream their demands and once 
asked to participate only a handful are able to do so, and NGOs are rightfully sceptical as GNC 
members say they respect NGOs, but do not consult with them on significant issues and have 
completely left them out of the constitutional process.”79 According to the survey, 90 per cent of 
respondents saw a role for civil society in rebuilding Libya but 73 per cent noted that civil society 
is unable to make its voice heard. Among the reasons listed were that there was an absence of 
political will to engage with civil society, the absence of a legal framework to govern civil society 
associations, and the legacy of political restrictions on freedoms over the past 42 years. This helps 
explain why the majority of respondents stated that the main political role of civil society was two-
fold: to re-organise relations between citizens and the state, and to help re-establish political 
stability. 
 Regarding the constitution per se, the survey revealed the following priorities for the new 
constitution:  
Priority Percentage of 
responses  
Security 71.1% 
Justice and Reconciliation  54.3%  
                                                          
77 Mohammad Zoubia, Chairman of the Centre for Civil Society Support, interview with author, Tripoli, 
June 2013. 
78 Youssef Sawani, “The Dynamics of Continuity and Change,” in The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the 
Struggle for the Post-Gadhafi Future. 
79 Hana’ Al Irfi, Head of the Women’s Caucuses/Committee at the GNC, interview with author, Tripoli, 
June 2013. 
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Rotation of Power  48.7% 
Religion  45.9% 
Model of Governance  45.9% 
Women’s Rights 40.8% 
Implementation of Shari’a Law  40.9% 
Citizenship  34.6% 
Political Participation  32.6% 
Economic Reform  29.5% 
Language  23.8% 
Efficient Use of Natural Resources  14.2% 
Foreign Affairs  10.3% 
Equitable Taxation 5.2% 
 
Lastly, when participants were asked why they were taking part in FDL activities, the majority 
said they saw dialogue and elections as a way to ‘learn about democracy’. Participation in the 
dialogues was interpreted mainly as a means of guaranteeing one’s rights by relaying one’s 
opinion. There was a broad recognition (61 per cent of respondents) that the new constitution was 
an important foundation for the new state in Libya, but that the mechanisms for participating in 
the constitutional process were still unclear and largely led by civil society’s own efforts. Tellingly, 
more respondents (30 per cent) saw participation in civil society activities as the most effective 
means of influencing politics, as opposed to participation in elections (21 per cent).   
 In conclusion, the emergence of new civil and political associations after the 2011 uprising 
is one of the most important changes from the Gadhafi era. The ability of citizens and civic 
organisations to gather, articulate demands, and interface with decision makers was a refreshing 
change from the past.80 The right to question public officials and to lobby on specific issues was 
also a new phenomenon. This increase in citizen interest in public affairs and the political process 
is unprecedented in Libya. Activists exhibited a great deal of awareness about the importance of 
civil society as the watchdog of the transition. At the same time, NGOs still struggled to channel 
                                                          
80 A recent account of this stark difference is in George Joffe, “Civil Activism and the Roots of the 2011 
Uprisings,” in The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Gadhafi Future. 
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their demands into a concrete policy-shaping endeavour in general, and over the constitution most 
particularly.81 
 The next section will address the extent to which one of these organisations was able to 
influence the agenda for the constitution. Even though civic organisations could now demand 
change, it was not clear who would listen to them, or even how they could make themselves heard 
by state institutions and politicians. Internal challenges faced by the organisations themselves also 
undermined their ability to influence political reform. Libyan NGOs and activists have very little 
experience in politics and associational life and these groups often struggle to maintain their 
membership base, attract volunteers, secure financial resources, and strategize their efforts to 
influence political decision making.82 They also operate in a context with no legal regulation to 
protect their freedom of association, to ensure their rights to access funding and be officially 
recognised by the state.83  
 
6.4 Citizens’ Voices and Priorities  
 This section further illustrates how the 2011 uprisings, and the transitional period that 
followed, were only a partially critical juncture for Libya. Because of deeply rooted predicaments 
that were not widely addressed or debated, over time the schisms that were already present in 
society became more evident. Thus, what actions NGOs could have undertaken to influence the 
building of new institutional models was inhibited because political decisions in the transitional 
period often reinforced these path dependent trajectories. In particular we observe clear path 
dependent outcomes when it comes to treatment of minorities, the absence of national unity, and 
the marginalisation of civic organisations.  
 The FDL launched a national initiative in January 2013 entitled “Nebbi f Dostoory” (My 
Demands in the New Constitution). The project provided the main source of empirical data on 
                                                          
81 Gilbert Doumit and Carmen Geha, “Libya’s Constitutional Twilight,” SADA Journal 
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/index.cfm?fa=show&article=49807&solr_hilite, (accessed April 21st 
2014). 
82 Workshop by International Centre for Non-profit Law and UNDP on a new NGO Law for Libya, notes 
taken from statements by representatives of 25 NGO members, attended by author, Tripoli, June 2013.  
83 Libya still has no NGO law and current organisations are operating in a legal vacuum, activists fear that 
this freedom can be taken away from them by the new government unless GNC is able to pass a law during 
its current term. In my survey 61% of respondents supported that government has a role in regulating NGOs. 
Notes from workshop by International Centre for Non-profit Law and UNDP on a new NGO Law for Libya, 
notes taken from statements by representatives of 25 NGO members, attended by author, Tripoli June 2013  
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citizens’ expectations and public demands vis-à-vis the new constitution.84  It was carried out 
through 15 semi-structured ‘dialogue’ events organised as focus groups in locations across the 
country. The topics for the dialogue sessions were based on an initial set of focus groups held 
between July 2011 and February 2012 which had highlighted five priority issues: (i) the role of 
Shari’a and Islamic Jurisprudence, (ii) the meaning of freedom and equality, (iii) the shape of the 
political and administrative system, (iv) the role of minorities, and (v) women’s rights.85 The focus 
groups also mapped specific priorities by region. Participants in the FDL sessions mentioned that 
oil and natural resources were their priority in the East, justice and reconciliation was their priority 
in the West, and citizenship and immigration were their priority in the South.86  
 The dialogues explored these issues in more detail with a sample of 900 participants 
between February and March 2013.87 The participants included (i) people from all regions of the 
East, West and South of Libya,88 (ii) representatives of tribal leaders, (iii) civil society activists, 
journalists, intellectuals and academics, (iv) business leaders, and (v) women and youth groups.89 
The dialogues were based on a structured approach asking participants to list priorities, define their 
preferences and address key issues they wish to see addressed in the constitution.90 The participants 
were then invited to debate three key issues (i) The System of Governance, (ii) Public Liberties, 
and (iii) Regional Priorities. These three axes would indirectly cover the five issues that emerged 
                                                          
84 The field work documenting the results of the constitutional dialogue was carried out in three phases: the 
first phase was an initial mapping of priorities using consultations mainly in Tripoli and Benghazi between 
July 2011 and February 2012, the second more substantive phase was carried out between January and 
March of 2013 in 15 locations, the results were then validated in a series of interviews during field visits in 
June and August 2013 
85 FDL initial findings were in tune with a number of policy reports on the constitutional priorities, see for 
instance Human Rights Watch, “Priorities for Legislative Reform: A Human Rights Roadmap for a New 
Libya.”  
86 The topics also are reflected as priorities in the survey. See Forum for Democratic Libya (May 2012). 
“Libya’s New Constitution: Towards an Inclusive and Democratic Social Contract,” initial mapping report, 
translated from Arabic. Also see Ben Halim, “Conversations across Libya.” 
87 600 out of the 900 participants agreed to fill the aforementioned survey before the dialogue started. 
Dialogue participants were a sample from the youth and women groups, military, former revolutionaries, 
local councils, media, civil society, political parties, academics, experts and tribal leaders. 
88 FDL selected these regions in line with the historical areas of Fezzan (West), Cyrenaica (East), and 
Tripolitania (West). This selection was done to engage citizens from the historically divided provinces and 
explore the extent to which demands are similar or divergent. The locations within the regions also were 
intended to include both rural and urban areas as well as more conservative and liberal areas. Amr Ben 
Halim, Chairman of the Board of the Forum for Democratic Libya, interview with author, Tripoli January 
2013.  
89 Overall the participants were 40% women and 40% people under 45. 
90 A copy of the survey and dialogue questions is in annex two. 
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from the initial mapping. It was agreed between FDL and Libyan constitutional experts not to 
address Shari’a law directly as it might invoke negative reactions, but rather it was to be addressed 
by asking citizens how they wished to see public liberties addressed and thereby indirectly invoke 
the issue of freedoms, women and minority rights in the light of Shari’a law. As for the issue of 
the political and administrative system, in an effort to the term nizam idari that would immediately 
point to federalism, the FDL resorted to asking citizens about the general system of governance 
they aspired to. Lastly, it was agreed to leave one issue to be chosen at the local level and then 
analysed as regional priorities. The dialogues therefore included two pre-selected topics that would 
be systematically debated while also leaving room for local activists to identify issues they 
considered important.  
 Locations for the dialogues were selected to ensure that they included: post-conflict 
locations, locations with ongoing tensions and violence, locations containing significant numbers 
of (former) Gadhafi loyalists, as well as rural and urban towns. The 15 dialogue sessions took 
place in the Eastern Region (Benghazi, Darna, Tobruk, and Ajdabia), the Southern Region (Sebha, 
Murzuq, and Ubari), and the Western Region (Tripoli, Jadu, Bani Walid, Sirte, Misrata, Zawaya, 
Zleiten, and Khoms). Unlike the survey data on the constitutional process, which showed that most 
participants converged as to the significance and the need to partake in the development of the 
constitution, responses on priorities and preferences regarding constitutional solutions diverged. 
The following themes reveal this dyadic relationship. The three sections summarize qualitative 
observations of responses during dialogue sessions. 
 
The System of Governance (nizam al hokm)  
In the dialogues the state system was defined as the system of governance or governance 
‘order.’ For ordinary Libyans the term often generated intense discussion as the only two systems 
they had experienced were the monarchy or the Jamahiriya. But after successfully toppling the 
dictatorship, Libyans were not in agreement on the form of the new system. In part due to the way 
the armed insurgency was organised, the period between 2011 and 2013 witnessed increasing calls 
for a federal system, especially from the Eastern region.91 Intellectuals and activists also openly 
                                                          
91 See more on demands for a federal Libya or an independent Eastern province in St. John, “Not Inclusive 
Yet.” 
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debated whether Libya should have a presidential or a parliamentary system, whether the 
monarchy should return, and whether a liberal democracy was even possible.92  
In the dialogues the most prevalent view among participants was that constitution should 
ensure federalism, or at least undertake decentralisation to empower local authorities. The second 
most popular view was that the constitution should account for decentralisation, but within a 
unified state system. However, probing into the reasons for this unveils the underlying aspirations 
of citizens for greater participation, the desire to have a greater voice, and greater equity.93 The 
most repeated demand regarding the state system was for a system that could guarantee public 
services equitably across all regions. The second most common demand was that the state system 
should guarantee that dictatorship would not return. The third most frequent demand was that the 
new system should fairly distribute resources and provide sustainable development. These 
demands indicate two underlying issues. The first is that the terms ‘federalism’ or 
‘decentralisation’ are politically loaded and that once asked about their basic needs, citizens across 
the regions had similar grievances and had similar expectations from the state system. The only 
regional disparities in the dialogue sessions were that there were more pro-federalists in the Eastern 
region, indicating an element of continuity from the pre-Gadhafi era. This situation primarily 
indicates citizens’ aspirations for an effective central state, but also for responsive and capable 
local authorities.  
 
Public Liberties (al horiyyat al aama)  
The question of freedom is contested in itself, as some personal liberties are still not openly 
debated in Libya. For example, “public order and morals” (al nitham al aam) is broadly accepted 
to take its foundations from Shari’a law.94 Thus when activists were asked what freedom meant 
they mainly referred to freedom of political and public participation.95 At the outset, dialogue 
participants were divided between the most popular view that freedom is about political 
                                                          
92 Faraj Najem, intellectual and activist, Director of the Africa Research Centre in Tripoli, interview with 
author, Tripoli, February 2012, and Bodyszyski and Pickard, “Libya Starts from Scratch,” 89. 
93 Forum for Democratic Libya, “Constitutional Briefs: Towards an Inclusive and Democratic Social 
Contract,” translated from Arabic (2013). 
94 Libyan society is traditionally very conservative and Islam is officially the religion of all its inhabitants. 
The vast majority of Libyans are Sunnis who adhere to the Maliki madhab (school of fiqh), see Sawani, 
“Post-Qadhafi Libya,” 5. 
95 Focus group with 15 NGOs, attended by author, Tripoli, August 2013. 
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participation and not private liberties, while the second most supported view was that freedom is 
about every aspect of life including religion, expression and assembly. The discussion about 
freedoms, what is allowed and prohibited, what is acceptable in society and politics, is a very 
nascent discussion in Libya. Probing deeper into these divergent viewpoints revealed more deeply 
rooted differences that the constitution must resolve.  
Participants regarded the issue of political freedom as relevant to the constitution mainly 
because it leads to institutional accountability and guards against the emergence of a hegemonic 
power. Freedom was also said to be required for free cultural, political and intellectual expression, 
to secure the rights of women, and to encourage new economic activities. Participants linked 
political freedom to political stability and commonly expressed the view that the new system 
should not limit such freedoms. Another key demand was that the constitution should guarantee 
the right of expression and association, as many participants wanted to be able to form 
organisations, media outlets, and political parties.96 Lastly, participants cited freedom of cultural 
expression as a key priority for private and public liberties. In addition to these views on public 
freedoms, participants were also divided on the role of religion, with differences arising between 
whether Shari’a should be the main source or the only source of legislation.97 Libyans were also 
divided on the issue of women’s rights, with divergent views of the issue of equality between men 
and women, and of equality under Shari’a law.98 Lastly, the issue of minorities and language is 
also a divisive issue, with some participants requiring the official recognition of the Tamazight 
language and others refusing this, stating that Arabic should be the only recognised language. For 
instance, in the Amazigh town of Jadu, teaching Tamazight and recognising the language officially 
was a recurrent demand. 
That being said, Libya’s history makes citizens sceptical about the role of the state and the 
ability of any constitution to address these needs. Given this scepticism, the role of religion has 
become a more unifying factor than membership of the state. During the dialogues, the importance 
                                                          
96 Libya still has no NGO law but 25 NGOs are already supporting a draft law that the Centre for Civil 
Society has proposed, GNC is yet to respond. From two focus groups with representatives from 28 
organisations, attended by author, Tripoli, June 2013, for the states on the NGO law proposal see Human 
Rights Watch, “Priorities for Legislative Reform: A Human Rights Roadmap for a New Libya.” 
97 Forum for Democratic Libya, “Constitutional Briefs: Towards an Inclusive and Democratic Social 
Contract, translated from Arabic (2013).  
98 Feedback from 15 women NGOs in workshop organised by UNDP on special measures and women 
quotas, attended by author, Tripoli, June 2013.  
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of Shari’a law was generally agreed upon, and no one participant wanted to appear to be 
challenging this. But while participants could agree on religiosity, the role of political Islam and 
of Islamic-inspired policies within the state that could guarantee freedom and equality remain 
unresolved. This has had grave implications for the demands of women’s groups and the Amazigh 
in particular, especially after the Board of Trustees of the Ulama (Islamic authorities) had 
abandoned the notion of a quota system for minorities, a view that was promoted by women 
members of the GNC throughout 2013.99 The role that the armed Islamists played in toppling the 
regime also granted them a large say in the NTC, particularly in relation to the adoption of Shari’a 
law as the source of legislation. 
 The dialogues on these two sets of issues across the 15 locations mentioned above indicated 
three main issues. Firstly, while the FDL succeeded in generating debate and deliberation on these 
issues, the impact of this process was limited to those citizens it was able to reach. This was mainly 
due to the second issue; FDL and dialogue participants were directing their demands to the GNC 
but significant decision-making power resided in the hands of religious authorities, tribal leaders, 
and armed groups that were not successfully engaged by civil society. The issue of Shari’a law, 
which has a domino effect on personal and political freedoms, is being dictated by religious elites, 
meaning that the involvement of grassroots organisations was very marginal to the process. The 
issue surrounding what form the state system should take is shaped by the GNC’s attempts to 
appease federalist groups in the East and armed revolutionaries (as evident in the decision of 
election of the constituent assembly rather than appointment). This implies that demands for an 
effective state and capable local authorities are seen as secondary to this high stake political 
struggle.100  
 
Regional priorities 
Eastern Region: Regulation of oil and natural resources 
Participants almost unanimously identified the issue of the fair redistribution of oil 
revenues as a main priority for the constitution to address. They saw the management of oil and 
                                                          
99 Hana’ Al Irfi, Head of the Women’s Caucuses/Committee at the GNC, interview with author, Tripoli, 
June 2013, and see Sawani and Pack, “Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Gadhafi,” 530. 
100 GNC debate pertaining to the constitution during the period of this study was merely on election dates, 
districting and representation of citizens in the three regions. See more on this in Sawani and Pack, “Libyan 
Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Gadhafi,” 540. 
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other natural resources as indicative of whether the political system deserved their allegiance. For 
activists, redistribution was an issue of “integrity and recognition for those of us who suffered 
under Gadhafi.”101 They wanted the constitution to include a mechanism to direct investment 
outside of Tripoli, as well enshrine principles of transparency. The main stated fears of participants 
in the Eastern region were how revenues from natural resources would be distributed and how the 
government would create alternative sources of revenue. Feelings of economic injustice and 
concern over the manipulation of state resources go back to the times of the monarchy and were 
only heightened in the post-Gadhafi era.102 At the time of the dialogues (2012 – 2013) tensions 
were growing in the Eastern region, with activists accusing the central government of Prime 
Minister Ali Zeidan of incompetence and corruption. What was of interest here was the connection 
participants made between natural resources and peace and stability, economic development, and 
local management of resources. This is an indicator of a rift between grassroots and elites 
approaches to governance. While federalist leaders in the East focused on the separation of 
institutions and greater representation, citizens had more substantive demands about equity that 
the broader discourse on federalism did not directly address. It is also additional evidence that FDL 
should have engaged with informal, local political leaders and opinion makers, in addition to 
formulating demands towards the GNC. 
  
Southern Region: Citizenship and Immigration  
The most commonly raised issue in the dialogues in the Southern region was the issue of 
acquiring citizenship; as it was linked to recognition, integrity and quality of life. This was not 
overly surprising, as the Southern region was historically seen as the “non-Arab” part of the 
country and therefore as default as alien to the rest of Libya.103 Participants explained that to be a 
citizen is an administrative status that enables one’s ability to access resources and services, and 
provides a shared identity regardless of people’s background. It was the procedure surrounding the 
gaining of citizenship that was implemented unfairly and which lacked consistency in the 
                                                          
101 Mohammad Zaroug, project coordinator of Nebbi f Dostoory and resident of Benghazi, interview with 
author, Tripoli, June 2013.  
102 Bruce St. John, “The Post-Gadhafi Economy,” in The 2011 Libyan Uprisings, 94-96.  
103 More on differences in minority attitudes towards the rest of Libya in Fathaly and Palmer, “Opposition 
to Change in Rural Libya.” 
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Jamahiriya.104 Participants in the dialogue recognised that citizenship had cultural, economic and 
political implications, especially when it came to women’s ability or inability to pass on citizenship 
to their husbands and children. Gadhafi had linked citizenship to survival and had historically used 
the attribution or non-attribution of citizenship to particular groups as a reward or punishment.105 
Participants in the South wanted the constitution to address how Libyan citizenship could be 
obtained and set consistent standards to solve the issue of immigration and stateless citizens, 
especially in the southernmost regions (by the borders of Chad and Niger). To this day, there are 
thousands of individuals born in Libya in the south with no recognised citizenship and no official 
means of obtaining Libyan citizenship.106 Participants directly related this issue to security, 
identity, and basic human rights. Their demands for the constitution focused on specifying ways 
to obtain citizenship, the legalisation of stateless citizens, and for the state to control the borders 
in order to prevent illegal immigration.  
 
Western Region: Justice and Reconciliation  
Participants in the Western region noted that the absence of justice for victims of crimes 
committed both during and after the revolution was creating polarisation and causing more 
violence. In the West, most discussions centred on crimes and violence committed in the 2011 
revolution. It was also the region that exhibited the strongest schisms, as pro-Gadhafi loyalists 
were very much present in the towns of Sirte and Bani Walid. Participants in the West believed 
that reconciliation efforts were needed primarily to identify who was eligible to take part in the 
political process, to demilitarize armed groups, and to put an end to violence. The constitution was 
seen as secondary issue compared to the need to establish a conciliatory process and/or judicial 
mechanism. Activists saw the issue of punishment or reconciliation as a vital process, “for people 
to pay for what they did, or for us to choose to forgive them.”107 Very often activists wanted the 
constitution to be based on the mechanisms of justice that tribal leaders have used successfully in 
                                                          
104 See Summary of Stakeholders’ Submissions to the Universal Periodic Review of Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, A/HRW/WG.6/9/LBY/3, 15 July 2010,  
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session9/LY/A_HRC_WG.6_9_LBY_3_Libya.pdf, 
(accessed June 12th 2014. Also see Al Rumi, “Libyan Berbers Struggle.” 
105 Luis Martinez, The Libyan Paradox (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 56-83. 
106 Forum for Democratic Libya, “Constitutional Briefs: Towards an Inclusive and Democratic Social 
Contract,” translated from Arabic (2013).  
107 Activists in focus group, organised by author, Misurata February 2013  
 191 
 
the past, and saw a need to rebuild the judiciary while still preserving heritage and local customs. 
The revolution of February 17 is a divisive issue for residents in the Western region, as many 
residents did not join this revolution and are considered traitors by many members of society. For 
instance in Misurata, those who did not fight were not necessarily pro-Gadhafi, but as they fled 
during the conflict they are now considered outsiders in their own community and harassed as “the 
returned” (aa’idoun) after the ‘martyrs’ stabilised the town. Participants noted that reconciliation 
and even forgiveness for crimes committed is necessary if this region is to be stable again.108  
 The dialogues in each region again revealed the inability of citizens and civil society to 
effectively refocus the general political debates toward their needs. Although the 17 February 
revolution, unlike Gadhafi’s revolution, reconfigured power and authority and allowed new actors 
to enter the political arena, the relations between citizens and state authorities is still very 
challenging. Survey participants reported that interacting with political leaders was possible, but 
that they were pessimistic about the ability of political institutions to respond to their demands. 
The constitutional dialogues were vibrant grassroots activities that lacked formal mechanisms to 
transmit outcomes and the insight gained to policy makers at the local and national levels. For the 
duration of this study, civil society spearheaded the deliberation process over the constitution. 
However at the same time, the GNC and NTC engaged in a form of power-sharing that ensured 
that two types of actors, the regionalists and the Islamists, had a guaranteed representation and a 
guaranteed say in the development of the constitution. As a result, more substantive dialogue on 
the needs of citizens and their aspirations was marginalised.  
 
6.5 Reform Limitations of Path Dependence in Libya   
The opportunity for reform embedded in the commitment of the NTC to draft a new 
constitution and the opening of the political sphere after 2011 was seized by Libyan activists and 
new NGOs. However, the need for consensus among the GNC, Islamic leaders and federalist 
factions on the issue of representation within the constitutional drafting committee has 
marginalised the role of civic organisations. Because of the nascence of the NTC and GNC, the 
legacy of statelessness prevailed and contributed to postponement of the constitutional process. 
This came at the expense of the chance that FDL and other civil society organisations could have 
                                                          
108 Confidential, young woman who left Misurata during conflict, interview with author, Misurata February 
2012  
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used to push forward demands for inclusion and participation in the ‘new’ Libya.  Two years after 
the NTC’s constitutional declaration, in which a 120-day timeline was announced, Libya is yet to 
have a constitutional assembly. This delay, coupled with scepticism by activists in the role of 
NGOs, can further lead to distrust between Libyans and the emerging state institutions during the 
transition. The constitutional dialogues documented here reveal that Libyans are yet to address 
social, political and religious cleavages. The different views expressed constitute in their core 
different views about the new state in Libya. If left unaddressed they threaten to jeopardise the 
criticality of the juncture in 2011 and can brining back old mechanisms of handling divergent 
views through repression and subordination of minority voices, that us those of women and 
Amazigh among others.  
The dialogue outcomes also reveal the weakness of state institutions in performing basic 
functions of providing citizenship status, redistributing wealth, and mitigating conflict. This might 
lead to the rise of non-state power-brokers to whom Libyans will resort to during transition. The 
weakness of state institutions in providing basic services and fulfilling basic functions further 
supports the argument that the GNC and NTC were weak players in the process of constitutional 
development. The path dependent outcomes resonate with Libya’s historical tradition of the state’s 
incapacity to institutionalise revolutionary outcomes which remain at the level of discourse. In 
practice, revolutions give more leeway to non-state actors or to specific leadership that controls 
the political process without reforming it into an inclusive process for citizens, civil society and 
for minority groups.  
The transition phase also brought back the politics of exclusion. The political isolation law 
brought back Gadhafi’s old practice of sanctioning those public officials who served in the 
previous regime and the exclusion of civil servants has left out a large segment of the population 
that has the experience to manage public organisations. In turn, the tendency of the government to 
give in to the demands of regional forces, Islamists and armed groups brought a form of power-
sharing. By guaranteeing representation to some groups, isolating others, and marginalising 
citizens’ voices, the constitutional process thus far is exhibiting a shift towards a power-sharing 
formula. Given the significance of the transition phase as a critical juncture, it is likely that this 
decision will be difficult to overturn in later stages.  
While the transition gave citizens the right to formally debate their aspirations and explore 
their demands from a new constitution, this formal right was not backed by a capable and 
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responsive state structure. The lack of governmental response to civil society organisations made 
advocacy efforts irrelevant to decision-making around the constitutional process and constitutional 
deadlines. The FDL, along other civic organisations, initiated a nation-wide process of dialogue 
and proposed concrete ways to resolve differences. However, no effort to consult with citizens was 
undertaken by the GNC. At least for the period of this study, the political leadership did not provide 
the required tools for an open and inclusive process of constitutional development. In effect, the 
new era brought back old players without giving sufficient political leverage to new civic 
associations. Based on the case study, Libya during its most recent transition continued to exhibit 
very weak state institutions challenged by old political forces and a vibrant, although ineffective 
civil society.  
 Lastly, while the transition phase allowed for a new margin of freedom for civil society 
organisations to operate, the case of FDL shows that such groups were ineffective in the reform 
process. The issue of newly found freedoms was regarded as a priority by dialogue participants 
and a prerequisite for their participation in the constitutional process. However, the data presented 
in this chapter points to the scepticism of activists that political leadership would respond to their 
demands. This comprises another limitation on the level of change that could be expected from the 
critical juncture in Libya. It appears that the juncture led to the establishment of a new form of 
‘political’ civic organisations but constrained their role in decision-making due to weak state 
institutions and the decision to adopt forms of power-sharing that made civil society actors less 
relevant to the constitutional process.   
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Chapter Seven - Comparing and Theorising about ‘Partially’ Critical 
Junctures in Lebanon and Libya 
  
7.1 Introduction  
The main question this thesis sought to examine was what issues explain the challenges to 
political reform in Lebanon and Libya? The cases of failed, or partial reforms to the electoral 
system in Lebanon and to the constitutional process in Libya were examined. Identifying the 
constraints on political reform first required an understanding of the history and contemporary 
contexts of both countries. I argued that there were three constraining elements of continuity from 
the Ottoman and colonial eras as well as from the postcolonial period that remained prevalent in 
Lebanon after Syria’s withdrawal in 2005 and in Libya after the fall of Gadhafi in 2011. These 
constraints were weak state institutions, power-sharing agreements, and ineffective NGOs. This 
thesis then presented an investigation of the mechanisms of path dependence in the context of these 
two transitions.  
The thesis provided a three-pronged analysis of the constraints on political reform during 
transition, after a critical juncture has taken place. I argued that these constraints challenged the 
assumption that critical junctures in Lebanon and Libya created heightened possibilities for 
change. These constraints when explored in detail led to the conclusion that these junctures were 
only partially critical. This thesis therefore challenged a common argument that significant 
transformations took place in Libya after the ‘Arab uprising’ and in Lebanon after the Syrian 
withdrawal. I also illustrated how civil society organisations played an important role during the 
transition process. However, the analysis showed that civil society in the context of power-sharing 
and weak states was unable to bring about significant political reform. The strength of the analysis 
on partially critical junctures is that it showed what changes were possible during transition and 
explained why some changes were not possible. In this sense, the thesis contributes to a debate on 
political transition in the region that is not binary, but that is based on in-depth exploration of the 
grey areas between change and continuity.  
This chapter brings together the insights uncovered in the cases of Lebanon and Libya. The 
objectives of this chapter are two-fold. I first compare the elements of continuity in Lebanon and 
Libya to specify the mechanisms of path dependence and the partial nature of the critical junctures 
the two countries underwent. Secondly, I highlight the implications for political reform in this type 
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of MENA transition from the perspective of historical institutionalism. As mentioned in Chapter 
One, Lebanon and Libya are two distinct, but comparable cases, as the following section will show. 
Whilst the Lebanon case displays deeply entrenched elements of continuity, this research identifies 
signs that Libya is headed in the direction of evading a certain type of political reform. The findings 
suggest that the three variables studied in Lebanon are also beginning to be found in Libya, 
although in different ways.  
 
7.2. Comparing Elements of Continuity  
Political scientists have long been interested in political change in general, and regime 
change in particular. There is a large body of literature that focuses on identifying change, 
interpreting change, and trying to predict change and the direction of political transitions. By 
investigating path dependence in Lebanon and Libya this thesis identifies new elements that can 
be used in developing further hypotheses and theories on the sources and types of political change. 
Path dependence helped explain how and why reformers in Lebanon and Libya could or could not 
operate effectively by showing how historical processes and structures limited the potential of 
specific junctures.1 The potential I refer to in each juncture is the extent to which there exists the 
possibility for a greater transformation than would have been possible before the juncture. The 
thesis not only described the processes and junctures that shaped change, but also identified the 
intricacies of path dependency, intricacies which limited the potential of each juncture.2 This 
section compares and contrasts the ways in which power-sharing, weak states, and ineffective civil 
society organisations formed the constraints that have limited political reform in Lebanon and 
Libya in recent years.  
 
Implications of Weak States  
Weak states in both Lebanon and Libya were a central theme in this thesis. I argued that 
during the transition the state institutions were a very ineffective actor in political reform. As one 
element of continuity, a main feature of weak states is public institutions that are limited in their 
ability to push forward reform options and to advocate for, or implement reform. Weak state 
                                                          
1 See for instance Pierson, Politics in Time.  
2 The need to expand the theory by identifying what brings about path dependence using an inductive 
approach is highlighted by several prominent scholars in this field, see for example Allen, “New Directions 
in the Study of Nation-Building.” 
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institutions are limited from a resource perspective and from a political leverage perspective. To 
say that the states of Lebanon and Libya are weak means that there are other political actors that 
are (too) strong in relation to the state, the former are able to decide to undertake or not to undertake 
reforms.  
For both countries the state has failed to permeate all political, social and geographical 
boundaries. State institutions therefore were not the main providers of political goods and were 
incapable of executing even partially consensual reforms. The examples of electoral reform and 
constitutional development showed that the state institutions were largely paralysed and in 
deadlock for most of the period studied. Lebanon’s parliament did not convene between late 2006 
and May of 2008 until an agreement was reached with Qatari patronage that only partially 
addressed the demands for reform of the electoral law. In Libya, the General National Congress 
(GNC) experienced a deadlock for months over the law for the election of a Constituent Assembly 
and was unable to conduct any formal activities to address citizens’ demands for the constitution.  
The states of Lebanon and Libya displayed weaknesses at the institutional decision making 
level. In Lebanon, the state at the national level could not mitigate the polarisation between the 
March 8 and March 14 factions. At the height of this polarisation state institutions were paralysed 
pending support from Qatar to bring about the 2008 Doha Agreement that included a new electoral 
framework.3 In Libya, between August 2011 and February 2013, the GNC and National 
Transitional Council’s (NTC) political failures meant that the military and political intervention of 
non-state actors was decisive for the promulgation of an electoral law for the constituent 
assembly.4 In both cases, decisions taken in formal processes led by state institutions needed the 
approval of non-state actors. When it comes to political reform therefore, these states remain 
unable to push forward, or to execute reform that might threaten the interests of these non-state 
political actors. This fosters the subservience of the state to external ethnic, sectarian or tribal 
actors. This situation provides a good illustration of the following point made by Mahoney on path 
dependency when he said “an institution can persist even when most individuals or groups prefer 
to change it, provided that an elite that benefits from the existing arrangement has sufficient 
strength to promote its reproduction.”5   
                                                          
3 See Salamey, “Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options.” See “Doha Declaration,” 
http://www.pogar.org/publications/other/lebanon/doha-agreement-08e.pdf, (accessed July 10th 2014).  
4 See Omar, “Libya: Legacy of Dictatorship.” 
5 Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” 518. 
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Secondly, both Lebanon and Libya were dependent on public administrations that lacked 
capacity and the political leverage to promote the rule of law. Although the 2009 elections in 
Lebanon were overseen by a Supervisory Committee for Electoral Campaigns (SCEC), violations 
of the law were widespread. SCEC had no institutional or political ‘teeth’ to control, limit, or 
sanction violations. Vote buying, sectarian discourse, hate speech and misuse of public spaces 
dominated the 2009 elections.6 In Libya, the NTC accepted two amendments to its original 
Constitutional Declaration, the first was to elect instead of appoint a constituent assembly, and 
second was to revoke equal rights for Libyan citizens by agreeing to a political isolation law. 
During transition both the NTC and GNC could not take any legal measures against crimes and 
assassinations and instead had to rely on armed brigades to keep the peace. The foremost example 
of this was the kidnapping of the head of the NTC Prime Minister Ali Zeidan by armed groups in 
Tripoli in October 2013. During this transition, the Libyan state failed to create an army or police 
force that was capable of dealing with the security challenges that were having deeply implications 
for the types of political challenges that characterised the period of this study. During the transition 
phases, the state’s weakness encouraged the re-emergence of the role of ethno-religious and 
military groups in Libya and in Lebanon reinforced the role of sectarian leaders as caretakers and 
guarantors of stability.7 
A third facet of this weakness was that the states were unable to structure or promote civil 
society’s participation in the reform processes. Thus, these states were unable to respond to the 
demands of citizens working through civil society organisations. This meant that during the phase 
of revolutionary demobilisation the state could not benefit from, or enhance the role of civil society 
organisations. This was evident in Libya for almost two years, where the GNC could not launch a 
formal dialogue process on the constitution although this was demanded by most civil society 
organisations.8 Although the civil society groups studied here benefited from the new possibilities 
to engage public officials after the uprisings, state institutions were not geared toward making 
good use of these efforts and demands. For similar reasons in Lebanon, between 2006 and 2008, 
the parliament could not adopt the recommendations of the Botrous Commission, or address the 
                                                          
6 See Pre-elections second report, Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections, and Corstange, “Vote 
Trafficking in Lebanon.”   
7 For Lebanon see Clark and Salloukh, “Elite Strategies, Civil Society and Sectarian Identities,” and for 
Libya see Joffe, “Civil Activism and the Roots of the 2011 Uprisings.” 
8 See Zoubir and Rozsa, “The End of the Libyan Dictatorship.” 
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demands of the Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform (CCER).9 Weak state institutions cannot 
routinely act as a conduit between civil society and policy makers and are therefore a structural 
challenge to the role of civil society organisations in both Lebanon and Libya.   
Lastly, in both countries citizenship and political rights continued to be linked to a person’s 
ethnic, religious or regional origin. State institutions were not the guarantor of citizenship rights 
or status. Mobilisation of the public after the uprisings was increasingly through sub-national 
groups. In Lebanon, sectarian political parties and loyalties to high-level zu’ama remained the 
main mechanism for receiving recognition and benefits from the state.10 For example, the only 
way to be able to vote is through proof of ancestral and sectarian origin; while the absence of civil 
courts and civil status laws means that the right to citizenship, as with it, formal recognition by the 
state, is a result of belonging to a sectarian sub-national group that has been officially recognised 
and guaranteed representation. In Libya, the post-Gadhafi phase witnessed a re-emergence of this 
form of mobilisation through sub-national groups that included primarily the federalists in the East, 
the Islamists, and the ethnic groups (especially the Amazigh community).11 The state’s inability to 
act as the final arbiter on citizenship, rights and responsibilities, further undermined the role of the 
new (‘modern’) civil society organisations and their ability to shape reforms.  
One major consequence of the maintenance of a weak state is that non-state groups get 
stronger over time and reinforce path dependent outcomes. Based on the observations made before, 
it is perfectly understandable how the Lebanese sectarian elites were able to continue to 
disempower state institutions after Syria’s withdrawal in 2005 and in so doing reinforce their 
positions as sectarian leaders. In the Libyan case, the chaos of the transition phase and the presence 
of powerful, armed groups were not conducive to building a strong central state administration. 
The failure to disband the armed groups and to generate political consensus on a national institution 
then facilitated the continuation of the disempowering of the state by the actors of the 
revolution/civil conflict. In these weak states ‘revolutionary’ junctures are critical because they 
place institutional arrangements on particular paths or trajectories, which are then more difficult 
to alter. The notion of a partially critical juncture illustrates a case where states remained weak 
                                                          
9 See Salamey and Payne, “Parliamentary Consociationalism.” 
10 See Khazen, Prospects for Lebanon - Lebanon’s First Post-war Parliamentary Elections. 
11 See Sawani and Pack, “Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Gadhafi.” 
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during the transition and thus reforms by new civil society actors remained heavily constrained by 
older social and political actors.  
 
Implications of Power-sharing Agreements  
Power-sharing agreements in both Lebanon and Libya have been a partial remedy for 
conflict and internal divisions, offering representation to the major religious and political groups 
in each country. Lebanon has long adopted this formula while Libya is now exhibiting signs of a 
potential consociational order. As defined by Lijphart, this system of governance primarily means 
the adoption of grand coalitions and segmental autonomy.12 Both these elements make the state 
institutions weaker than the segments supporting them. Additional potentially problematic 
characteristics are proportionality and the minority veto.13 These features are problematic for 
reform as they reinforce Mahoney’s assertion that the power to change remains in the hands of 
elite groups who can avoid an institutional reform even if citizens demand it.14 
One of the first implications of power-sharing is a diminished sense of national identity 
and of identification with the state. The foundations of Lebanon’s state structure under the French 
mandate originated in the Ottoman millet system, which guaranteed sectarian groups the ability to 
govern their own communities. This form of communal power-sharing in Lebanon enabled the 
persistence of a strong sectarian political culture throughout the postcolonial period, including 
after the Syrians withdrew in 2005. This political context in turn constrained the possibility for 
electoral reform in 2005 and 2009 because the proposed reforms would threaten the interests of 
the sectarian elite. In Libya, the first constitutional process of 1951 enshrined regionalism as the 
basis for participation in the new nation state. While this model subsided under the monarchy and 
disappeared under Gadhafi, it made a comeback by default during the 2011 revolution and ensuing 
civil conflict. The gradual evolution of power-sharing in Libya following 2011 fragmented the 
Libyan public and political sphere even further down the lines of tribes and regional sub-groups 
                                                          
12 Grand coalition refers to the practice of power sharing as a form of jointly ruling a country that is deeply 
divided by major sub-national groups. Segmental autonomy that segments within society are given the 
power and right to make decisions that are delegated to them. See Lijphart, “Non-Majoritarian Democracy: 
A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Theories.”  
13 Proportionality is an institutional guarantee of the representation of previously defined segments in civil 
service appointments, and the allocation of public funds. The veto is a guarantee for minorities that they 
will not be outvoted by a majority when their vital interests are at stake. See ibid.  
14 Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” 518.  
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that constrained the ability of citizens to participate meaningfully in the constitutional process. A 
more inclusive and open constitutional process as proposed by the FDL, would have diminished 
the power of the emerging ethnic, military and religious elites. The dispersion of decision-making 
powers among pre-determined segments fragmented identity and citizenship in Lebanon and Libya 
during these transitions. In both countries, political participation of citizens and civil society 
remained contingent upon the willingness of separate segments (religious, sectarian, tribal or 
ethnic) to engage with their communities. Segmental autonomy therefore, inherent to the premise 
of power-sharing, inhibits any reform that would make the political order more inclusive and 
participatory and more open to civil society. This also meant that if and when sectarian or ethnic 
leaders chose to veto a process, power-sharing destabilised the political process and increased the 
potential for violent strife.15 This thesis verified that the lack of willingness to adopt political 
reforms by both the Lebanese and Libyan political systems is maintained by enshrining power-
sharing agreements. 
Secondly, in both countries the representation of predetermined groups posed a challenge 
to the new NGOs participation in reform processes. Power-sharing mechanisms that gave greater 
power to sectarian or ethno-Islamic groups rendered these civil society organisations largely 
ineffective.16 Advocacy and mobilisation attempts from outside of predetermined groups had a 
marginal impact on the outcomes of the constitutional process in Libya and on the elections in 
Lebanon. For example, in the 2009 elections in Lebanon, the opposing March 8 and March 14 
camps colluded in devising an electoral law that served their interests by dividing up voters and 
districts to favour their own sectarian lists. Although this came at the height of the CCER 
campaign, parliament paid lip-service support to their demands, but at the end of the day voted on 
a law that supported a sectarian majoritarian system.17 In Libya, at the height of the efforts of the 
FDL, and other groups, in advocating for an inclusive grassroots dialogue during the constitutional 
process, the GNC chose to back the representation of Islamists and federalists in the process.  
Thirdly, an explicit or implicit power-sharing formula exacerbated the lock-ins in the state 
system. Due to the confinement of participation to pre-selected groups, when political institutions 
evade reform during a revolutionary juncture it is likely that this situation will create reinforcement 
                                                          
15 See Roeder and Rothchild, Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars. 
16 For Lebanon see Clark and Salloukh, “Elite Strategies, Civil Society and Sectarian Identities.”  
17 See Khoury, “Lebanon’s Election Law: A Cup Half Full.” 
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mechanisms. In Lebanon, the 2009 revisions to the electoral law did not include key reforms that 
would make the elections more competitive and representative. As a result the elections displayed 
clear vote buying patterns that locked-in the role of high level zu’ama in the process of mobilising 
voters. Power-sharing creates long-term ripple effects, because power is in the hands of elites that 
are benefiting from a lack of reform. In Libya, the GNC’s decision to use elections rather than an 
appointment process for the constitutional committee de facto empowered regionalist groups at 
the expense of a more balanced representation of citizens’ views in the constitutional process. As 
a result, the constitutional timeline has been extended without a concrete end date in sight pending 
the ability of the High National Elections Commission to organise and manage the election of the 
drafting assembly.18  
After these revolutionary junctures mass protest movements were subsequently 
demobilised when power-sharing institutionalised representation and gave greater voice to only a 
few of these groups. Because power-sharing rests on the foundations of a grand coalition and 
guarantees veto powers to major ethno-religious communities, political leaders with a strong social 
base tend to emerge as the guarantor and protector of the ‘new’ political system. The role that these 
actors take upon themselves does not allow for the emergence of a civically oriented opposition or 
for civically based participation in the system. In both countries therefore, political leadership 
refocused around leaders, zu’ama, tribes or Islamists and this refocused political participation 
around these leaders. Both uprisings failed to lead to the creation of viable national political parties 
with reformist outlooks and which comprised of multiple sub-national identities. The only space 
explored here that was intra-ethnic and intra-sectarian was in the new civic organisations that were, 
however, ineffective in bringing about reform. Power-sharing encouraged a ‘return to the past’ 
rather than reform and renewal.  
Lastly, power-sharing transfers allegiances from the state to sub-national groups and as 
such diminishes from the state’s ability to direct the transition. Sub-state groups became more 
powerfully entrenched and their demands shaped the reform (or non-reform) process. In Libya the 
recognition of minorities evolved gradually during the transition, while Lebanon’s system gave 
power to sectarian groups consistently before and after the 2005 juncture. As such, although 
power-sharing can temporary mitigate conflict and civil war, its long-term effects create a state 
structure that buttresses the role of particular elites in power and is inherently resistant to reform. 
                                                          
18 Sawani and Pack, “Libyan Constitutionality and Sovereignty Post-Gadhafi.” 
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The difficulty is heightened when actors view power-sharing as a finality (as in the Lebanese case) 
rather than a transitional measure (as could be the case for Libya). It is possible to argue that 
Lebanon has long missed its opportunity to reform the political order, while Libya is still evolving 
into a power-sharing structure. A major contribution that this thesis makes is to show how power-
sharing weakens the potential for civil society actors to promote political reforms during a political 
transition. I have shown in the case studies of each country how adopting power-sharing guarantees 
that the citizens and political groups that ascribe to the pre-determined segments end up having a 
greater influence over reform. Because of the effects of critical junctures, this ‘right’ to a share of 
political power creates long-term implications that are difficult to reverse.  
 
The Ineffectiveness of Non-governmental Organisations  
 Civil society organisations formed the main case studies and sources of empirical evidence 
that supported my argument regarding the non-critical nature of the recent ‘revolutionary’ 
junctures in Lebanon and Libya. The notion of civil society was problematized in this thesis first 
by portraying it as an array of organisations, movements and groups that emerged as a widespread 
phenomenon after each uprising. The organisations studied here were examples of NGOs engaged 
in political activism and lobbying, and were chosen to help explain the constraints on political 
reform. Studying political activism by NGOs during the transitions also helped reveal how weak 
states pose a challenge to the mobilisation of citizens and their participation in the process of 
political reform during transition. I explained the uprisings using Capoccia and Kelemen’s 
definition of critical junctures as relatively short periods of time during which there was a 
substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices would affect the outcomes of interest.19 
NGO actors were one category of agents that were supposed to play a greater role during transitions 
than they could before the junctures. During the uprisings citizens and newly emerging NGOs 
were able to widely mobilize people against Syria in Lebanon and against Gadhafi in Libya. In 
both cases, the dynamics of mobilisation during the uprisings were quite spontaneous. However, 
demobilisation after the uprisings was challenging for NGOs in both countries. The organisations 
selected for these case studies were unable to create enough grassroots support for the reforms that 
they proposed. The experiences during the transitional periods questioned the ability of these 
NGOs to formulate demands that were non-adversarial, while they were able to mobilise citizens 
                                                          
19 Capoccia and Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures,” 348. 
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in opposition to the current situation, they struggled to cause impact in favour of a new form of 
governance. Ultimately, in Lebanon, the sectarian system and role of zu’ama was reinforced in the 
political process at the expense of the role of NGOs after 2005. Similarly, Libya’s constitutional 
process strengthened not new NGOs, but historically marginalised agents such as Islamists, tribes 
and federalists. The NGOs did, however, have the freedom to carry out their work across the 
entirety of both countries, engage with various segments of society, and openly formulate their 
demands as a result of the partial transformation of the political environment.  
Secondly, NGOs were slow to organise themselves and their demands in relation to the 
pace of the transitional period. LADE had been operational for almost a decade before the critical 
juncture, while FDL was in inception during the revolution. However, the long-term features of 
Lebanon’s political system – a specific notion of political leadership (zu’ama), of power-sharing 
agreements (co-existence), and of political institutions (nizam taifi) – overrode the transient 
potential of NGOs. The Lebanese transition after 2005 quickly brought back adaptable sectarian 
leaders, reinforced a culture of co-existence among the elite, and strengthened sectarian institutions 
that stifled the nascent groups that were engaging in political activism and lobbying. In Libya, by 
empowering and strengthening the ‘older’ types of sub-national groups (Islamists and ethnic 
minorities), the process gave a greater role to regionalism (jehawya). The literature on critical 
junctures generally stresses the importance of sequencing and timing in the analysis.20 By looking 
at the emergence of political institutions in Libya and the re-emergence of political institutions in 
Lebanon, we find that NGOs were often at fault in terms of the timeliness of their demands. It was 
as if by the time they launched their campaigns it was too late for the political order to change as 
the critical juncture had already passed.  
Thirdly, the NGO campaigns in both countries tried to distance themselves from traditional 
power structures of tribe, sect or ethnicity. While this autonomy provided the activists with a 
margin of freedom to engage with a wide range of audiences, it also distanced them from the daily 
concerns of citizens. This ‘neutrality’ was often ineffective in generating sufficient pressure for 
reform. FDL and LADE’s advocacy efforts failed to persuade politicians to adopt reforms. The 
partial criticality of the junctures created a window of opportunity for NGOs to register and operate 
in a way that could lead to their demands being formally recognised. But formal recognition was 
                                                          
20 See Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.”  
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not enough for a formal agreement from political institutions to adopt and implement reforms that 
would have made the juncture fully critical. In many ways, this failure was connected to the 
strategies of both LADE and FDL in keeping their autonomy from political leaders who were well 
known to people at the grassroots level. In addition, the ineffectiveness of these strategies was 
linked to their assumption that the centres of power and sources of decision-making and authority 
in Lebanon and Libya were official government bodies. In both cases, there were non-state political 
actors directly shaping the decisions of the parliament and the GNC. In Lebanon, a ‘national 
dialogue table’ was set up between 2007 and 2008 to take strategic decisions while the parliament 
was practically unable to function. However, NGOs directed their efforts either to formal 
governmental institutions or to grassroots activism. At this point, government institutions and 
grassroots were not the most important players in deciding on the new electoral law in Lebanon 
and in developing the process for Libya’s new constitution. Evidently, the activists failed to 
properly map and understand the power structures that underlay political reform in the two weak 
states. 
Lastly, both campaigns faced similar organisational challenges regarding the sustainability 
of their efforts. FDL could not sustain or increase its efforts at the time when the GNC was passing 
an electoral law and the political isolation law. FDL succeeded in engaging citizens in dialogue at 
the local level, but had no mechanism to translate its efforts into a concrete political outcome. It 
remains to be seen whether FDL will undertake efforts to influence the content of the new 
constitution once a drafting committee is in place. In Lebanon, LADE failed to link its reports on 
violations to the CCER movement.21 While LADE organised and trained over 3,000 observers to 
document violations to the electoral process, it had essentially stopped its CCER-related activities 
shortly after the passing of the new electoral law in Doha.  
The major contribution of this empirical study on the two NGOs was two-fold. In terms of 
the method, the case studies aided in the inductive exploration of each of the critical junctures by 
providing concrete empirical evidence that supported a broader conclusion about the transition in 
both countries. By showing how NGOs were ineffective in influencing reform, this thesis reveals 
patterns of citizen-state relations and civil society-state interactions that would otherwise go 
                                                          
21 LADE gave the argument that they needed to validate this data before making it available to the public 
and in the end only released the final elections report a year later. Gilbert Doumit, General Coordinator of 
2009 observation operation, interview with author, March 2014  
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unnoticed from a purely institutional perspective. The thesis challenges the normative approaches 
that claim NGOs routinely contribute to democratisation,22 or that suggest NGOs are incompatible 
with the political culture in the Arab World.23 The case studies in this thesis freed the notion of 
civil society from these binary arguments and revealed the importance of a particular pattern of 
path dependence in the broader political system.  In this sense, NGOs are not a sign of the absence 
or presence of democratisation trends, but a reflection of the types of demands and forms of 
demobilisation that exist in a particular country. NGOs are also an important avenue in the 
exploration of citizen-state relations, and more specifically, to what extent the state can or cannot 
address reform demands during transitions. The fact that both NGOs had demands for a more 
inclusive and representative political order and the fact that the state could not adopt such reforms 
is profoundly significant in explaining the transition and direction of the changes in both countries.   
Throughout this thesis, the approach of path dependence was used to explain the way in 
which political leaders in Lebanon, and political newcomers in Libya during the transition, 
reinforced similar institutional mechanisms to those in place pre-uprising. Here, the thesis also 
expanded the work of historical institutionalists, who see political actors as rationally-bound 
satisficers.24 I argued therefore that political actors who were anti-Syrian in Lebanon and anti-
Gadhafi in Libya did not act in a way to maximize national interest, but were bound by institutions 
and past practices. The weakness of the reform process is therefore both a symptom and a 
reinforcer of path dependence.  
A final remark should be made here on the three levels of analysis; namely power-sharing, 
weak states and ineffective civil society organisations. In addition to the implications of each of 
level on the reform process, this thesis also explains how they reinforce one another. I argued that 
power-sharing in itself weakens the state and marginalizes civil society. I also argued that a weak 
state structure facilitates the emergence of a power-sharing agreement, especially after a conflict. 
In itself an ineffective associational sector is both a symptom of weak states and power-sharing 
agreements, but is also an enabler of these two dimensions. A strong and influential, nationally 
active civil society could prompt a process of reconstruction of strong state institutions and could 
either be part of power-sharing agreements or maintain a strong oversight role regarding such 
                                                          
22 See Diamond and Morlino, “The Quality of Democracy: An Overview.”  
23 See Stepan and Robertson, “Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism.” 
24 See Magnusson and Offosson, Evolutionary Economics and Path Dependence, and Simon, Reason in 
Human Affairs. 
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agreements. The interaction of these three levels leads to a state that is incapable of acting as a 
mediator, promoting reform and executing even partial reform. An ineffective civil society gives 
a greater space to the role of predetermined sectarian groups within power-sharing agreements. 
The major difference between the two cases is that the Lebanese case is more an example of the 
resilience of a long-standing system, while Libya’s situation reveals emerging trends that are not 
yet fully formalised. It can even be argued that Libya is almost certain to have power-sharing 
agreements, and that the end of the transition process will create lock-ins for future reformers.  
 
7.3 Conclusion and Questions for the Future: Why Partially Critical Junctures  
I close this chapter with two main conclusions. The first is based on the theoretical 
framework that this thesis developed and the second concerns the implications of this study on 
future research in both academic and policy-orientated literature. The challenge for Lebanon and 
Libya is that once a political juncture is rendered only partially critical it sets both countries on a 
path dependent trajectory that makes reform unlikely. Failed reform attempts in both countries 
subsequently reinforced the recurrence of pre-existing political dynamics. As such, political 
alternatives that were plausible during the uprising appear almost impossible after the criticality 
of the juncture is lost. The partially critical juncture of Syria’s withdrawal made electoral reform 
a plausible option, particularly when government appointed the Botrous Commission to seriously 
study the required reforms and their implications. For reasons addressed in Chapter Four, that 
opportunity was lost. Hence, the elections of 2009 showed clear elements of continuity from the 
2005 elections as well as the elections held under Syrian tutelage. Similarly in Libya, the 2011 
revolution brought about a crucial transition phase when the formation of a new governance system 
for the country was plausible. The constitutional case study showed how Libya’s GNC has had to 
resort to various strategies to appease tribal leaders, Islamists, and militant groups in order to tempt 
them into the process and was unable to respond to the demands and priorities of activists.  
This thesis has argued that in the presence of a weak state, a power-sharing order and an 
ineffective civil society, ‘revolutionary’ junctures are not really critical to the political system. For 
junctures to be critical it is necessary to undergo deep changes from how the question of political 
reform was previously dealt with. These changes must be significant for state institutions, for the 
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political leadership and for civil society organisations. A critical juncture can create larger 
transformations, when the institutional and political constraints detailed here are undermined.25  
The diagram below summarizes the constraints on reform detailed in this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The approach developed in this thesis presents an innovative way of explaining why 
political reform was constrained; this was achieved through the study of partially critical junctures 
that could be said to reflect transitions in the region. Looking at junctures as partially critical is 
useful in three ways for understanding political change and continuity in the MENA region. Firstly, 
the partially critical junctures approach accounts for and identifies how a limited change may take 
place. It therefore overcomes the binary approach traditionally used when questioning whether or 
not political change has taken place. Secondly, explaining revolutions as partially critical junctures 
helps problematize the issues of change and continuity. While path dependence arguments often 
highlight continuity and constraints on change, they also lack detailed evidence to identify and 
explain limited change. Building on the school of historical institutionalism, this thesis coined the 
approach of partial criticality to understand and analyse such changes by looking at two cases of 
partial/failed reforms.  
                                                          
25 See how institutions define and affects decisions on reform in Zysman, How Institutions Create 
Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth.   
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 This approach also deepens our understanding of path dependence in Lebanon and Libya. 
According to Mahoney, power-centric explanations posit that “an institution can persist even when 
most individuals or groups prefer to change it, provided that an elite that benefits from the existing 
arrangement has sufficient strength to promote its reproduction.”26 Functional explanations state 
that once events lead to the selection of a particular institution path dependence can predict self-
reinforcing processes. The contribution that this thesis makes to these debates is an exploration of 
how the features of path dependency are reinforced and why new political types of civil society 
organisations are ineffective in reform.  
Future research on transitions in the region can be advanced in three ways in the light of 
the evidence provided here. Firstly, future research can detail how path dependence is articulated 
in other critical junctures. The features of path dependence identified in this thesis facilitate a 
comparative approach, as they can be applied to other contexts within the MENA region. Potential 
case studies include Morocco (which witnessed some form of constitutional reform in 2010), 
Yemen (which went through an uprising and also has strong tribal identities), and Tunisia (which 
has a vibrant civil society sector and also underwent a period of reform after 2011). Such cases 
could help expand the analysis to include the various features that enable or disable political reform 
after a critical or partially critical juncture. Secondly, additional research could investigate the 
factors that would enable institutions to escape the lock-in of path dependence. Showing how 
partially critical junctures were shaped by institutional constraints revealed how reforms pathways 
were challenged, but it also opened the door for questions about the possibility of avoiding such 
path dependent outcomes.  
Lastly, because the research for this thesis was empirically grounded, it can be used to 
inform policy prescriptions about transition and reform in Lebanon, Libya and the broader MENA 
region. The issue of supporting and promoting civil society must take past failed strategies by civil 
society into consideration. We continue to see efforts and resources poured into myriad ‘advocacy’ 
campaigns, but this thesis has shown how advocacy alone is insufficient to influence the political 
processes. More effort should be directed towards the supporting of new political leadership that 
does not have its power and popularity based on of tribe, sect or ethnicity. These efforts might 
challenge traditional power structures and create political competition based on policies and 
programs that make reform more plausible. Without competition it is inevitable that the traditional, 
                                                          
26 Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” 518. 
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armed, and most historically significant elites will continue to dominate political life. The thematic 
issues explored here can also be used to inform policymaking in connection to elections and 
constitutional processes. In Lebanon, it is likely that without reforms elections will be less and less 
important, as they are only an extension of sectarianism. In Libya, it is likely that if the 
constitutional process disregards the demands explored in this thesis, further violence, division 
and state deterioration will ensue. International support was crucial for regime change in these two 
countries, and also amplified the role and effect of demands made by the masses. The same 
international support can surely play a role in encouraging or discouraging reform in the next 
phase. 
By revealing the intricacies of path dependence, the approach in this thesis can also 
profoundly inform future research on transition, democratisation, and civil society in the MENA 
region. The intricacies that inductive research helps identify would create new questions, based on 
observed events and comparisons. The hypotheses generated primarily from participant 
observation, and tested here through empirical tools, should be a vital starting point for both policy 
and academia to engage further with the persistence of old patterns that continue to characterize 
politics in the MENA region before and after revolutionary junctures. 
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Annex -2- List of Interviewees (in alphabetical order)  
 
Libya Case Study interviews  
 
1. Abdel Kaber Al Fakhakhry, Hanan, The Commission to Support Women in Decision 
Making, Tripoli, 21 June 2013. 
2. Abu Sedra, Lamia, member of the Humanitarian Relief Coordination platform in Benghazi 
and later Director of the Centre for Civil Society, Tripoli, 11 February 2012.  
3. Al Hayyali, Hicham, independent student activist, Tripoli, 24 June 2013. 
4. Al Irfi, Hana’, Head of the Women’s Caucuses/Committee at the GNC, Tripoli, 20 June 
2013. 
5. Al Lafi, Abulozoum, Director of Fezzan Coalition/Gathering, Tripoli, 12 June 2013. 
6. Alhuwarre, Nasser, Libyan Observatory for Human Rights, Tripoli, 13 February 2012. 
7. Barkawi, Fariha,  Darna Member of General National Congress, Tripoli, 22 June 2013. 
8. Ben Halim, Amr, Chairman of the Board of the Forum for Democratic Libya, Tripoli 14 
January 2013. 
9. Bouchoucha, Haneen, television presenter and communications coordinator for the Forum 
for Democratic Libya, Tripoli, 19 January 2012.  
10. Duncan, Pickard, constitutional specialist working from Libya with Democracy Reporting 
International, interview via skype, 2 December 2012.  
11. El Qebaili, Ahmed, Ministry of Social Affairs representative, Tripoli 13 February 2012. 
12. ElTayeb, Aya, H20 campaign for the constitution, interview via Skype, 4 December 2012.  
13. Kaddora, Abdel-Kader, Libyan constitutional expert, Tripoli, 23 January 2013. 
14. Lawgaly, Atiya, Minister of Culture and Civil Society, Beirut, 24 January 2012.  
15. Mohammad, Hana’, Independent activist (Teacher from Merzok), Tripoli, 21 June 2013. 
16. Najem, Faraj, Board Member of the Forum for Democratic Libya and Director of the Africa 
Research Centre in Tripoli, interview with author, Tripoli 7 February 2012. 
17. Sagizly, Mustafa, Head of the Warriors Affairs Commission, Tripoli, 21 July 2012.  
18. Styp-Rekowski, Adam, Head of Assistance to Building a Constitution UNDP program, 
Tripoli, 10 February 2012. 
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19. Zaroug, Mohammad, project coordinator for Nebbi f Dostoory, Forum for Democratic 
Libya, Tripoli, 21 June 2013. 
20. Zoubair, Mohammad, Chairman of the Board for the Centre for Civil Society, Tripoli, 19 
August 2012. 
 
Confidential Interviews in Libya  
1. Constitutional expert with United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Tripoli 
18 August 2013. 
2. Libyan Transparency Association representative, Tripoli, 14 February 2012.  
3. Libyan former member of Female Scouts Association, Tripoli, 13 February 2012. 
4. General National Congress Member with Muslim Brotherhood, former political prisoner 
of 15 years, Tripoli, 15 January 2013. 
5. Mother of assassinated prisoner in 1996, Member of Committee for the Search of Truth, 
Tripoli, 10 February 2012. 
6. Rebel fighter in Misurata Katiba (battalion), Misurata, 9 February 2012. 
7. Young woman who left Misurata during conflict, Misurata 9 February 2012. 
8. Libyan diaspora member and university professor, London, 18 May 2011.  
9. General National Congress Member, Tripoli, 17 June 2013.   
10. Misurata Chamber of Commerce representative, Misurata, 6 February 2012. 
 
 
Lebanon Case Study Interviews 
 
1. Abdalla, Samer, Nahwa el Muwatiniya program coordinator, Beirut 10 November 2011. 
2. Abdel Samad, Omar, LADE Board Member, Beirut, 12 March 2013. 
3. Abi Azar, Omar, founder of the movement to bring down the sectarian system in 2011 
(Iskat Al Nizam Al Taifi), Beirut, 10 March 2012. 
4. Abou Dayya, Marwa, General Coordinator at Nahwa el Muwatiniya, Beirut, 15 March 
2011.  
5. Antoun, Randa, professor and author of The National Strategy to Combat Corruption, 
Beirut, 15 November 2012. 
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6. Assad, Rony, coordinator of the Civil Campaign for Electoral Reform, Beirut, 5 August 
2013.  
7. Ayoubi, Belal, founder of collective of NGOs in Tripoli North of Lebanon, Beirut, 3 March 
2013. 
8. Chambers, Richard, Chief of Party of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 
Beirut, 5 May 2013. 
9. Doumit, Gilbert, founder of Nahwa el Muwatiniya in 2004 and General Coordinator of 
2009 electoral observation mission with LADE, interview with author, Beirut, February 
2012.  
10. Ekmekji, Arda, Member of Supervisory Commission for Electoral Campaigns, Beirut, 10 
March 2011. 
11. Franjieh, Sahar, Nahwa el Muwatiniya Board Member, Beirut 15 December 2011.  
12. Hassan, Nabil, outreach coordinator for CCER, Beirut ,7 April 2013. 
13. Maalouf, Joseph, Member of Parliament from 2009 – present, Beirut, 10 February 2014 
14. Matta, Aline, American Bar Association advisor on National Network for Access to 
Information, Beirut, 8 November 2011.  
15. Menhall, Natalia, 2009 elections observer, Beirut, 7 April 2013.  
16. Nassar, Yara, LADE founder and executive director, 5 October Beirut 2011. 
17. Salem, Paul, LADE Chairman of the Board in 1996 and spokesperson, 7 November Beirut, 
2010. 
 
Confidential Interviews in Lebanon 
1. Electoral campaign team member of candidate in South of Lebanon district elections of 
2009, Beirut, 3 February 2012. 
2. Electoral monitoring campaign representative in office West Bekaa, Beirut, 8 April 2013. 
3. Electoral monitoring campaign representative in the Metn district, Beirut, 7 April 2012. 
4. Electoral monitoring campaign representative in the North district, Beirut, 5 April 2012.  
5. Electoral monitoring office coordinator in Akkar, Beirut, 10 April 2013. 
6. Leading Lebanese journalist covering LADE observation mission, Beirut, 10 April 2012. 
7. Representatives of youth factions of the following political parties: Syrian Socialist 
National Party, Lebanese Forces, Future Movement, Free Patriotic Movement, Tashnag 
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Party, Amal Movement, Al Marada, Hezbollah, Lebanese Democratic Party, Kataeb Party, 
National Liberal Party, Democratic Left, and Democratic Renewal, Beirut April and May 
2013.   
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Annex -3- Libya Survey Questions  
Translated from and administered in Arabic 
 
This aim of this survey is to collect data on citizen activism and constitution development in Libya. 
Results will be used in the PhD Thesis of Carmen Geha at the University of St. Andrews in 
Scotland. Participation in this survey is voluntary. 
 
Demographic and socio-economic information: 
I. Sex: 
□ Male 
□ Female 
 
II. Age: 
□ Under 17 □ 18 to 25  □ 26 to 35 □ 36 to 55 □ 56 and above  
 
III. Region: 
□ Southern Region, please specify the city: _________________________ 
□ Western Region, please specify the city: __________________________ 
□ Eastern Region, please specify the city: ___________________________ 
 
IV. Education level: 
□ Illiterate 
□ Primary education 
□ Complementary education 
□ Secondary education 
□ Undergraduate 
□ Graduate 
□ Post graduate 
□ Vocational training 
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V. Occupation:  
□ Unemployed 
□ Part-time worker 
□ Full-time worker 
□ Student 
□ Daily worker 
□ Other, please specify:  
 
I. The first thing that comes to your mind when you hear the term “civil society” is: 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
II. How do you perceive the contribution of Libyan civil society today? 
□ Not effective □ Somehow effective □ Highly effective 
 
III. Do you think the Libyan citizen can play a role in state building in Libya today? 
□ Yes □ No  □ I don’t know 
  
IV. How are you personally participating in the political process in Libya? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
V. Why is it important for citizens to participate in the political process?  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
VI. How can Libyan non-governmental organisations have a bigger role in the political 
process? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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VII. What are priorities that civil society should work on in Libya?  
□ Education 
□ Military 
□ Business 
□ Raising Awareness 
□ Justice 
□ Elections 
□ Natural resources 
□ Immigration 
□ Constitution 
□ Accountability 
□ Media 
□ Dialogue 
□ Other, please specify:  
 
VIII. To what extent are Libyan decision-makers open to feedback from citizens? 
□ Very low □ Low □ Medium □ High □ Very High 
 
IX. How do citizens give feedback to politicians? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
X. Do you think the government should have role in regulating the work of non-governmental 
organisation? 
□ Yes □ No  □ I don’t know 
 
XI. If your answer to the previous question was yes, how do you think this can be? 
□ Providing funds 
□ Licensing  
□ Security protection 
□ Other, please specify: ______________________________________________ 
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XII. What are the challenges facing citizen activism in Libya? 
□ Lack of funds 
□ Lack of coordination between different organisations 
□ Security situation 
□ Lack of wide spread national efforts 
□ Other, please specify: ______________________________________________ 
 
XIII. How would you measure the level of influence you have over political life?  
□ No influence □ Medium influence □ High influence 
 
XIV. Why do you assess this level of influence?  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
XV. In your opinion, do you think the Libyans have the opportunity to participate in political 
life? 
□ Yes □ No  □ I don’t know 
 
XVI. If your answer to your previous question was yes, please explain how? 
□ Running for the local elections 
□ Running for the upcoming parliamentary elections 
□ Demonstrations 
□ Civil society activism  
□ Other, please specify: ___________________________________________________ 
 
XVII. In your opinion, what is the main role of the constitution? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
XVIII. What are the top 5 priorities in order of importance that you wish to see addressed in the 
constitution?  
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□ Women’s rights 
□ Model of Governance 
□ Religion 
□ Shari’a law  
□ Foreign Affairs 
□ Citizenship 
□ Natural resources 
□ Security 
□ Rotation over Power 
□ Political Participation  
□ Economy 
□ Taxation 
□ Justice and Reconciliation 
□ Language 
□ Other, please specify 
 
 
XIX. Do you think the average Libyan has a role in the shaping the new constitution? 
 □ Yes □ No  □ I don’t know 
 
XX. If your answer to the previous question was yes, what are possible ways for you to 
participate in this process? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
XXI. Why is it important for you to participate in a dialogue around the constitution? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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XXII. Why is it important for your particular region/town to participate in the constitution? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
University of St. Andrews – School  of International Relations 
Research Participant Consent Form 
 
I fully consent to participating in Carmen Geha’s research. I understand the purpose of this 
research is to contribute to Carmen’s PhD thesis explore the role and dynamics of civil 
society in power-sharing systems, with select case studies from Lebanon and Libya. 
Carmen’s thesis is tentatively entitled “Civil Society’s Opportunities and Limitations: 
political and theoretical transitions” and focuses on the work of civil society organisations 
in both Lebanon and Libya between 2005 and 2012.  
This survey is one of main tools for data collection. All research participants will have 
access to information collected. Confidentiality will be respected and no information that 
discloses the identity of the participant will be released or published without consent. 
Unless approval is given, interview respondents shall remain anonymous.  
I wish for my name to appear when this research is published:  
YES  NO  
 
   Name: __________________________ Organisation: _______________________ 
    
   Email: __________________________ Phone Number: _____________________ 
 
  Signature: ________________________ Date: _____________________________ 
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Annex -4- Lebanon Electoral Observation Methodology  
 
Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections 2009 monitoring operation:  
I. Pre-elections monitoring methodology  
 
 
 
Indicators for Election Observation 09 
LADE developed 267 indicators for the pre-election period based on the electoral law No. 25/2008, 
a review of international monitoring criteria; and decrees issued by the Ministry of Interior and 
Municipalities, that were as follows:  
 Election Administration (Ministry of Interior, Supervisory Commission for Electoral 
Campaigns (SCEC), voter registration committees, municipalities, security bodies, and 
judicial authorities): 181 indicators 
 Electoral campaigns of candidates, lists, and political parties: 41 indicators 
 Media Performance: 27 indicators 
 Voters Behavior: 18 indicators  
 
Monitoring Mechanisms: Documentation Tools, Validation, and Weekly Reports  
The monitoring process and techniques is based on documentation, validation, and continuous and 
periodic methodical reporting. Therefore, three types of tools were developed: documentation 
tools, validation tools, and reporting tools.  
 Documentation tools included:  
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 Documentation of Electoral Activities: All electoral activities including: campaigning, 
media, advertising, and electoral expenditure during festivals and events.  
 Documentation of Violations: 30 district offices collected the violations.   
 Monitoring Voter Performance: Types of enquiries made by citizens in relation to the 
electoral process, types of violations recorded, and extent of citizen compliance with the 
law were documented.  
 Documentation of E-Day Violations: During the E-Day, violations are recorded using E-
Day violation forms reflected in codes used by the SMS system.  
 
2. Validation tools:  
 Witnesses Evidence: After the documentation of any violation, it is analysed by 
LADE’s team before signatures of witnesses are collected.  
 Audio, Visual, or Written Evidence  
 
Types of Violations  
The following presents a sample of the types of violations that could be observed at local level and 
could be documented and audited:  
 
Media and Electoral Advertising:  
 Electoral advertising and campaigning in unauthorised media  
 Campaigning outside the places authorised by the municipality and/or local authorities 
 Airing or publishing any provocative campaigning material or incitement discourse 
instigates violence or sectarian sedition.  
 Employing one candidate’s advertising space for the interest of another candidate or 
political party 
 
Pressure on Voters:  
 Interference of public officials and civil servants or security institutions, mayors, or 
governors in favour of a certain candidate or political entity.  
 Physical threats, or threats to economic, social, or moral interests of voters 
 223 
 
 Promises to perform services to voters in return for voting for a certain candidate or a 
political entity 
 Seizure of IDs in return for voting for a certain candidate or a political entity.  
  
Campaign Spending:  
 Payment of any expenditure or service provision that exceeds the ceiling of electoral 
expenditure to any local entity, particularly if it were never paid over the past three years 
 Payment of any expenditure for electoral campaigning that exceeds the electoral ceiling: 
festival, advertising, offices… 
 Receiving funding or grants from non-Lebanese sources.  
 
Use of Public Utilities for Electoral Purposes:  
 Electoral activities in a public institution, school, municipality, place of worship… 
 Provision of any services or resources for electoral interests  
 
Other Violations:  
 Payment of direct bribes to voters or through mediators  
 Defamation of candidate  
 Breach of campaign silence period from 12:00 AM on Friday, June 6th to 07:00 PM on 
Sunday, June 7th.  
 Disrespect of candidacy period or withdrawal of candidacy  
 
II. LADE Election Day Monitoring Reporting Strategy  
 
LADE developed a deployment strategy for observers and rapid reporting system that provides the 
best range of information about the election.  
LADE deployed 3,500 observers covering all electoral districts as such: 
1. Mobile teams: Mobile teams of 2,000 observers will be assigned to an area and will roam 
between polling centres in that area. They captured information from the polling stations 
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that they visit. These mobile teams will be distributed proportionally around the country 
by the number of polling stations.  
2. National Sample: LADE drew a national random sample of polling stations. A sample of 
500 stable observers covered the selected polling stations.  
3. Targeted Districts: 1,000 observers will be deployed to polling stations in areas that LADE 
expected to be the most contentious.  
 
LADE issued reports on three types of information on Election Day:  
1. Critical incidents: LADE reported incidents that would cause a serious questioning of the 
results of the polling station. All critical incidents were logged in on a form and appeared 
on LADE website.   
2. Qualitative information about the character of voting at polling stations. This included 
indications of irregularities and other information of interest to the process of the elections. 
3. Polling station results: LADE observed and reported on the counting of ballots.  
 
LADE’s communications system was designed to collect and process the most relevant 
information as quickly as possible through Election Day. SMS messaging offered the quickest and 
most efficient means of collecting information. In addition LADE set-up a call centre with a hotline 
to receive calls from its observers and citizens at large.  
Monitoring criteria on Election Day included: 
 Implementation of electoral system reforms 
 Assessment of the election against international standards 
 Election administration: Ministry of Interior and SCEC 
 Parties and candidates campaign 
 Media coverage 
 Voting, counting and tabulation of results 
 Complaints and appeals 
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Annex -5- Note on Transliteration  
 
 
Transliteration in this thesis follows the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES) style 
guide. Words that are included in the IJMES word list have been spelled as they appear on the list 
without italicisation or diacritical marks. Words referring to prominent places and names of 
prominent figures were not treated as a technical term but were written in accordance with the 
common English spelling of the word (such as zu’ama or ulama or shari’a).  
 
Additional names of places and people are spelled as they are pronounced in colloquial Arabic in 
within the contexts of Lebanon and Libya. 
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